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第一次鸦片战争后德国对厦门的影响 1842-1917

**German Involvement in Xiamen After the  
First Opium War 1842-1917**

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## 摘要

英美于第一次鸦片战争后在厦门的历史已有详细而广泛的研究和记载，然而，德国的影响却几乎被忽略。本篇论文将通过对德国在“不平等条约”时期对厦门影响的研究来填补这一空白。本文认为，第一次鸦片战争后，德国对厦门的影响在中德于1861年签订的第一份条约之前已经开始，于第一次世界大战前结束。不过当地影响是次要的，德国的利益中心在于航运业。尽管德国人在中国的沿海贸易和船只租赁并不少见，但与厦门有业务往来的不多。由于在厦门的德国人少于50人，当地的德国建筑屈指可数，其中包括两座领事建筑、一个旅馆、少数的贸易公司和几个私人场所。除了厦门的第一所公共图书馆由德国人所建外，当时的社会福利几乎没有德国人的贡献。当时的崇真会本来有一个绝好的机会，可以派遣一名传教士作为德语老师，可是他们错过了这个机会，而是将精力集中于香港。关于商业贸易，德国的贸易公司主要致力于沿岸贸易和苦力运输，当时直接苦力移民到哑鲁（现苏门答腊）就是他们所发起的。德国和厦门的直接贸易只是很小规模的，几乎都是通过香港。出人意料的，从厦门走私到新加坡的吗啡和可卡因的主要供应者居然是德国。然而，克虏伯大炮工厂在当时的贸易和胡里山炮台的装备中起着关键作用。厦门曾是德国人最喜欢的东亚港口，甚至几乎成为德国军舰使用的又一租界地。德国东亚分舰队不但定期到达厦门，而且解决过一个贸易冲突、帮助应对日本对鼓浪屿的潜在入侵等。遗憾的是，鼓浪屿的著名景点风动石同样毁于德国军舰队员之手。对德国人来说在厦门最重要的是其航运业，德国的航运公司大部分经营船舶租赁业务，而非在厦门和其他贸易港口间固定航线航行。德国的船比其他国家的船小，且在很长一段时间主要包括帆船，正因如此，当港口开放后，他们的主导业务是沿岸贸易，但是，他们对厦门的影响也随之不断减少。直到1900年，大多数依赖于帆船和小轮船的中小规模航运公司被定期的班轮公司所取代，特别是被大阪商船株式会社的传取代。德国较大的船舶公司北德意志-劳埃德公司和汉堡-美洲行包航运股份公司就是这时候进入厦门航运业务，他们几乎完全从事于去新加坡的苦力贸易，在一战前并没有取得牢固的立足点。当一战开始时，德国船运只有昔日规模很小的一部分，在厦门的德国人也减少了，仅剩下一个贸易公司，是否将德国领事馆搬回福州的讨论一直被搬上议程。至此，德国对厦门的影响于一战前几乎不复存在。

**关键词：** 厦门；鼓浪屿；通商口岸；德国船运；中德历史。



## Abstract

While American and British life in Xiamen after the First Opium War has been well researched and documented, German influence has widely been ignored. This thesis fills this gap by investigating German spheres of influence in Xiamen during the era of the “Unequal Treaties”. It argues that the German involvement after the First Opium War started before the first treaty between China and Germany in 1861 and also ended before the First World War. While local involvement was minor, German interests centered around shipping. Although the high importance of coast trade and chartering for Germans in China was not unusual, Xiamen could not serve other German interests. With less than 50 Germans in Xiamen the local German establishments were few and comprised two consulate buildings, a hotel, a handful of trading houses, and several private properties. There were almost no German contributions to social welfare, except the first public library in Xiamen which was established by a German. The Basel Mission would have had a golden opportunity to send a missionary as a German teacher, but missed out on the chance and instead concentrated its efforts on Hongkong. Regarding commerce, German trading houses mainly engaged in the coast trade and coolie transport, and even a direct coolie emigration to Deli was initiated by them. Trade between Germany and China only had a small scale, and went indirectly over Hongkong. Surprisingly, Germany was the main supplier of morphine and cocaine which was smuggled from Xiamen to Singapore. Also the Krupp cannon factory played a role in trading and was used to equip Fort Hulishan. Xiamen was Germany’s favorite port in East Asia and stood once on the edge of becoming a concession for German warships. The German East Asia Squad not only regularly anchored in Xiamen but also silenced a trading conflict and helped to counter a potential Japanese invasion of Gulangyu. Regrettably, it was also the crew of a German warship that destroyed the “Rocking Stone”, a sight on Gulangyu. Most important for the Germans was the shipping business in Xiamen. German shipping companies mostly operated as charter companies and not as regular lines, in Xiamen as well as in the other treaty ports. The ships were smaller than of the other nations and primarily consisted of sailing ships for a long time. With them, the Germans dominated coast trade when the port was opened. However, their influence continuously diminished in Xiamen. Until 1900, the numerous small and middle-sized shipping companies which relied on sailing vessels and small steamers were displaced by the regular shipping lines, particularly by the ships of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha. The big German shipping companies North German Lloyd and the Hamburg America line entered the shipping business in Xiamen around this time. They engaged almost exclusively in the coolie trade to Singapore and could not gain a strong foothold before the First World War. When the First World War started, German shipping only had a small fraction of its former scale, the German population had declined, only one trading house was left, and discussions were active whether to relocate the German consulate back to Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian. German influence in Xiamen thus had become almost non existent before the First World War.

**Keywords:** Xiamen; Gulangyu; Treaty Port History; German Shipping; Sino-German history.

第一章	绪论	1
第二章	论文论据与资料来源	4
第三章	德国在不平等条约中的影响	8
第四章	厦门租界时期	12
第五章	德国官方机构与厦门的联系	15
5.1	德国领事管	15
5.2	德国邮政邮轮	19
5.3	德国东亚分舰队	21
5.4	厦门险沦为德国军事租界	25
5.5	结论	29
第六章	德国在厦门的人口、设施和影响	30
6.1	当地人口	31
6.2	当地场所与设施	33
6.3	当地教育与传教士	40
6.4	工部局	42
6.5	领事馆法庭	43
6.6	新厦门旅馆	43
6.7	大清邮政和德国邮政	45
6.8	德国世界政治在厦门的体现	46
6.9	风动石和SMS Leipzig	47
6.10	结论	50
第七章	贸易和商业	51
7.1	当地的德国银行	51
7.2	当地的德国货币	53
7.3	当地的德国公司	53
7.4	厦门到德国的出口贸易	59
7.5	厦门从德国的进口贸易	60
7.6	克虏伯大炮和胡里山炮台	64
7.7	德国商人与鸦片的探讨	65
7.8	苦力航运	67
7.9	结论	70
第八章	德国航运公司	72
8.1	来自汉堡的德国轮船航运公司及其金星航线	73
8.2	捷成汉轮船公司 1886-1900	73
8.3	“地球”轮船公司 1886-1893	75
8.4	汕头轮船公司 1886-1893	75
8.5	Sartori & Berger 1886-1889	76
8.6	M. Struve 1888-1898	76
8.7	1869弗伦斯堡轮船公司 1890-1900	77
8.8	亚洲海岸公司 1890-1900	78
8.9	瑞克麦斯轮船公司1896-1900	78

8.10	中国海岸线公司 1896-1900 . . . . .	79
8.11	R. Wahl和W. Wahl 1897-1900 . . . . .	80
8.12	R. M. Flomann 1899-1900 . . . . .	80
8.13	汉堡—美洲行包航运股份公司 1899-1900 . . . . .	81
8.14	北德意志-劳埃德 1899 . . . . .	83
8.15	当地船运公司 . . . . .	85
8.16	其他船运公司 . . . . .	88
8.17	结论 . . . . .	92
<b>第九章</b>	<b>德国在厦门的船运交通</b>	<b>96</b>
9.1	综述 . . . . .	96
9.2	船运发展的影响因素 . . . . .	100
9.3	船运的发展 . . . . .	108
9.4	结论 . . . . .	113
<b>第十章</b>	<b>结论</b>	<b>115</b>
<b>附录A</b>	<b>时间轴</b>	<b>129</b>
<b>附录B</b>	<b>地理词汇表</b>	<b>131</b>
<b>附录C</b>	<b>谢辞</b>	<b>136</b>

# Contents

<b>Chapter One</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter Two</b>	<b>Sources and Materials</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Chapter Three</b>	<b>Germany in the Treaty War</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Chapter Four</b>	<b>Concession Time in Xiamen</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Chapter Five</b>	<b>German Official Presence and Xiamen</b>	<b>15</b>
5.1	Germany's Consulate in Xiamen . . . . .	15
5.2	Imperial Post Steamer . . . . .	19
5.3	East Asia Squadron . . . . .	21
5.4	Xiamen's Potential as a German Concession . . . . .	25
5.5	Conclusion . . . . .	29
<b>Chapter Six</b>	<b>Local Population, Establishments, and Influence</b>	<b>30</b>
6.1	Local Population . . . . .	31
6.2	Local German Properties and Establishments . . . . .	33
6.3	Education and Missionaries . . . . .	40
6.4	Municipal Council . . . . .	42
6.5	Consulate Court . . . . .	43
6.6	The New Amoy Hotel . . . . .	43
6.7	Imperial Chinese and German Post Offices . . . . .	45
6.8	German's World Policy in Xiamen . . . . .	46
6.9	The Rocking Stone and the <i>SMS Leipzig</i> . . . . .	47
6.10	Conclusion . . . . .	48
<b>Chapter Seven</b>	<b>Trade and Commerce</b>	<b>51</b>
7.1	Local German Banks . . . . .	51
7.2	Local German Currency . . . . .	53
7.3	Local German Firms . . . . .	53
7.4	Export Products to Germany . . . . .	60
7.5	Import Products from Germany . . . . .	61
7.6	Krupp cannons and Fort Hulishan . . . . .	65
7.7	German Merchants and the Opium Question . . . . .	66
7.8	Coolie Shipping . . . . .	68
7.9	Conclusion . . . . .	71
<b>Chapter Eight</b>	<b>German Shipping Companies</b>	<b>73</b>
8.1	The German Steamer Shipping Company of Hamburg and the Kingsin line	74
8.2	M. Jebsen 1886-1900 . . . . .	74
8.3	Steamship Company "Globus" 1886-1893 . . . . .	76
8.4	The Steamboat Company Shantou 1886-1893 . . . . .	76
8.5	Sartori & Berger 1886-1889 . . . . .	77
8.6	M. Struve 1888-1898 . . . . .	77
8.7	Flensburger Steam Company of 1869 1890-1900 . . . . .	78

8.8	Asiatic Coast Company 1890-1900 . . . . .	79
8.9	Rickmers Shipping Company 1896-1900 . . . . .	79
8.10	The Chinese Coastline Company 1896-1900 . . . . .	80
8.11	R. Wahl and W. Wahl 1897-1900 . . . . .	81
8.12	R. M. Flomann 1899-1900 . . . . .	81
8.13	HAPAG 1899-1900 . . . . .	82
8.14	North German Lloyd (NDL) 1899 . . . . .	84
8.15	Local Shipping Companies . . . . .	86
8.16	Other Shipping Companies . . . . .	89
8.17	Conclusion . . . . .	93
<b>Chapter Nine</b>	<b>German Shipping Traffic in Xiamen</b>	<b>97</b>
9.1	Overview . . . . .	97
9.2	Factors in the Development of Shipping . . . . .	101
9.3	Development of Shipping . . . . .	109
9.4	Conclusion . . . . .	114
<b>Chapter Ten</b>	<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>116</b>
<b>A</b>	<b>Timeline</b>	<b>131</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>Geographical Glossary</b>	<b>133</b>
<b>C</b>	<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>138</b>

## Chapter One Introduction

When the British started the Opium Wars and invaded China, other nations such as Germany soon followed to claim spheres of influence on Chinese land. German involvement in the smaller treaty ports such as Xiamen has widely been ignored by scholars. This thesis targets to fill the gap by investigating German involvement in Xiamen in terms of local life, trade, shipping, and concessions. The time period investigated reaches from the British invasion of Xiamen during the First Opium War in 1842 up to the end of the First World War in 1919.

The goal of the thesis is to lay a foundation for the German involvement in Xiamen, for which little is known up-to-date. The thesis thus investigates the extent of German involvement in one of the commercially less important treaty ports. With the application of Gulangyu as a UNESCO World Heritage Site two years ago on the 29. January 2013<sup>1</sup> answering this question became even more important for the recognition of Gulangyu itself. The thesis tries to fill gaps by showing which German establishments were located in Xiamen, how big the population was, and how the Germans interacted with the Chinese and other nations. But the thesis is not only important from a local perspective: It helps to answer questions for Germany such as whether the nation was involved in the drug trade, the extent of German coolie transport, how the shipping companies were handling the coast trade in China, and how German nationals shaped the treaty port landscape.

The thesis was written following a historical methodology and both bases on a quantitative and qualitative approach to explain the German influence in Xiamen. A quantitative approach is used in the discussion of shipping, trade, and the demographic development of the German population in Xiamen. The data facilitated by the quantitative approach stems from the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs entries that provide shipping, trade, and demographic data, and from shipping lists by the German consul in Xiamen. Results were primarily obtained by aggregating or summarizing data, e.g., by investigating the maximum of the German population or the trend of German shipping development over time. The qualitative approach mainly relies on German and English primary and secondary sources as explained in the next chapter, and on the results of the quantitative analysis to assess the German influence in Xiamen.

The thesis investigates the involvement from a standpoint of the actual influence of Xiamen. Thus, the thesis avoids to mention German domestic policies and decision makings, provided that events and development can be explained without them.

The thesis argues that German involvement in Xiamen after the First Opium War already started before the first treaty between Germany and China, which was the Treaty of Tientsin signed in 1861. It shows that the main involvement was related to the shipping business, while local influence was minor. When thus shipping declined in 1900, the German involvement almost diminished. When the First World War broke out in 1914, no more German ships arrived in Xiamen which signified the end of German influence.

The German population in Xiamen was small and never exceeded 50 persons. Besides their professional occupation, Germans often acted in administrative positions

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<sup>1</sup>National Commission of the People's Republic of China for UNESCO, "Kulangsu" (2013), <<http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5807/>>.

such as consuls, as observers in the consulate court, or in the Municipal Council. Likewise, establishments were few and Germany did not have schools, missionaries, or hospitals in Xiamen. Instead, two buildings associated with the German consul were located in Xiamen, the *New Amoy Hotel* was lead by a German, and also several private properties and trading houses associated with Germans existed. A German founded the first public library in Xiamen. The small local involvement is not surprising, since Germany's ambitions in China started late and then immediately centered around the Shandong area. Before 1897 when Germany seized Qingdao, Xiamen as Germany's favorite port in East Asia stood twice on the verge of becoming a German concession. Also, Germany twice used gunboat policy in Xiamen, to silence a trade conflict and to help to prevent a potential Japanese invasion in 1900.<sup>2</sup> Apart from that, coexistence on the island was mostly peaceful.

All the interests in Xiamen centered around shipping. The professional consulate was initiated to facilitate commercial shipping and for the German warships. The local trading firms mainly operated in the coast trade since import and export trade between China and Germany were minor. The exact trade volume cannot be assessed, since the trade went indirectly over Hongkong. German import products primarily comprised "sundries". Surprisingly, important import goods also included morphine and cocaine, which were then smuggled from Xiamen to Singapore. Relevant were also the Krupp cannons used to equip Fort Hulishan which have been preserved until today. German merchants and shipping companies also participated in the coolie trade and, e.g., initiated a direct coolie emigration to Deli.

Both small and big shipping companies likewise participated in the coast trade and coolie transport, mostly as charter transports and not as regular lines, as has been noted by other scholars. The thesis investigates the development of shipping more closely and present factors that influenced shipping in Xiamen. Until 1900, German sailing ships and steamers were smaller than ships of other nations, and Germany relied the longest on sailing vessels. Shipping continuously decreased due to regular shipping lines. The business almost vanished when the state subsidized Osaka Shosen Kaisha steamers frequented the harbor. After 1900 only big shipping lines continued to operate in Xiamen but could only make little profit with the coolie transport to Singapore. Before the First World War, German shipping in Xiamen was almost dead.

The thesis refers to Chinese locations via the standardized *Pinyin* system but without using tone marks. The city of Xiamen or Amoy is thus spelled Xiamen since the Pinyin of the city is spelled Xiàmén, removing the tone marks leaving Xiamen. Notable exceptions are cities that have an established English name which is still used today such as Hongkong, Port Arthur, or Tamsui. For consistency, also the place names in direct quotations were normalized using this convention.

Geographical names often appear in different spellings depending on the source. The appendix thus contains a glossary of all Chinese place names referring to a city, province, or region. Besides the Pinyin spelling without tone marks and the Chinese spelling, it also contains alternative English and German names. The glossary was additionally supplemented with names from Wikipedia, so that the glossary is more complete and can serve for further research.

Chinese and German terms were translated into English, even if an established trans-

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<sup>2</sup>The potential Japanese invasion in 1900 is in the further referred to as "Japanese Scare". The term had been coined by Pitcher in "In and About Amoy" (Pitcher 262).

lation did not exist before. Where a clear conclusion from the English name cannot be made, the Chinese or German version is given in brackets following the English term.

The thesis bases mostly on German and English sources. An overview of the most important sources is given in Chapter Two to ease further research, especially for non-German speaking scholars, since the chapter presents the translated title and short summaries.

The time investigated in this thesis starts with the *Unequal Treaties* (不平等条约) which the imperial nations forced through their gunboat policy. While the general significance and history of the treaties has already been researched thoroughly, Chapter Three presents the treaty war with a focus on the German participation.

Chapter Four then investigates the concession time in Xiamen to eventually fix the time frame on which the thesis focuses. The chapter ends the general introduction part on Xiamen, and Germany in context of the treaty era.

Chapter Five continues by examining the German official presence in Xiamen which comprised the German consulate as an important local factor, the East Asia Squadron as part of the German navy that also enforced gunboat policy in Xiamen, and the Imperial Post Steamer used as a German colonial expansion tool. Since Xiamen was the most important German port in Fujian and beyond, a section in the chapter devotes itself to the question why Germany did not take a concession in Xiamen.

The next chapters dive deeper into detail and argue the influence by using demographic, shipping, and economical data.

Chapter Six analyzes the development of the population, professions and local establishments. It sheds light on the extent of local German life, institutions, and events.

Chapter Seven explores the extent of German trade and commerce in China. The chapter both explores the business fields of local companies, as well as import and export goods between China and Germany.

Chapter Eight shows which German shipping companies were involved in Xiamen, what their characteristics were, and how these companies developed towards 1900 when most German shipping declined.

Based on the previous chapters, Chapter Nine argues the total development of German shipping and the factors that played a role in its decline. It gives an explanation to the ups and downs of German shipping during the period investigated in this thesis.

Chapter Ten presents the findings of the thesis and summarizes the points made.

Appendix C contains an acknowledgement of all the people and institutions that contributed to the thesis. Appendix A displays a timeline that spans over the period investigated in the thesis and illustrates important events related to the German influence in Xiamen in a chronological order. Appendix B comprises names referring to Chinese places with alternative German, English, and Chinese spellings.



## Chapter Two Sources and Materials

Most sources regarding the German involvement in Xiamen are naturally written in German. This chapter gives an overview of the most important sources to facilitate further research, especially for non German speaking scholars. German sources titles are translated into English and a coarse overview of the material's content is presented. While the thesis uses some Chinese secondary sources no effort was made to investigate materials from Chinese archives, with the Chinese Maritime Custom entries being the only exception. Still, the thesis raises concerns where further research facilitating sources with a Chinese view on the events would be desirable.

The main sources of the thesis consist of two sets: one are the Chinese Maritime Custom entries, and the other one German official communication records.

The Chinese Maritime Custom documents, further also referred to as Custom documents, are yearly volumes with various data about the maritime trade in China after the Opium Wars. They include general statistics about trade and shipping between China and the foreign nations, as well as specific data for every treaty port. Most important for this thesis were the specific statistics about shipping traffic in Xiamen, containing the number of ship declarations, trading statistics, and passenger transport. Additionally, the Maritime Customs also contain yearly reports starting from 1887 (volume 13), and decennial reports between 1882 and 1921 which partly explain the development and shipping of trade, but also the general development in Xiamen and its surroundings. While the yearly and decennial reports are cited in this thesis, the data aggregated in the diagrams is not due to the high number of volumes.

The book "Treaties, conventions, etc, between China and Foreign states" that contains the original treaty documents was also published by the Maritime Customs.

The German official records mainly stem from two archives: The *Federal Archive* in Berlin-Lichterfelde (*Bundesarchiv (BArch)*) and the *Political Archive of the Foreign Office* in Berlin (*Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA AA)*). One file regarding a supposed deletion of ships from the ship register of a German company in Xiamen could be found in the *City Archive of the Hanseatic City Lubeck (Stadtarchiv der Hansestadt Lübeck)*.

Although files from the *Military Archive of the Federal Archiv (Militärarchiv des Bundesarchivs)* in Freiburg regarding the German navy in Xiamen would have been available they were not used for this thesis. This was due to the high number of materials in the other two archives in Berlin, as well as due to the emphasis of the thesis on local German influence. Since Germany did not have concessions or military establishments in Xiamen, these materials were deemed less important.

From the Federal Archive several files were used. The file R 901/30946 "Foreign Settlements in Amoy" (*Fremdenniederlassungen in Amoy*) describes the establishment of the Municipal Council and also contains some English materials. Files R 901/54146 until 54150 contain the yearly reports of the consulate in Xiamen between 1887 and 1906. The file R 901/5036 contains the yearly trade reports from 1907 to 1913. File R 901/22575 "Establishment of a Marine Establishment in Amoy" (*Errichtung eines Marineetablissemments in Amoy*) contains the plans for an establishment of a provision magazine in Xiamen. R 1001/2301 contains materials regarding the "Amoy emigration to the Indian archipelago with a particular reference to the Deli project, 1891" (*Amoy-Auswanderung nach dem Indischen Archipel mit besonderer Bezugnahme auf das Deli-*

Unternehmen, 1891) which describes the coolie trade to Deli that was operated by German merchants in Xiamen.

Also from the Political Archive of the Foreign Office several files were used. 15 files about the administration and employment issues regarding the consulate in Xiamen in R 252844-252854 and R 141823-141826 from 1871 to 1917 that partly also contain additional information such as yearly reports were evaluated. The later yearly reports are stored in the Federal Archive, as mentioned above. The files from the German consulate in Beijing contain files from Xiamen between 1862 and 1914 in R 9208/950 to R 9028/954 which were also analyzed.

An important complementary source were newspaper articles regarding Xiamen from the on-line newspaper platform *NewspaperSG* maintained by the Singaporean Government. Since Xiamen was important for the migration of workers to Singapore, and because of social and economical ties, many articles about the city can be found on the platform.<sup>3</sup> The platform contains Singaporean and Malaysian newspaper from 1831 to 2009. The *Mid-day Herald* (digitized 1895-1896), *The Straits Times* (digitized 1845-2009), the *Straits Times Weekly Issue* (digitized 1845-2009) and the *The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser* (digitized 1884-1942) were used in this thesis.<sup>4</sup>

Regarding overview books of Xiamen *A Short History of Koolangsu* by Giles is the first one that had been published after the Opium Wars. The previous book, as noted in it, was the *History of Amoy* published in 1839 that does not contain a reference to foreigners yet.<sup>5</sup> Hughes writes in *Amoy and the Surrounding Districts: Compiled from Chinese and Other Records* about the history of Xiamen and nearby areas.

A series of books regarding Gulangyu, Xiamen, and Fujian was written by Brown. *Old Gulangyu in Foreigners Eyes* includes many quotations of various sources concerning the history, living, and trade on Gulangyu. *Discover Gulangyu* concentrates on the current state of Gulangyu but also provides historical information and a description of the buildings in Gulangyu. *Magic Xiamen* contains a mixture of recent and historical information regarding Xiamen, including Gulangyu. The books base on records written in English and thus contain only few references to German life in Xiamen.

The Protestant missionaries in Xiamen published books that were used in this thesis. The American missionary Pitcher wrote the book *In and about Amoy* that provides a rich overview of the treaty time in Gulangyu. The British missionary Macgowan describes his impressions about his missionary work in Xiamen in *Christ or Confucius, which?.* No German missionaries were based in Xiamen that could have published a book.

Several books with an overview of treaty ports were deemed useful. One with several references to German establishments in Xiamen is *Twentieth century impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other treaty ports of China: their history, people, commerce, industries, and resources* by Wright and Cartwright. The *Commercial Handbook of China* compiled by American consuls provides general and trading information about Xiamen and the other opened ports.

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<sup>3</sup>Chen mentions many of the ties related to newspapers in *The Early Chinese Newspapers of Singapore. 1881-1912*.

<sup>4</sup>The Singapore Free Press and Merchantile Advertiser was one of the earliest newspaper maintained by Europeans in Singapore after the *Singapore Chronicle* that had already appeared in 1824. Together with the Straits Times the newspaper accounted for two out of four English newspapers in the 1960s (Chen 12, 17).

<sup>5</sup>H.A. Giles, *A Short History of Koolangsu* (A.A. Marcal, 1878) 3.

Secondary sources about the German involvement in Gulangyu and Xiamen are scarce. Most scholarly work focuses on the German concessions of Tianjin and Hankou, as well as the lease of Qingdao but neglects the other ports such as Xiamen. Documents about the trade between Germany and China either focus on the period after the First World War or again at the other concessions. Useful material is often only found in marginal notes, whereas the documents focus on other parts than the German involvement in Xiamen. In order to reconstruct the German involvement, the thesis thus relies on a variety of different secondary sources.

The thesis uses some books that describe various aspects of the relationship between China and Germany. The books by Eberstein are the most comprehensive and insightful sources regarding the early exchanges between Germany and China. In the two books *Prussia and China. A History of difficult relationships* (*Preußen und China. Eine Geschichte schwieriger Beziehungen*) and *Hamburg China. History of a Partnership* (*Hamburg China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft*) Eberstein describes the development of the relationships to China between the two most important German states before the founding of the German empire, and for the Hamburg book beyond that.

Also *Germany and Republican China* by Kirby includes a short introduction about the German involvement in China before 1914, but mainly concentrates on the period afterwards. Kelly investigates in *Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy* the development of the German navy with a focus on Tirpitz who was relevant for the selection of the concession in Qingdao. Ho presents in *The Foreign Trade of China* the trade between China and foreign countries and also contains a chapter about Germany import and export trade. However, since the German trade volume only became significant after the First World War information about before 1914 is also scarce in the book.

Since shipping was of major importance for the Germans in Xiamen, the thesis also relies on sources regarding shipping companies and the development of shipping. Primarily, the first four out of five volumes about German passenger shipping by Kludas' *The History of German Passenger Shipping Die Geschichte der Deutschen Passagier-Schiffahrt*) were used. For smaller shipping lines that mainly operated freight lines, information is more scarce and mainly on-line sources were used.

As an addition, yearly reports of the shipping company NDL starting from 1899 were evaluated.

Several books regarding German companies' histories in China exist which often reference German shipping. Two books by Becker with Michael Jebsen: *Owner of a Shipping Company and Politician. 1835-1899. A Biography.* (*Michael Jebsen: Reeder und Politiker. 1835-1899. Eine Biographie*) and Hänisch with Jebsen & Co. *Hong Kong. China Trade in the Change of Time 1895-1945* (*Jebsen & Co. Hong Kong. China-Handel im Wechsel der Zeit 1895-1945*) regarding the shipping company M. Jebsen were used. Möring writes in *Siemssen & Co., 1846-1996* about the German company Siemssen that also had a branch in Fuzhou.

Regarding Hulishan and the Krupp cannon trade, the thesis mainly relies on an article by Piotr *Coastal Fortifications in Xiamen* (*Küstenbefestigungen in Xiamen*).

Travel reports of Germans in Xiamen could also be found and used in this thesis.

Georg Wegener described in *During Wartime in China 1900/1901* (*Zur Kriegszeit in China 1900/1901*) his impressions and experiences from visits to several cities in China during the Boxer rebellion. He started the journey from Sydney after hearing about the stirrings.

Wilhelm Grube was a sinologist and visited Xiamen from where he wrote a letter on the 27. October 1898, contained in *Wilhelm Grube (1855-1908): Live, Works, and Collections of the Linguist, Ethnologist, and Sinologist* (*Wilhelm Grube (1855-1908): Leben, Werk und Sammlungen des Sprachwissenschaftlers, Ethnologen und Sinologen*). In it he primarily criticized the British due various reasons but also reported impressions from his visit to Xiamen. Grube was a former classmate of Merz, who was German consul in Xiamen during his visit.

Ernst Grünfield traveled for his book *Treaty Ports and Colonial Conditions in China, Japan, and Korea: a colonial political study* (*Hafenkolonien und kolonieähnliche Verhältnisse in China, Japan und Korea: eine kolonialpolitische Studie*) between 1910 and 1912 to East Asia. The book describes the history about several treaty ports in East Asia, and he also reported his personal experiences in them, such as for Xiamen.

The citation style of this thesis bases on the MLA footnotes citation style. Where footnotes provide more than a bibliographical reference, the MLA in-text citation style is used. The first time a source is referenced it is fully cited. Further references are abbreviated by only noting the authors and title of the resource. If this is not sufficient to unambiguously identify the resource additional attributes are noted.

Exceptions of the citation style are made for sources of the German Federal Archive, the Political Archive of the Foreign Office, and the Museum Eckernförde, which recommend unambiguous citation styles themselves.

The next chapter starts with the investigation of the German influence in Xiamen. It begins with the analysis of the Sino-German treaties in order to build up a framework for further investigations.

## Chapter Three Germany in the Treaty War

Following the First Opium War, the foreign colonialist nations carved China into spheres of their influence. Treaties were one aspect of the foreign invasions in China, but in reality it were the gunboats that mattered. This chapter investigates when Germany entered the “Treaty War” in China and when it ended. Doing so also helps to investigate the time Germany was involved in Xiamen in order to restrict the time period for the rest of the thesis.

In the first *Treaty of Nanking* on the 29. August 1842 China had to open access for England to the five ports of Xiamen, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai. The German Karl Gützlaff also participated in the treaty mission and acted as an interpreter for the British. The treaty allowed England to carry out trade without restraints and with fixed tariffs, to open consular offices, and to reside in the five named cities. It thus also abolished the *Hong Merchants* (公行) which the Chinese government appointed to have a monopoly on trade with the foreign powers. While an article regarding the treaty was first published in *The Globe* on the 16. December 1842, an article appeared on the 6. January 1843 in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* in Germany.<sup>6</sup> This first treaty did not establish any legal basis with the other imperial powers including Germany.

The first treaties contained three significant clauses, that other states including Germany adopted: tariff control, extraterritoriality, and the most favored nation clause.

The most severe clause the imperialist states imposed on China was the right of *extraterritoriality*. While the Treaty of Nanking exacted the rights of trade and residence at the named ports, the American-Chinese treaty of the 3. July in 1844 explicitly named an extraterritoriality clause.<sup>7</sup> Britain added the clause in the *Treaty of the Bogue* that was signed on 3. October 1845. Extraterritoriality allowed the foreign states to act under their own jurisdiction without the Chinese government being able to intervene.

*Tariff control* was another important clause already stated in the Treaty of Nanking. Tariff control allowed trade under fixed tariffs, negotiated between China and one or several foreign powers.

The *most favored nation* clause specified that any trade advantages obtained by one nation would also be conferred to the nation having the most favored nation status.

German entrance into the Treaty War was late, since the German empire was not founded until 1871 and the German states were busy with wars inside Europe. Still, Hamburg and Prussia started their China ambitions before the founding of the German empire.<sup>8</sup>

After China signed the first treaty, officials were willing to give concessions to other nations to follow their strategy by letting “barbarians fight barbarians”. The first German treaty obtained by Prussia was thus granted without military pressure since Prussia did not have a strong fleet at this time. The treaty was a result of the *Eulenberg* mission which aimed to establish relations with China, Siam, and Japan and was conducted between 1859 and 1862. First drafts of the Sino-German treaty were already designed

<sup>6</sup>R Derek Wood, “The Treaty of Nanking: Form and the foreign office, 1842–43”, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 24.2 (1996): 181-187.

<sup>7</sup>William C. Johnstone, “The End of Special Privileges in China”, *Far Eastern Survey* 11.25 (1942): 252.

<sup>8</sup>The two books by Eberstein give a detailed account of the diplomatic beginnings and trade.

in 1859.<sup>9</sup> However, until the mission succeeded two years passed.

The first treaty was the *Treaty of Tientsin* (*Freundschafts-, Handels-, und Schiffahrts-Vertrag*) and contained the three clauses of extraterritoriality, tariff control, and the most favored nation status. It was the first treaty that allowed Germany to open trade and settlement in Xiamen. The treaty contained 42 articles and was signed between Prussia and China in 1861. The articles were not only valid for Prussia but also for the other German states. It had a similar content as the Treaty of Nanking and allowed the German states to have diplomatic agents in Beijing and the treaty ports. Apart from Xiamen, the treaty also allowed free settling at the ports of Guangzhou, Shantou, Fuzhou, Ningbo, Shanghai, Penglai, Tianjin, Niuzhang, Zhenjiang, Jiujiang, Hankou, Qiongzhou on Hainan, Tainan, and Tamsui. The tariffs for the trade of German vessels were specified in an supplementary appendix. The values were effectively maximum values through the most favored nation clause. Article 41 specified that the treaty would be valid for 20 years and allowed a revision of the treaty after 10 years.<sup>10</sup>

The next major treaty between Germany and China was the *Supplementary Convention*, signed between Prussia and China on the 31. March 1880.<sup>11</sup> Primarily, it allowed trade with further ports in China. It also confirmed the previous articles that were not replaced through this treaty, explicitly the most favored nation clause already stated in the Treaty of Tientsin in article 40. Apart from that, the treaty specified details regarding trade regulations.<sup>12</sup>

With Bismarck leaving in the March 1890 and the accession of Wilhelm II, German's foreign policy changed from mere trade and a general interest in China to an expansion of the German sphere and the rise of German colonial politics. Especially Chapter Five investigates the importance of Xiamen in this context. Germany's policy changed from wanting to be a "superpower in Europe" to one wanting to make "world policy". In the 1890s, Germany set up its first colonies in New Guinea and other islands in the South Seas. Afterwards, Germany tried to get a colony in the Pacific Ocean in East Asia. To reach its goals, Germany intervened together with Russia and France in the First Sino-Japanese War between 1894 and 1895 and could force Japan to not take the half island Liaodong. After the war on the 3. October 1895, Germany received its first concession in Hankou, and a second one in Tianjin on the 30. October of the same year.<sup>13</sup>

However, these concessions were not enough as Germany wanted to establish a base for its warships that would also be able to provide coal. Germany realized this goal by taking Qingdao (see Section 5.4). While the previous treaties mainly contained general regulations regarding the treaty ports, Germany concentrated on Jiaozhou for the next treaties. At the 6. March 1898 Germany and China signed the *Convention for the Lease of Kiaochow* that guaranteed German sovereignty for a 50 kilometer zone around Jiaozhou bay for 99 years. The Jiaozhou treaty retained the right for Germany to build two

<sup>9</sup>Bernd Eberstein, *Preussen und China. Eine Geschichte schwieriger Beziehungen* (Duncker & Humblot, 2007) 174, 175.

<sup>10</sup>Imperial Maritime Customs. Inspectorate General of Customs., *Treaties, conventions, etc., between China and Foreign states*, vol. 2, III Miscellaneous series (Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1917) 851-883.

<sup>11</sup>Imperial Maritime Customs. Inspectorate General of Customs. 930.

<sup>12</sup>Imperial Maritime Customs. Inspectorate General of Customs. 930-943.

<sup>13</sup>Liu Jing, "Wahrnehmung des Fremden: China in deutschen und Deutschland in chinesischen Reiseberichten vom Opiumkrieg bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg", Diss., Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, 2001, 34, 35.

railway routes in Shandong and exploit coal mines around the train routes.<sup>14</sup> Further agreements regarding Jiaozhou included the *Kiaochow Custom Agreement* signed on the 17. April 1899 Jiaozhou<sup>15</sup>, the *Amendment to the Agreement of the Establishment of a Custom House in Tsingtau* signed on the 2. December 1905<sup>16</sup>, and *Manufactures in German Territory*<sup>17</sup> signed on the 17. April 1907. However, no Chinese authorities signed these treaties. They were only agreements between Germany and the other foreign nations, as only the Inspector General of Customs and a German representative signed them.

After the First World War Germany and Austria-Hungary lost all special privileges in China through the *Treaty of Versailles*. Germany had to give back the concession of Hankou and Tianjin.<sup>18</sup> The country could not resign its rights in Xiamen, because it officially did not have any and was merely part of the international settlement on Gulangyu.

Subsequently, the Chinese Nationalist party *Guomingdang* (国民党, GMD) put efforts into the abolishment of the treaties. While principally willing to abolish the treaties, Britain and the United States deemed the internal position too instable as to give up all their rights on extraterritoriality and on other clauses.<sup>19</sup> However, the Nationalists achieved stepwise achievements such as the regaining of tariff autonomy.

In the manifesto of the First GMD National Congress in January 1924, the Chinese Nationalist party specified to give most-favored-nation treatment to any nation voluntarily giving up its special privileges.<sup>20</sup> Following, until 1928 the Nationalist Government concluded new tariff treaties with Austria, Finland, Chile, the United States, Britain, Norway, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, France, and Spain, all subject to the most-favored-nation clause.<sup>21,22</sup> Although Germany did not voluntarily give up its treaty rights a new treaty guaranteed equal foot between Germany and China.

After regaining the leased territory of Weihai in 1930, China also regained the British concessions at Zhenjiang and Xiamen.<sup>23</sup> Britain and the United States gave up their right of extraterritoriality on the 11. January 1943.

A tentative start date for the German involvement in Xiamen after the First Opium War is thus the Treaty of Tientsin in 1861. However, as the next chapter discusses, German influence in Xiamen could already be felt earlier. An ending date of German involvement based on the treaties is after the First World War, where trade on equal base replaced German's gunboat policy. Up to this date, Germany had concessions in Hankou and Tianjin and the leased territory of Jiaozhou.

<sup>14</sup>Imperial Maritime Customs. Inspectorate General of Customs. 944-950.

<sup>15</sup>Imperial Maritime Customs. Inspectorate General of Customs. 951-956.

<sup>16</sup>Imperial Maritime Customs. Inspectorate General of Customs. 957-972.

<sup>17</sup>Imperial Maritime Customs. Inspectorate General of Customs. 973-977.

<sup>18</sup>William C Johnstone, "The Status of Foreign Concessions and Settlements in the Treaty Ports of China." *American Political Science Review* 31.05 (1937), <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1947920>>: 944.

<sup>19</sup>Edmund SK Fung, "The Chinese nationalists and the unequal treaties 1924-1931", *Modern Asian Studies* 21.04 (1987), <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/312763>>: 793-819.

<sup>20</sup>Fung 799.

<sup>21</sup>Fung 810.

<sup>22</sup>LH Woolsey, "China's termination of unequal treaties", *American Journal of International Law* (1927), <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2189128>>: 291.

<sup>23</sup>Fung 811.

The next chapter explores how Xiamen developed in this time frame, when it was opened for foreigners, what concessions existed, and how it related to Germany. Based on that, the chapter presents a time frame of German influence in Xiamen for the remainder of the thesis.



## Chapter Four Concession Time in Xiamen

This chapter focuses on the treaty time in Xiamen from the opening up to the end of the First World War. It investigates how Germany fitted into the picture in Xiamen. Following, the chapter establishes the time frame of German involvement in Xiamen on which the thesis focuses.

While the British signed the Treaty of Nanking with China in 1842, they tried before to set their foot on Xiamen. On the 3. July 1840 an English vessel sailed to Xiamen to forward a letter to the authorities in Beijing. When the Chinese authorities disallowed landing, the British opened their fire and nevertheless tried to set foot on the island. However, the Chinese eventually prevented the foreign vessel to accomplish its mission.<sup>24</sup>

Under the command of Hugh Gough and Admiral Parker, a British fleet of “two 74s and seven other ships of war, four steamers, twenty-three transports, and two other vessels, carrying in all 3,500 troops” dropped anchor in Xiamen on the 25. August 1841. On the 26. August they issued an ultimatum to surrender the city. The Chinese forces expected the British and were well prepared. However, when the Chinese ignored the ultimatum the British could capture the island through an attack from the rear. The British left 500 soldiers on Gulangyu and only evacuated the island in March 1845 after the payment of the fifth installment of the indemnity of the Nanking Convention.<sup>25</sup>

Gulangyu as a part of Xiamen was the settlement of the foreigners. Later, consulates were first established on the island. However, Gulangyu and the main island of Xiamen could only be seen together in terms of foreign daily life. While the consulates were established on Gulangyu, many of the businesses and banks were on the island of Xiamen. The foreigners were busy with their daily work on the island of Xiamen, and spent their night in Gulangyu.

Soon after the British opened the port, other nationalities arrived in Gulangyu and the resident foreigners established an informal organization to deal with daily matters. The “General Purpose Committee” on Gulangyu was concerned about streets, lights, hygiene, bridges, and medical services and the organization was both tolerated by the Chinese officials and consulates.<sup>26</sup>

Although Germany signed the treaty of Tientsin in 1861 German trade started soon after the opening of the port together with English and American trade.<sup>27</sup> Additionally, Xiamen was already in 1860 a favorite port for German war ships.<sup>28</sup> Even the first German consul Pasedag took office in 1859. Additionally, Pasedag founded the first German company Pasedag & Co. in 1854.

Nevertheless, Germany was split into various states up until to the Franco-Prussian War and did not have a clear foreign policy in China. While independent merchants traded without effective protection, real German official presence only started in April 1874 with the opening of the German consulate in Xiamen.

Starting from 1877 efforts were taken to make the island Gulangyu an official inter-

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<sup>24</sup>Pitcher 72-73.

<sup>25</sup>Pitcher 73-77.

<sup>26</sup>Ernst Grünfeld, *Hafenkolonien und kolonieähnliche Verhältnisse in China, Japan und Korea: eine kolonialpolitische Studie* (G. Fischer, 1913) 182.

<sup>27</sup>Pitcher 213.

<sup>28</sup>Patrick J. Kelly, *Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy* (Indiana University Press, 2011) 118.

national settlement. However, only on the 10. January 1902 the local Chinese authorities and the consuls of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, France, Spain, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland and Norway made an agreement.<sup>29</sup> The agreement was forwarded to Beijing and in 1903 Gulangyu became an International Foreign Settlement controlled by the powers of America, Great Britain, Germany, Holland, Spain, and Japan. A *Municipal Council* composed of six members, including a Chinese representative, was established in May. A Captain Superintendent of the Police took control of a Indian Sikhs force.<sup>30</sup>

The British concession in Xiamen was only formally organized in 1877<sup>31</sup> whereas consuls were already operating in Gulangyu and trade had been flourishing a long time. The concession did probably not have any practical relevance. Japan gained exclusive concessions to a number of ports including Xiamen in 1896.<sup>32</sup> However, the location in Xiamen just existed on paper, since the location was not suitable for building.<sup>33</sup> The same was true for the Americans who had a nominal concession at the harbor port.<sup>34</sup>

Although many nationalities had interests in Xiamen, coexistence evolved without major conflicts. However, as argued in Chapter Five Germany considered Xiamen as a potential German naval base. Nevertheless, when Germany had the opportunity for a pretext to implement its colonial strategies in 1897 it seized Qingdao instead. Also in the “Japanese Scare” of 1900, the Japanese wanted to use the burning of a temple as a pretext to invade the island. Probably, they acknowledged how the Germans invaded Qingdao under a similar excuse. However, the other imperial powers quickly reacted and prevented the potential invasion. Probably, the Chinese reacted to the increased Japanese interest in Xiamen and allowed the international settlement in 1902.

With the outbreak of the First World War German ships immediately stopped to arrive in Xiamen (see Chapter Nine). However, the local German trading house Pasedag & Co. and the consulate still could continue to operate until 1917 (see Chapter Seven and Chapter Five). In this year, remaining establishments and ships were confiscated from Germany. Also the steamer *Keongwai* of the NDL which had to remain in the harbor in 1914 was seized by the Chinese government in 1917 (see 8.14).

How can a time period for the German influence in Xiamen be established? In context of the gunboat policy, Xiamen was first opened by the British in 1845, although the city had already been captured in 1841. German influence started to be felt not long after 1850. This is apparent through the establishment of the first German trading house in 1854, the reference to shipping of the Northern German States by contemporary witnesses, as well as the high German shipping traffic in 1863,<sup>35</sup> when the Maritime Customs was established and started to record the shipping traffic. Still, sources about

<sup>29</sup>LH Woolsey, “The Japanese in Kulangsu”, *American Journal of International Law* (1939), <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2190798>>: 528.

<sup>30</sup>Pitcher 248.

<sup>31</sup>Johnstone, “The Status of Foreign Concessions and Settlements in the Treaty Ports of China.” 943-944.

<sup>32</sup>Johnstone, “The Status of Foreign Concessions and Settlements in the Treaty Ports of China.” 944.

<sup>33</sup>Grünfeld 127.

<sup>34</sup>Julean Herbert Arnold, *Commercial Handbook of China*, Miscellaneous Series, No. 84, vol. 1 (Washington Government Printing Office, 1919) 362-363.

<sup>35</sup>German shipping traffic in 1863 almost amounted 20 percent of the whole shipping traffic, see Chapter Nine.

the beginning of German influence in Xiamen are very scarce. Not only the Maritime Customs, but most other sources such as the consul reports only started to appear after 1860, making it difficult to establish an exact beginning of German influence.

One possible time frame for the German influence in Xiamen would be the lifespan of the German consulate from 1874. However, as Chapter Nine argues, Germany was especially active in shipping and had its peak before the establishment of the professional consulate. It would thus be more applicable to set the time frame starting with the merchant consulate in 1859. However, as already mentioned, up to 1863 the Maritime Customs documents contain no entries for German ships. On the other hand it is likely that the port has already been flourishing with German ships for several years.

For the end of the German influence also several possibilities come into question. After 1900 German shipping had several low points where shipping almost ceased to exist. While in 1914 no more ships arrived, the number was already close to zero before. Not considering shipping, the end of influence is 1917 where remaining establishments were seized by the Chinese government.

Since this dilemma of missing sources for the initial period and several possible ending points of influence cannot be resolved with the sources found during the preparation of the thesis, the thesis takes a conservative estimate of German influence in Xiamen, namely from the opening of the port in 1842 up to one year before the end of the First World War in 1917. Due to the scarcity of sources regarding the German shipping before 1863, however, the thesis concentrates on the time period starting from 1863 up to the end of the First World War.

The next chapter goes deeper into the establishment of German official presence in China. The chapter explains the factors that constituted the official background and protection for German life in Xiamen. As such, it also argues the reasons for the establishment of the German consulate.

## Chapter Five German Official Presence and Xiamen

There are three essential cornerstones of German official presence which influenced life in Xiamen. Two of them were the *Imperial Post Steamer* (*Reichspostdampfer*) and the *East Asia Squadron* (*Ostasiengeschwader*) which formed the maritime influence. The other cornerstone was of administrative and local nature, namely the German consulate.

While shipping and trade already flourished before the establishment of the German empire in 1871, official German presence only appeared later. The first German consulate already existed in Xiamen since 1859. However, the first consul was a merchant with a focus on his own welfare. The professional consulate was established later in 1886. Especially under Wilhelm II Germany started to quickly expand its naval capacities and began to operate in the East Asian waters. The expansion of the East Asia Squadron and the introduction of the Imperial Post Steamer where the two central units that introduced this change of policy.

This chapter investigates these three official elements and its influence in Xiamen. Since Xiamen was the most important German port in East Asia before the concession in Qingdao, another section investigates why Germany never forced a concession in Xiamen.

### 5.1 Germany's Consulate in Xiamen

Already in 1853, Georg Th. Siemssen wrote in a letter to the Hamburger senate that in addition to the consulate in Fuzhou, a consulate in Xiamen would be useful: "Although the place does not directly trade with Europe, coast trade with European ships here and in East India is always increasing, and because of that more and more ships also arrive here. In the last year, Mr. Wm. Mensing, also from Hamburg, established himself there and would be suitable to adequately represent Hamburg". Following, Wilhelm Mensing was appointed as a consul in Xiamen but did not accept the post, since he returned to Europe due to the unstable political condition.<sup>36</sup> The list of registered Germans in Xiamen from 1864 confirms that he also did not return later (see Table 1).

The first German consul in Xiamen was Charles Julius Pasedag of Pasedag & Co. who accepted the position in 1859 and was also the owner of the company Pasedag & Co. He first represented Hamburg, and later also Hanover, Oldenburg, and Prussia. During an absence in 1866 Pasedag appointed Cäsar Krüger to be his deputy.<sup>37</sup> At this time the German empire did not exist and not even the Treaty of Nanking was signed. Due to the Chinese principle of equal treatment, Germany could still operate a consulate.

In the Confucian Chinese society, a merchant had a low position which probably negatively influenced communication with the Chinese authorities. Pasedag himself stressed the importance of having a professional consul as opposed to a merchant consul: "For a few years I have already advocated to have a professional consul in Xiamen because Xiamen is Fujian's harbor with most German ships. In Fuzhou, the residence of the vice Governor of the province, German ships are very scarce; and the circumstance that Xiamen has a strong exchange with Taiwan supports the employment of a professional consul even more."<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup>Bernd Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* (Christians, 1988) 98, 103.

<sup>37</sup>Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* 103.

<sup>38</sup>Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* 103.

On the 6. July 1869, the British consul W. H. Pedder formally took over the consulate from Pasedag.<sup>39</sup> The same reported on the 3. September 1869 complaints from German captains that Pasedag still continued to transact official business and charged fees by making use of the Prussian consular seal (see Figure 2). Pasedag denied that he exercised consular function.<sup>40</sup> It seems that he could still continue to work as a consul until Pedder took over again shortly before the arrival of the professional consul Krauel.<sup>41</sup>

Figure 1 shows the official stamp used by the consulate in Xiamen after the establishment of the German Empire. Its inscription reads *Imperial German Consulate in Amoy*. The stamp is different from the seal used by Pasedag before the establishment of the German empire as shown in Figure 2. The old seal reads *Imperial Prussian General Consulate for China*.




Figure 1: Stamp of the German Consulate in Xiamen next to Merz's signature<sup>42</sup>

In April 1874 Dr. Friedrich Richard Krauel as a professional consular took over Pasedag's post. Krauel stayed for six years as a consul in Chinese cities, including Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Shanghai. Starting from 1879 he acted as a consul in Australia.

The big question is why Xiamen was chosen to have a professional consulate. In this year, the population on the island only amounted 18 (see Table 2) which could hardly argue the need for a professional consulate. In a letter from the 31. August 1873 from Fuzhou Krauel revealed the advantages and disadvantages of having the professional consulate in Xiamen and gave a comparison with the location of his consulate in Fuzhou. Indeed, in it he confirms that the local population and companies both in Xiamen and Fuzhou were not large enough to justify a professional consulate. However, Fuzhou

<sup>39</sup>PA AA R 9208/950: 143.

<sup>40</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 145-152.

<sup>41</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 164.

<sup>42</sup>PA AA R 141824.

<sup>43</sup>PA AA R 252845.



Figure 2: Earlier Seal of the German (Prussian) Consulate in Xiamen<sup>43</sup>

as the capital of Fujian was the seat of the Provincial Governor and additionally an important harbor for the tea trade, only ranking behind Shanghai and Guangzhou.<sup>44</sup>

Xiamen's advantages were already mentioned by Siemssen's and Pasedag's remark about the shipping traffic: Xiamen was an important port for the coast trade, and the German shipping traffic was high as the next chapters argue. Also Krauel notes for Xiamen that "all interests of the merchants concentrate on shipping, which stems from its location at the sea and its in every sense excellent harbor." He continues: "It is especially the coast trade in the further sense that Xiamen owes its importance. At the same time also the importance for German interests base on it. The coast trade, which is for the most part handled by sailing ships, lies mostly in German hands. The Chinese charterers prefer German ships because of their solidarity and the prudence of the German captains. Xiamen as the center of cabotage is also the center of German sailing." Finally he states that the "shipping interests of the South Chinese port claim attention and work of a [potential future] consul. The circumstances between ships and crews, the chartering, the conflicts with harbor pilots and the Maritime Customs and associated incidents require consular protection and already almost exclusively give enough work for an office."<sup>45</sup> As a letter from the 12. January 1874 indicates, his proposal for transferring the professional consulate from Fuzhou to Xiamen was accepted and he started work on the 25. April 1874.<sup>46,47</sup>

On the 26. January 1901, the German consul Dr. Constantin Merz<sup>48</sup> advocated to relocate the consulate back to Fuzhou, and let the interpreter act as a consul in Xiamen. It could hardly be an accident that just in 1900 the German shipping traffic came

<sup>44</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 181.

<sup>45</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 184, 188.

<sup>46</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 193-204.

<sup>47</sup>His insightful report is confirmed and further investigated in the following chapters of this thesis. Chapter Six and Chapter Seven confirm that indeed the population and local firms were small and their interests centered around shipping. Chapter Six shows that the consulate and its associated court mainly dealt with shipping issues. Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine investigate shipping and confirm Xiamen as an important German port on the Chinese coast. Sailing ships were replaced over time, however German steamers managed to substitute the sailing ships up to a certain level. Only after 1900 German shipping came to an abrupt decline.

<sup>48</sup>He already came in 1883 to China and worked first as a consul in Tamsui (Hopf and Walravens 102).

to a before unreached minimum, and even further declined in 1901 as Chapter Nine argues. Previously, also M. Jebsen from the shipping company with the same name (see Section 8.2) advised on the 11. February 1898 to the Reichstag<sup>49</sup> to relocate the professional consulate in Xiamen to Hainan, since Xiamen had lost economical importance.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, in 1897 which trading statistics were available for Jebsen showed that Xiamen was also in a before unreached low in this year.

In his letter, Merz gave four reasons for the relocation. The first one was that Fuzhou gained political importance in the last years between 1898 and 1900, although it is unclear from where the higher importance stemmed. The second one was the trade and shipping traffic: "Xiamen no longer has its previous importance for the German trade and German shipping, while German trade and German shipping in Fuzhou have been increasing the last years." The third reason was that a non professional consul, referring to Siemssen in Fuzhou, would have a greater struggle with the Chinese authorities, and the fourth that in Xiamen a service apartment would only be available for the consul.<sup>51</sup>

In a letter from the 5. June 1906, the later consul Löhneysen disagreed with Merz. He argued that Fuzhou did not necessarily have a higher political importance than Xiamen. His arguments for Xiamen are again to be found in shipping, namely in the importance of Xiamen as a harbor for warships. The consul noted that Xiamen "has one of the biggest and best harbors in the world". He argued that the German warships often anchored at the port and that the harbor would "even suffice for the biggest fleet of the world" and thus also for ships like the *SMS Bismarck*.<sup>52</sup>

Löhneysen was correct by arguing that the general trade volume increased, and that Merz's other arguments were only dummy arguments. However, he did not take into account that German trade only occupied a small volume of Xiamen's trade. He also argued that the general shipping development of the port was still increasing, which would also not have been a crucial argument for a German consulate. However, the main shortcoming in his arguments were that he relied on the German shipping average of the years from 1895 to 1904. While shipping in Xiamen was still more significant than in Fuzhou the consul did not account for the decline in shipping from 1900 on, and thus advised to leave the German consulate in Xiamen.<sup>53</sup>

That the consulate was not relocated back to Fuzhou after Merz's letter in 1901 can be attributed to the inertia of the authorities in Berlin. However, it is also possible that Berlin decided to leave the consulate in Xiamen in favor of the warships as argued by consul Löhneysen. While Germany in the meanwhile took a concession with a harbor in Qingdao, the geographical position and excellent harbor of Xiamen still offered advantages worth to be protected by a consul. Overall, the discussion for the relocation of the consulate shows that Xiamen declined in its importance for Germany which was the result of the stagnation of German shipping. The only advantage that Xiamen could retain after 1900 was its suitability for the German warships.

German consuls and merchants often represented the interests of other nations in Xiamen. Examples include the Flensburger J. Petersen who acted as a Danish consul,<sup>54</sup>

<sup>49</sup>The Reichstag was the Parliament of the German Empire.

<sup>50</sup>Bert Becker, *Michael Jebsen: Reeder und Politiker. 1835-1899. Eine Biographie* (Ludwig, 2012) 492.

<sup>51</sup>PA AA R 252853: 1-2.

<sup>52</sup>PA AA R 252853 3-6.

<sup>53</sup>PA AA R 252853 7-20.

<sup>54</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 185.



Krauel and later Germans consuls acted as Italian consuls,<sup>55,56</sup> and as Dutch consuls.<sup>57</sup> Wilhelm Kruse was vice consul for Norway, and also represented twice the German consulate for a longer period.<sup>58,59</sup> Also August Piehl of Pasedag & Co. was a consul of the Netherlands and vice-consul for Sweden & Norway. B. Hempel of Pasedag & Co. was noted as a consular officer of the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway.<sup>60</sup>

## 5.2 Imperial Post Steamer

Plans to initiate an *Imperial Post Steamer* (*Reichspostdampfer*) line to East Asia already existed since 1872. However, such a project was initially not yet realizable.<sup>61</sup>

The discussion to support the German industry in East Asia with a regular Imperial Post Steamer line came up again and again, and on the 6. April 1885 the line was finally decided by the Reichstag. The first company to apply for the Imperial Post Steamer service was the Kingsin line (see Section 8.1) which applied in the same year. However, their ships were deemed too slow and although it was the only candidate the company could not secure a contract with the government.<sup>62</sup>

At this time, the NDL (see Section 8.14) was the most powerful German shipping company and although their ships also did not satisfy the requirements, it got the contract for the Imperial Post Steamer line to East Asia, and another one to Australia on the 28. April 1885. The NDL had to build the steamers in a short time and per contract in German shipyards.

On the 30. June 1886 the line came into operation with a four week frequency and the first ship, the *Oder* started its journey over Antwerp, Said, Suez, Aden, Colombo, Singapore, Hongkong, and Shanghai. The NDL expanded the line with the big steamers *Bayern*, *Preußen*, and *Sachsen*. However, the additional prestige cost the NDL since the subsidized lines were not profitable until 1893.

To fulfill the contract, the NDL expanded further into East Asia and also used the existing *Dresden* and *München* ships to East Asia as Imperial Post Steamer which the government approved on the 29. May 1889.<sup>63</sup> The *Prinz Heinrich* followed on the 2. January 1895. Besides that ship, in 1897 the vessels *Preussen*, *Bayern*, and *Sachsen* were setting off the first time for East Asia.<sup>64</sup>

On the 3. January 1897 the HAPAG (see Section 8.13) started its expansion to East Asia and also claimed its place in the Imperial Post Steamer service. On the 13. April 1898 the Reichstag officially decided to let the HAPAG operate the mail steaming service together with NDL. At the same time, the contract destined that the frequency

<sup>55</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 219.

<sup>56</sup>PA AA R 9208/953: 19, 40, 93.

<sup>57</sup>PA AA R 9208/953 23, 69.

<sup>58</sup>PA AA R 9208/954: 11.

<sup>59</sup>PA AA R 9208/953 293.

<sup>60</sup>A list of German consuls with their Chinese name and years of office can be found in (福建省情资料库). The Chinese Wikipedia contains an article of the German consulate in Xiamen that formats these entries in a more readable way under <https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/德国驻厦门领事馆>.

<sup>61</sup>Arnold Kludas, *Die Pionierjahre, 1850 bis 1890*, Geschichte der deutschen Passagierschiffahrt (Weltbild Verlag, 1994) 168.

<sup>62</sup>Kludas, *Die Pionierjahre, 1850 bis 1890* 168-173.

<sup>63</sup>Kludas, *Die Pionierjahre, 1850 bis 1890* 173-179.

<sup>64</sup>Arnold Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900*, Geschichte der deutschen Passagierschiffahrt (Weltbild Verlag, 1994) 100-107.



of journeys to East Asia had to increase to fourteen days. The contract period started with the 1. October 1899.

The HAPAG started its participation with the *Hamburg* and *Kiautschou*.<sup>65</sup> To operate in higher frequency the NDL bought the ships *König Albert* and the HAPAG the *Prinzess Irene*. However, already in 1904 the HAPAG withdrew from the Imperial Post Steamer service. The HAPAG gave the *Kiautschou* to the NDL in exchange for NDL's six freight steamers. In 1903 and 1904 the NDL also put the ships *Zieten*, *Seydlitz*, *Roon*, *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*, *Prinz Ludwig* in East Asia (and partly Australia) into operation.

In 1909 the NDL started to operate the Imperial Post Steamer to Qingdao instead of Nagasaki every four weeks. Since the traded goods were not suitable for transportation with the Imperial Post Steamer, the approach did not lead to a profit.<sup>66</sup>

On the 18. July 1913 the HAPAG tried to enter the Imperial Post Steamer business again by offering to operate it without government subsidizing. However, the First World War got in the way and the business was not initiated.

Apart from the Imperial Post Steamer line to East Asia, another line at the coast of China had also been subsidized although it was not counted as a Imperial Post Steamer. Through a contract from the 30. August 1898 the government allowed the shipping company M. Jebsen to operate weekly ships between Shanghai and Qingdao with two steamers. The service started on the 1. November 1898. Another contract obligated the company from the 1. April on to cover the line Shanghai-Jiaozhou-Yantai-Tianjin in an interval of four to six days. Following, the company bought the new steamers *Tsingtau*, *Knivsberg*, and *Mathilde*.<sup>67</sup>

On first sight, the Imperial Post Steamer had no connection with Xiamen. As indicated above there was no direct Imperial Post Steamer connection to it. There were only two ports in China that the German government officially subsidized as a Imperial Post Steamer line, namely Shanghai and Hongkong.

However, to begin with, the shipping company M. Jebsen received through it financial government support for his coast line. Jebsen's ships also reached Xiamen and contributed, e.g., 30 percent of the German shipping traffic in 1896. The ships of Jebsen were also one of the few shipping companies that not only survived the abrupt decline in 1900 (see Chapter Nine), but could flourish through the chartering of his ships in Xiamen that were used to compensate the shortage of Japanese steamers during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and 1905.

More importantly, the two big German shipping lines NDL and HAPAG only started to operate in China through the subsidized Imperial Post Steamer contracts. In a logical sequence, they expanded their business from there to Xiamen where they were first seen in 1899. After 1900, the NDL and HAPAG were among the few German shipping companies that kept operating in Xiamen.

Traveling reports confirm that the Imperial Post Steamer operated besides its subsidized routes. The Imperial Post Steamer was reported to drive from Shanghai to Hongkong in three days, but to anchor at Fuzhou during the tea season on its return

<sup>65</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 108-109.

<sup>66</sup>Arnold Kludas, *Sprunghaftes Wachstum, 1900 bis 1914*, Geschichte der deutschen Passagierschifffahrt (Weltbild Verlag, 1994) 156-168.

<sup>67</sup>Adolf v. Hänisch, *Jebsen & Co. Hong Kong. China-Handel im Wechsel der Zeit 1895-1945* (Selbstverlag, 1970) 53-54.

path.<sup>68</sup> Thus, it cannot be ruled out that the NDL and HAPAG visited Xiamen with their Imperial Post Steamer ships, e.g., to transport coolies.

Additionally, the Imperial Post Steamer allowed travelers and goods alike to reach and depart from China. For example, Wegener traveled with the Imperial Post Steamer steamer *München* to China where he also visited Xiamen.<sup>69</sup> Since Hongkong was the trading hub from which German goods reached Xiamen (see Section 7.5) the Imperial Post Steamer contributed indirectly to the German export to Xiamen.

As the name suggests, the operating of the Imperial Post Steamer also allowed the establishment of German post offices such as for Xiamen. The first German post office opened on the 16. August 1886 when the first Imperial Post Steamer arrived in Shanghai. In Tianjin, a post office opened in October 1889, in Yantai on the 1. June 1892. After the lease of Jiaozhou many new post offices were erected. On the 9. August 1900 a post office was established in the former district of Tanggu in Tianjin, on the 1. September 1900 in Shanhaiguan. The post office in Beijing only opened on the 11. September 1900. On the 1. April 1900 a post office opened in Hankou, on the 28. October 1901 in Zhenjiang. In the south of China the post office in Fuzhou was opened in 1900 before the ones in Xiamen<sup>70</sup> and Hangzhou that were opened two years later.<sup>71</sup>

Figure 3 shows the German post offices that operated in 1902 as explained above. Additionally, it displays the German sea connections. According to the graphic, the Imperial Post Steamer line as seen in the picture as *Subventionierte Reichspostdampfer-Linie nach Ostasien* went to Guangzhou and Shanghai and on its return way also to Fuzhou. Apart from that, a regular line south of China can be seen by the HAPAG (see Section 8.13), in the picture as *Hamburg-Amerika-Linie (Canton-Shanghai)* between Guangzhou and Shanghai.

The German post was first managed from Germany, and starting with 1901 through the central post office in Shanghai. The Imperial Post Steamer operated only in Shanghai and Hongkong. However, starting from the May 1887 also English and French ships transported the German post to Germany.<sup>72</sup> German post from Xiamen was not sent to Shanghai or Hongkong for further transportation. Instead, Xiamen had with Guangzhou and Fuzhou direct shipping connections with Germany that transported the post.<sup>73</sup>

### 5.3 East Asia Squadron

To facilitate the expansion in the East Asiatic area, Germany initiated the *East Asia Squadron* (*Ostasiengeschwader*, 东亚分舰队) as part of the German navy in 1876. The East Asia Squadron was mainly used on the coasts of China and Japan.

The East Asia Squadron was useful for Germany through its sole presence in China. While before, the German merchants were unprotected against foreign countries, the East Asia Squadron now could intimidate potential aggressors and exert pressure itself. Compared to the trading vessels, German gunboats had the advantage to be able to

<sup>68</sup>Meyers Reisebücher, *Weltreise: Erster Teil: Indien, China und Japan* (Weitsuechtig, 2013) 241.

<sup>69</sup>G. Wegener, *Zur Kriegezeit in China 1900/1901* (Bod Third Party Titles, 2011) 12.


<sup>70</sup>Section 6.7 presents details regarding the duties of the post office in Xiamen.

<sup>71</sup>Germany. Reichspostministerium, *Postarchiv*, vol. 31 (1903), 84, 85.

<sup>72</sup>Germany. Reichspostministerium, *Postarchiv*, vol. 31 (1903), 84.

<sup>73</sup>Germany. Reichspostministerium 86.

<sup>74</sup>Germany. Reichspostministerium 86.

Figure 3: German Post Offices in China 1902<sup>72</sup>

anchor in any Chinese harbors to protect trade or to chase other vessels through the Treaty of Tientsin.<sup>75</sup>

From 1881 to 1883, the East Asia Squadron included the following war ships:<sup>76</sup>

- Flagship and Cruiser Frigate *SMS Stosch*
- Corvette *SMS Hertha* (until July 1882)
- Corvette *SMS Elisabeth* (starting July 1882)
- Gunboat *SMS Wolf*
- Gunboat *SMS Iltis*

On the 1. April 1881 the *SMS Stosch* was initiated to take over the role as a flagship of the East Asiatic warships.<sup>77</sup> Soon after, the *SMS Stosch* anchored in Xiamen along with the *SMS Elisabeth* and *SMS Iltis*, as the German consul reported for 1882.<sup>78</sup> In these early years the *SMS Stosch* already came into use to solve a trading conflict, further referred to as the “Sugar Boiling Pan Incident”. The Chinese custom office confiscated pans for boiling sugar (Zuckersiedepfannen) that a German business man wanted to use to open a sugar boiling business in Taiwan. The iron pans itself belonged to C. Gerard & Co. The Chinese custom office claimed that a Chinese had a monopoly on this business and seized the pans. According to German sources the local authorities refused to hand back the pans even when the government in Beijing gave the order to do so. The East Asia Squadron arrived on the 28. December 1884 in Xiamen with the *SMS Stosch* and *SMS Elisabeth*.<sup>79</sup> As the Customs office still refused to return the pans, a heavily armed landing corps of 300 men blocked the streets to the customs office and broke into it. Without resistance, they retrieved the pans and carried them to the German consulate. Afterwards, they let 20 marines and an officer at the iron-foundry of C. Gerard & Co. for their protection.<sup>80,81,82</sup>

Even if the local Chinese authority were right, the “Sugar Boiling Pan Incident” was a golden opportunity for the East Asia Squadron to demonstrate its usefulness to the government in Berlin, the ascent of the German navy to the British, as well as Germany’s gunboat policy to the Chinese.

In 1895, when German warships examined the harbor of Xiamen, the *Mid-day Herald* referred to the incident: “They have struck terror into the minds of the Chinese there before. It is only a few years ago that the German flagship ‘Elizabeth’ landed a force

<sup>75</sup>Imperial Maritime Customs. Inspectorate General of Customs. 865.

<sup>76</sup>Uwe Lüthje, “Tagebuchs-Auszug betreffend die Reise S.M.S. “Hertha” nach Ost-Asien und den Südsee-Inseln 1874 – 1877 im Museum für Völkerkunde der Universität Kiel”, (2007) 59.

<sup>77</sup>Lüthje 59.

<sup>78</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 372.

<sup>79</sup>Lüthje 59.

<sup>80</sup>G. Wislicenus and W. Stöwer, *Deutschlands Seemacht: sonst und jetzt nebst einem Überblick über die Geschichte der Seefahrt aller Völker. Erläutert durch 65 Bilder vom Marinemaler Willy Stöwer* (Grunow, 1896) 77.

<sup>81</sup>Straits Times Weekly Issue, “Amoy” (15 Jan. 1883), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/stweekly18830115-1.2.4.7.aspx>>: 1.

<sup>82</sup>Wislicenus and Stöwer report (77) that the *SMS Iltis* instead of the *SMS Stosch* arrived. However, the newspapers and other reports all mention the *SMS Stosch* and *SMS Elisabeth*.




Figure 4: The East Asia Squadron in Xiamen 1896<sup>85</sup> (by Courtesy of William Brown)

of sailors and marines, and raided the residence of the Taoti [Taotai (道台)<sup>83</sup>] in order to recover possession of a few iron cooking pans that had been seized from a German subject. The Chinese official took to his heels, and the Chinese were at their wit's end.”<sup>84</sup>

Figure 4 shows from left to right the SMS Irene, SMS Kaiser SMS Prinzess Wilhelm, SMS Arcona, SMS Cormoran, and SMS Iltis of the East Asia Squadron in the harbor of Xiamen, most likely when the survey of the harbor took place.<sup>86</sup> It were also the same ships that were used to invade Qingdao.

In 1900, after the occurrence of the “Japanese Scare” and when the Boxer Rebellion started, Wegener reported a high presence of warships: “Here, as well as in Hongkong, there are at present many cannon boats signifying the exceptional state. In front of the European settlement three English cannon boats, one American, and one Russian boat is placed. Further away in a branch of the bay there are no less than four Japanese

<sup>83</sup>The Taotai was the local authority in the Qing dynasty with which the foreign consuls frequently negotiated about civil and military affairs.

<sup>84</sup>Mid-day Herald, “Germany and Amoy” (28 Oct. 1895), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/middayherald18951128-1.2.4.aspx>>: 2.

<sup>85</sup>Illustrierte Zeitung, “Das deutsche Geschwader auf der Rhede von Amoy (China)” (09 Mar. 1896): 562–563.

<sup>86</sup>The label reads *The German Squadron in the Harbor of Xiamen (China). Following a Photograph by Willy Stöwer.* (Das deutsche Geschwader auf der Rhede von Xiamen (China). Nach einer photographischen Aufnahme gezeichnet von Willy Stöwer.).

boats.”<sup>87</sup> After the incident, the German gunboat *SMS Tiger* was ordered to go to Xiamen where it arrived after the other ships and was seen on the 3. August 1900.<sup>88</sup>

In a personal talk with consul Merz, Wegener could confirm<sup>89</sup> that the burning of the temple was only a spontaneous pretext of the Japanese for their occupation.<sup>90</sup> The conflict was solved by the gunboat presence and both Japanese and British withdrew their troops. The German gunboat *SMS Tiger* did probably only play a minor part in it. However, the public opinion of the Chinese probably was in favor of the Germans as reported by Wegener, since the settlement of the dispute occurred with the anchoring of the German warship.<sup>91</sup>

Xiamen stayed an important port for the East Asia Squadron throughout its existence, and every year the warships anchored in Xiamen. Through the expansion of the East Asia Squadron, their number increased throughout the years. For example in 1910 the *SMSS Scharnhorst*, *SMS Jaguar*, and *SMS Iltis* anchored two times, and the *SMSS Leipzig* (which’s crew destroyed the Rocking Stone in 1908, see Section 6.9), *Nuernberg*, *Tiger*, *Luchs*, and *Taku* one time.

## 5.4 Xiamen’s Potential as a German Concession

The first potential German concession in Gulangyu started with a planned storage magazine suggested in a letter from the 19. March 1875. The letter was written on behalf of Stosch who was the leader of the Imperial Admiralty (Kaiserliche Admiralität) between 1872 and 1883. Although the letter did not refer to it, Stosch probably responded to Krauel’s suggestion when investigating Xiamen as a location for a German professional consulate, who then mentioned that “Xiamen will presumably still be important for a German Marine establishment.”<sup>92</sup>

Stosch claimed that German warships had to transport provisions, materials, inventory, and clothing on their boats since the required goods could not be bought at all, or only in inadequate quality. Thus, he deemed a storage magazine on Gulangyu to be useful. According to him, German warships were sometimes so full that the inventory had to be stored on the steerage where it was in the open air and inaccessible for maintenance.<sup>93</sup>

Stosch judged that Xiamen was in a perfect location as it was situated centrally between Singapore, Yokohama, Nagasaki, Manila, Hongkong, and Shanghai. Moreover, the harbor facilities allowed convenient maintenance of the ships.<sup>94</sup>

Not enough, the mentioned inventory could be bought for a low price, it was already “a hub for the coast trade that was exclusively in German hands”, and coals as well as provisions were available in a high quality. Stosch asked for permission for his plans,

<sup>87</sup>Wegener 44-45, 48-49.

<sup>88</sup>The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, “Japanese at Amoy” (03 Aug. 1900), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singfreepressb19000803-1.2.8.3.aspx>>: 2.

<sup>89</sup>British and Americans reported that the cause of the “Japanese Scare” was only a pretext, e.g., see (Pitcher 262-264)

<sup>90</sup>Wegener 44-45, 48-49.

<sup>91</sup>Wegener 63.

<sup>92</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 185.

<sup>93</sup>BArch 22575.

<sup>94</sup>BArch 22575.



to let a captain of a warship investigate the location, and suggested to take the project into account in the budget for the next year.<sup>95</sup>

However, Stosch's plans were from the beginning on unorganized and sloppy. His first letter exhibits exaggerated praising of Gulangyu, contains several contradictions, e.g., when noting that inventory could not be bought but later again stating that the goods were available in good quality for purchase in Xiamen for the storage magazine. Stosch also suggested to assign the maintenance and administration of the magazine to the consul, who would have then had no more time to fulfill his other duties. He also imagined that perhaps the two consul properties could be used for the planned 1280 square meter big magazine, which was simply unrealistic.

In a writing from the 19. February 1875 Berlin approved the essential direction of his request, although expressing some of the noted objections. Preparations started and the *SMS Ariadne* with corvette captain Kühne was sent to Xiamen and other places on the coast for investigations. The consul inquired at the local companies for the prices regarding coal and other goods, including Tait & Co, Pasedag & Co., as well as Gerard & Co. The selection of three potential properties included one opposite of Gulangyu on the island of Xiamen, as well as private properties of Gerard and Andersen on Gulangyu, as Section 6.2 shows.

The idea was finally discarded. First, the magazine was noted in the budget with the same price as the alternative project, a hospital in Yokohama. The *Empirical Budget House (Reichshausetat)* expressed "serious doubt" for the approval of the magazine with such a course plan and unmentioned budget calculation.<sup>96</sup> Even after resolving this concern, the idea had no chance to be implemented since in the course of the planning the storage magazine developed to a naval base. Also, a later proposal mentions to bring the property "under German sovereignty" after purchase which would in fact have meant a German concession.

That this was a delusional idea without practical significance was noted by Krauel on the 26. October 1876, who stated the concern in a diplomatic manner, as he noted that "the establishment of a bigger Marine establishment in East Asia is neither needed, nor useful." In it he also expressed the additional argument that in the next time only two corvettes and two gunboats (see Section 5.3) were planned to operate in East Asia.<sup>97</sup>

Another time when Xiamen was on the verge of becoming a German concession was around 1895. The German empire was long born and with the ascent of Wilhelm II, Germany wanted to have a "place in the sun" and form its colonial empire.

At this time, Germany was expanding its navy and trade, but still did not have a base in East Asia. In 1896 Wislicenus et al. complain about the situation: "It is clear that an effective strategy of naval warfare requires preparations in peace times. Coal storages have to be constructed at ports of all seas and the colonial ports as bases have to provide all kinds of reserves, coal, ammunition, and food. In the Atlantic ocean, in the Indian Ocean, and in the South Seas, Germany only has colonial bases with minor strategical importance. Regrettably, in an area where the German maritime trade is quite strong and where conflicts with other naval powers are of daily concern, no naval base is present. The area I am talking about is East Asia where our diplomacy should have secured a port long time ago, such as Xiamen, to guarantee protection of naval

<sup>95</sup>BArch 22575.

<sup>96</sup>BArch 22575.

<sup>97</sup>BArch 22575.

trade during times of peace and war. I hope that this overdue issue will be solved in time!”<sup>98</sup>

Only two years later Germany seized Qingdao and constructed its naval base in the Jiaozhou bay. That Xiamen could provide reserves, coal, ammunition, and food can be seen as a fact through the answers of the companies during the planning of the provision magazine after 1875. Why had not Xiamen as the favorite German port in Asia been chosen as a concession?

In many books, the answer seems straightforward, such as Jing and Mühlhahn who state that the Germans planned the occupation of two places, one in the south and one in the north. According to them, the eventual options were the Zhoushan Island in front of Shanghai in the north and Xiamen in the south, Jiaozhou bay in the north and the Penghu islands in the south.<sup>99</sup> Seemingly, the Germans favored the first pair of Zhoushan Island and Jiaozhou as a suitable port for its navy base. They state that the Federal Foreign Office remarked in 1895 that the Zhoushan Island already belonged to the British since 1846, and Penghu to Japan. Finally, Xiamen as an international concession was also out of question.<sup>100</sup> However, the actual selection of the port predates a longer investigation.

According to Kelly, several people were central in the planning of the potential bases: Admiral Tirpitz, Rear Admiral Otto Diedrichs, and Admiral Knorr. They were all leader of the East Asia Squadron: Admiral Knorr was the leader between 1886 and 1887, Rear Admiral Otto Diedrichs between 1897 and 1899, and Tirpitz between 1896 and 1897. Latter basically built the German navy from scratch.

Wilhelm II instructed Diedrichs and Knorr to prepare a document about potential naval bases for the 8. November 1895. Diedrichs with more experience in Asia selected Jiaozhou. Knorr instead promoted Xiamen, Zhoushan Island, Jiaozhou, and Sansha. On the 4. July 1896 Tirpitz got the orders from Knorr to investigate Xiamen, Jinmen, Sansha, and Zhoushan Island. Tirpitz showed an initial preference of Jiaozhou, and was in disfavor of Xiamen because of the “diplomatic strings attached” to it.<sup>101</sup>

Even before Tirpitz’s mission German warships were also reported in Xiamen. Probably, a mission to survey for naval bases was already assigned to Tirpitz’s predecessor in the East Asia Squadron, Paul Hoffmann. The *Mid-day Herald* reported on the 28. November 1895: “Amoy, it would seem, is a famous hunting ground for Germany. That the Germans have their eye on the little island is certain.”<sup>102</sup> On the next day, the newspaper reported the actual sightings: “We reported that on Wednesday there was a rumor in Hongkong that the German fleet was in Xiamen, and that it was reported there that the Germans were to take the Nanao Island as satisfaction for the outrages on the German missionary stations near Shantou some time ago. By the coasting boats which arrived here today we learn more of the doings of this fleet. On the 13th inst. the German men of war Kaiser Irene, Cormoran and Princess Wilhelm were quietly at anchor, in Xiamen, though there were many rumors ashore as to their intentions. But on the

<sup>98</sup>Wislicenus and Stöwer 163-164.

<sup>99</sup>K. Mühlhahn, *Herrschaft und Widerstand in der "Musterkolonie" Kiautschou: Interaktionen zwischen China und Deutschland, 1897-1914*, Studien zur Internationalen Geschichte (Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2000) 90.

<sup>100</sup>Mühlhahn 90.

<sup>101</sup>Kelly 118-120.

<sup>102</sup>Mid-day Herald, “Germany and Amoy”.



day previous to this the flagship and one cruiser were observed in the harbor of Jinmen surveying. The explanation given of this proceeding by the German residents of Xiamen was that the admiral was examining the capabilities of this harbor to serve as a naval station and the site of a dock yard.” After praising the harbor of Xiamen, the newspaper continues: “In consequence of the German surveying vessels and the consequent rumors of hostile inventions many of the well-to-do residents have left for the mainland. But as the survey is now complete the chances are that these will at once return. As for the report of the Nanao Island being occupied, no further particulars have come to hand, but the opinion of all the men who know the island is that it would make a fine colony.”<sup>103</sup>

In August 1896 Tirpitz also led discussions with the Ambassador Eduard von Heyking who proposed to choose Xiamen. Heyking suggested that the Russians were interested in Jiaozhou, since Port Arthur was not ice-free all the year, and that they have sheltered in the harbor before. Tirpitz sent his report on the 13. September 1896 in which Xiamen thus stayed an option “because Tirpitz had learned from British contacts that, despite its treaty status, Britain would make only small difficulties if Germany were interested.” However, he favored Jiaozhou over all.<sup>104</sup>

When Wilhelm II asked Heyking for a response he answered that Tirpitz and he had decided that Xiamen would be their choice. Tirpitz was at this time in Zhoushan Island and Heyking gave an immediate answer because he did not want to let the emperor wait. When Tirpitz’s report arrived the emperor was confused and asked Knorr regarding the selected base. As a result the Chinese Tariff Director Hans Detring was contacted who advocated Jiaozhou.<sup>105</sup>

However, Tirpitz changed his mind and suddenly voted for Xiamen in a letter of the 7. December since he thought that China agreed that Jiaozhou would be given to Russia. On the 13. April 1897 Tirpitz left for Berlin to become State Secretary.<sup>106</sup> On the 6. November 1897 Berlin reached the news that missionaries in Shandong had been murdered. Only six days later Admiral Diedrichs who was Tirpitz’s successor in China seized Qingdao. At this time Tirpitz feared war with Russia, but Wilhelm was targeting Jiaozhou.<sup>107</sup> That the missionaries were killed in Shandong did not play a major role at this time.

While in the end Jiaozhou was chosen, the previous investigations suggest that Xiamen was on the verge of becoming a German concession. Surprisingly, the British would not even have prevented it. However, a takeover of Xiamen would have still been risky since the Americans and Japanese could have responded with diplomatic or military actions. Especially the Japanese, who were themselves highly interested in the port would have been dangerously near in the newly conquered Taiwan.

In 1906 a last time a potential invasion by Germany was feared. On the 23. January 1906 the German consul reported “false rumors” that had been spread by the Chinese and English newspapers and concerned the establishment of a German coal station in Xiamen. According to them, to accomplish this goal the Germans wanted to buy the New

<sup>103</sup>Mid-day Herald, “The Germans at Amoy. (Honkong Telegraph.)” (29 Oct. 1895), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/middayherald18951129-1.2.8.aspx>>: 3.

<sup>104</sup>Kelly 121.

<sup>105</sup>Kelly 122.

<sup>106</sup>Kelly 123-128.

<sup>107</sup>Kelly 143.

Amoy Dock Company.<sup>108</sup> However, since Germany had already conquered Qingdao that could serve as a coal station, the establishment of a concession in Xiamen after 1897 was out of question.

## 5.5 Conclusion

That Xiamen was an important port for German warships is undisputed. Xiamen was also the proving ground for the East Asia Squadron which confiscated sugar cooking pans in 1886. In spite of its importance, Xiamen never became a German concession. That sometimes it stood on the verge of it shows the planning to establish a storage magazine in 1875. However, the scope of the project became too extensive and since a storage magazine was not really necessary the project was discarded. Before the concession of Jiaozhou in Qingdao, Xiamen was again investigated as a potential German navy base. That Gulangyu was inhabited by British, Japanese, American, and other nationalities did not seem to play a big role, especially since the British did not lay claim on Xiamen.

Although the Imperial Post Steamer had no direct connection with Xiamen, it played an important part for its shipping development. The shipping companies NDL, HAPAG, and M. Jebsen could profit through the subsidizing of the official shipping line. All three companies anchored in Xiamen. Especially the NDL and HAPAG accounted for most of the shipping traffic in Xiamen starting with 1900. Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine both investigate thoroughly how they contributed to the shipping traffic in Xiamen. Through the regular line from Germany to China, German travelers (see Chapter Six) and goods (see Chapter Seven) could arrive and depart from China. The Imperial Post Steamer also allowed the establishment of the German post office in Xiamen as Section 6.7 shows.

The first German consulate was opened in 1859. However, the first consul was the merchant consul Pasedag who misused his authority. In 1874 Krauel became the first professional consul. The main reasons for the opening of the professional consulate were related to shipping and trade of Germans in Xiamen. Discussions started after 1900 to relocate the professional consulate back to Fuzhou. As argued later, with 1900 the shipping declined to a minimum and Xiamen's future importance for Germany was doubtful. However, Xiamen was still a popular harbor for German warships that anchored every year. Probably this was the reason that the consulate still stayed in Xiamen until the end of the First World War.

The next chapter follows with an investigation of local life in Xiamen. It presents a viewpoint that is strictly focused on Xiamen and thus transitions from the previously more general chapters to more specific ones regarding local life, trade, and shipping.

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<sup>108</sup>PA AA R 9208/953 215.

## Chapter Six Local Population, Establishments, and Influence

German local life in Xiamen had a small scale, with only few German establishments and a small population. Travel reports often describe Gulangyu as a small and quiet island. So does Grünfeld who notes that apart from Shanghai, all other ports in China are merely *outports*: “The other places in China are smaller, and the foreign settlements in them are mostly just a few houses or blocks big.” However, Xiamen enjoyed a special position among these less important ports: “One of the organized settlements worth mentioning is Gulangyu in Xiamen. It is a lovely island and mainly residence of foreigners, who conduct their business in the British concession. The houses are adapted to the half tropical climate and lie scattered around gorgeous plantings, so that the settlement seems like a mansion city. It is indeed difficult to think of a nicer stay than on the island with its quiet avenues and parks, where only from time to time a church or shop can be spotted. Only a few number of Chinese live on Gulangyu.”<sup>109</sup> Gulangyu’s natural beauty, gardens, and extravagant mansions are noted in almost all foreign traveling reports.

Grünfeld also mentions the isolation of the foreign settlements and concessions by taking a foreigner living on Gulangyu as an example. According to him, he got to know people “who lived seven years on Gulangyu and could not bring up enough interest to visit the Chinese city of Xiamen which would only lie ten minutes away, but which is recognized as China’s dirtiest city.”<sup>110</sup> While this might be an exaggeration, reality was that most foreigners lived on Gulangyu. Also Chinese lived on Gulangyu, however they mostly either belonged to a higher class such as returned overseas Chinese, or whose profession was to cater for the richer people on Gulangyu.

Also Grube stresses the beautiful appearance of the island Gulangyu: “Xiamen is very interesting through its scenery and nice temples. In the background are many bald sharply jagged mountain chains, while the hills on the coast have countless massive boulders of grotesque forms, with small picturesque temples in between. [...] The mountains are full of tigers that sometimes wander to the outskirts of Xiamen. One time a mighty tiger even swam from Xiamen to Gulangyu. Gulangyu namely is the lovely picturesque city on which the Europeans live (while their businesses are in Xiamen).”<sup>111</sup>

Wegener describes Xiamen as a city that “does not reach the standard of Hongkong’s fantastic mild beauty, it appears less heroically, but of a fascinating bizarre beauty. The rocks have even more peculiar and temperamental forms: a confused and random aggregate of granite boulders appearing as if the sea was petrified in the surf.”<sup>112</sup>

Naturally, most traveling reports focus on the landscape and sights rather than on the city and German influence. The question that remains open after evaluating these travel reports is thus the scope of German local life on Gulangyu. To follow this question, this chapter investigates the size of the local population, occupations, local German establishments, how it contributed to the island life, and how Germans interacted with other nationalities.

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<sup>109</sup>Grünfeld 178.

<sup>110</sup>Grünfeld 215.

<sup>111</sup>Hopf and Walravens 103.

<sup>112</sup>Wegener 44.

## 6.1 Local Population

The German population in Xiamen was small compared to the rest of the foreign population. It never exceeded the persons working in the few local establishments, and members of the ship crews living in Xiamen.

The first German consular reports still give a complete list of the population, such as seen in Table 1 for the year 1864. At this time, the population merely amounted a dozen, half of them being merchants.

Name	Age	Birthplace	Profession
Pasedag, Adolph	35	Bergen	Merchant
Krüger, Caesar	31	Altona	Merchant
Witt, Heinrich	21	Hamburg	Merchant
Ulisch, Hermann	28	Angermünde	Merchant
Nielmann, Carl	35	Wismar	Merchant
Martin, Otto	26	Leipzig	Watchmaker
Schmidt, Wilhelm	34	Dessau	Grocer
Gerard	29	Hanover	Grocer
Stefen	31	Hamburg	Carpenter
Busch	28	Hamburg	Carpenter
Schmidt	45	Hamburg	Baker
Pasedag, Carl Julius	35	Grimmen	Merchant

Table 1: List of Germans in Xiamen 1864

Table 2 shows the development of the German population for the other years.<sup>113</sup>

<sup>113</sup>The table gives only an incomplete overview of the development of the German population, since it is aggregated from several different sources. However, it presents a plausible development.

<sup>114</sup>Liu Jing, "Wahrnehmung des Fremden: China in deutschen und Deutschland in chinesischen Reiseberichten vom Opiumkrieg bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg", Diss., Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, 2001, 34.

<sup>115</sup>R. Nield, *The China Coast: Trade and the First Treaty Ports* (Joint Publishing (HK), 2010) 105.

<sup>116</sup>W. Schüler, *Abriss Der Neueren Geschichte Chinas* (Bod Third Party Titles, 2013) 149.

<sup>117</sup>PA AA R 9208/950: 55.

<sup>118</sup>Liu Jing, "Wahrnehmung des Fremden: China in deutschen und Deutschland in chinesischen Reiseberichten vom Opiumkrieg bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg", Diss., Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, 2001, 34.

<sup>119</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, vol. 5 (1875), 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 719.

<sup>120</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, vol. 5 (1875), 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 719.

<sup>121</sup>H.A. Giles, *A Short History of Koolangsu* (A.A. Marcal, 1878) 38.

<sup>122</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, vol. 9 (1881), 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 335.

<sup>123</sup>PA AA R 252850: 16.

<sup>124</sup>PA AA R 9208/951: 77.

<sup>125</sup>PA AA R 9208/953: 225.

<sup>126</sup>Philip Wilson Pitcher, *In and about Amoy. Some historical and other facts connected with one of the first open ports in China*, Second Edition (The Methodist Publishing House in China. Shanghai and Foochow, 1912) 216.

<sup>127</sup>Liu Jing, "Wahrnehmung des Fremden: China in deutschen und Deutschland in chinesischen Reiseberichten vom Opiumkrieg bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg", Diss., Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, 2001, 34.

<sup>128</sup>William C Kirby, *Germany and Republican China* (Stanford University Press, 1984) 23.

Year	Germans in China	Germans in Xiamen	foreigners in Xiamen
1849	33 <sup>114</sup>	-	-
1850	-	-	29 <sup>115,116</sup>
1864	-	12	-
1867	-	12 <sup>117</sup> -	-
1872	487 <sup>118</sup>	-	-
1874 <sup>119</sup>	-	18	176
1875 <sup>120</sup>	-	43	275
1878 <sup>121</sup>	-	38	251
1881 <sup>122</sup>	-	43	275
1885	-	38 <sup>123</sup>	-
1886 (1885?)	-	38 <sup>124</sup>	-
1903	-	ca. 20	-
1905 <sup>125</sup>	-	26	1745
1910 <sup>126</sup>	-	26	(507?)
1913	2949 <sup>127,128</sup>	-	-
1917	-	-	3,885 <sup>129</sup>

Table 2: German Population in China and Xiamen 1849-1917

Until 1874 with 18 people, the number stayed relatively constant. From the year 1874 to 1875 the German population suddenly increased from 18 to 43 people. Not only the German, but the whole foreign population in Xiamen increased from 176 to 275 in that year. The percentage of the German population thus increased only from about 10% to 16%. The number of the Germans and other foreigners stayed relatively constant until about 1885.

Only around the year 1903 there was a drop of the German population to around twenty people. The foreign population in total, however, still increased further. In 1910, there were only 26 Germans left in Xiamen that represented only about 5% of the foreign population.

While at around 1903 the German population in Xiamen stagnated, it generally increased in China. Between 1872 and 1874, about three percent of the Germans in China were living in Xiamen. However, between 1910 and 1913 only less than one percent of the German population in China was living on the island. Why did the German population in Xiamen decrease?

As the following sections argue, local life in Xiamen was very limited and there was no local German production company. Additionally, the port as a trading hub lost continuously in importance, e.g., through the Japanese expansion to Taiwan. As demonstrated by the next chapters, German interests centered on the shipping industry in Xiamen. In 1900, the shipping business declined abruptly and German shipping companies were displaced (see Chapter Nine). The decline of the population after 1900 was thus caused by the lost shipping business and the associated working opportunities, connected to the displacement of regular lines and the decline of Xiamen as a trading hub.

<sup>129</sup>Julian Herbert Arnold, *Commercial Handbook of China*, Miscellaneous Series, No. 84, vol. 1 (Washington Government Printing Office, 1919) 351.

As with the other nationalities represented in Xiamen, only a small percentage of the population were women. However, many German children lived on the island. In the year 1886 18 men, 15 children, and 5 women were registered. Taking the children into account, only about half the German population could follow an occupation.

With a maximum of 43 persons noted in 1875 and 1881 from which about half were children, there is little space for interpretation. The largest part worked as merchants, in the beginning independently and later in companies such as Pasedag & Co., H. A. Petersen & Co., and Gerard & Co. There were probably also members of ship crews registered in Xiamen, since most German ships were chartered for the coast trade and thus did not return to Europe. A hand full of persons also worked in the consulate, since it needed a consular, secretary, interpreter, and an assistant clerk, although one of them was sometimes Chinese and not all posts were continuously occupied. Also the post office and hotel must have had one or two German workers. Additionally, the Maritime Custom service occupied German workers, e.g., as lighthouse keepers and harbor pilots.

German custom employees together with Austrian ones occupied many positions as lighthouse keepers in the Lights Department of the Customs. After the outbreak of the First World War, the Customs department lamented the loss of those senior lighthouse keepers. The lighthouse keepers were mixed Chinese and Europeans and after the outbreak of the war, the German ones were replaced by men of more junior rank.<sup>130</sup>

Apart from that, there were Germans working as carpenters, bakers, grocers, watch-makers, doctors and in various other jobs.

## 6.2 Local German Properties and Establishments

The German consul mentions the existing German properties in the letter from the 5. June 1906 regarding the relocation of the German consulate.<sup>131</sup> The estimated value of the properties was 135,000 Tls<sup>132</sup> and comprised two consulate buildings, properties by the company Pasedag & Co., as well as other private German properties. The properties of Pasedag & Co. were estimated to amount 90,000 Tls, the one of the consulate 30,000 Tls, and other private properties 15,000 Tls. Compared to that, Siemssen & Krohn in Fuzhou alone owned properties estimated to amount 190,000 Tls, exceeding the value of the German properties in Xiamen altogether.

The report neither mentions the post office that opened in 1902 (see Section 6.7), nor the *New Amoy Hotel* owned by a German (see Section 6.6). The post office was associated with the consulate and was thus located in the consulate building, and the *New Amoy Hotel* already closed its doors or was counted as private property. All cases confirm that German local establishments were few.

The German grounds associated with the consulate were bought in 1874. They included two buildings that were before owned by Jones and Hauenstein. Jones was a British doctor and leased the flat from *Huang Chü Lao*, *Huang Chü*, *Huang Shih An*, *Huang Hsin Cheng*, *Huang Chou*, and *Huang Yu*. After the purchase, the building by Jones was used as the German consul mansion. The other building was owned by

<sup>130</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, *Amoy. Decennial Report, 1912-1921*, 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 6.

<sup>131</sup>PA AA R 252853 18.

<sup>132</sup>*Tael* (兩, Tls) was a former Chinese currency which was used to pay the Customs fees. In the Maritime Customs it is abbreviated as Hk. Tls. which stands for Haikwan Taels (海關兩).

the German Hauenstein who took it over from *Huang (born Chen)*, and *Huang Kai*. Subsequently, Germany utilized it as a consulate office.<sup>133</sup>

Wegener's traveling reports and the German consul's answer confirm two buildings related to the German consulate. According to Merz, besides the bureau office "down here", there was also his flat situated more inside the island. Wegener describes the villa later on as being "particularly gorgeous situated in a dominant height as an ancient acropolis temple and also its form reflected such a nature through its surrounding portico carrying the roof. The property reflected a proud and free sense."<sup>134</sup>

Truth was, that the consuls had to report again and again to the German Federal Office, that the consul mansion seen in Figure 5<sup>135</sup> was not suitable to accommodate more people than the consul and his family.

The first German professional consul Krauel reported on the 1. October 1873 that the service mansion would be big enough for consul and interpreter, and he and Budler lived two years together, running a joint household. However, consuls with a family would have left only one room for the interpreter, which "could not even satisfy the most basic requirements."<sup>136</sup> The service mansion had besides the salon, dining room, and two lounges for receiving guests three private rooms that were used as a living room, bedroom, and nursery.<sup>137</sup> The German consulate never acquired other mansions, and thus paid compensation for other employees.

The consulate office as seen in Figure 6 consisted of four rooms. It comprised a reception room, a court room, a small working office for the consul, and another small room for a Chinese scribe. That the consulate employees were not living in luxury is demonstrated by a note of the consul in 1882, who states that the court room was temporarily used for the interpreter and Chinese scribe, since the other small room that was before used for the Chinese scribe was now used for the German scribe Mateling, since "the doctor did not want to allow him to sleep in the moist cellar as he indicated in a long letter."<sup>139</sup>

A map from *In and about Amoy* from 1908 confirms the German consulate and residence building.<sup>141</sup> The residence building was situated in the middle of the island near Camel Rock (骆驼山). The German consulate office was situated near the British con-

<sup>133</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 245-262.

<sup>134</sup>Wegener 50, 60.

<sup>135</sup>The German label reads *German Consulate on Gulangyu (Deutsches Konsulat auf Gulangyu)*. There are, however, several reasons why it was the consulate mansion and not the office. First, the two buildings are frequently confused and even the book accompanying the UNESCO World Heritage Application refers to the German building near camel rock and the one near the British consulate simply both as *German Consulate* in English and 德国领事馆 in Chinese. Secondly, the descriptions by Wegener fit to the labels attributed in this thesis. While the consulate office only had a mediocre appearance, the mansion was high on the mountain and looked like an "acropolis temple" as reflected in the illustration. Last, features of the building such as the flat roof of the living mansion and the rounded arcs of the consulate office also confirm that the depicted photo is the living mansion.

<sup>136</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 280-281.

<sup>137</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 245-262.

<sup>138</sup>G. Franzius and W. Röse, *Kiautschou, Deutschlands Erwerbung in Ostasien* (Schall & Grund, 1898) 89.

<sup>139</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 282.

<sup>140</sup>Philip Wilson Pitcher, *In and about Amoy. Some historical and other facts connected with one of the first open ports in China*, Second Edition (The Methodist Publishing House in China. Shanghai and Foochow, 1912) 42.

<sup>141</sup>Pitcher 321.




Figure 5: German Consulate Mansion on Gulangyu at Around 1898<sup>138</sup>






Figure 6: German Consulate Office on Gulangyu<sup>140</sup>

sulate and Japanese Consulate Residence. Figure 7 shows an enhanced version of the mentioned map.




Figure 7: Map of Gulangyu 1908<sup>142</sup> (by Courtesy of William Brown)

Figure 9 shows another map that depicts Gulangyu together with Xiamen harbor. Apart from the *German Consulate Residence* (21) near *Camel Rock* (22) and the *German Consulate* (17) near the *British Consulate* (18) the map further confirms other German buildings.

The map associates two buildings with Pasedag & Co. The first building is a shared establishment *J. G. Goltz & Co. and Pasedag & Co.* (1) and the second is labeled as *Pasedag & Co.* (7). The shared building with *J. G. Goltz & Co.* was probably the business office, and latter a private mansion. Unfortunately, the labels on the map can almost not be read and only the second building could be identified with some degree of certainty. The first building which's location stayed unidentified likely was located on Xizi Road (西仔路) where most merchants set up their businesses.<sup>143</sup> The estimated value of the properties in 1906 also presents the possibility, that more houses were owned by Pasedag & Co.

Figure 8 shows a house on Gulangyu from 1880<sup>144</sup> that was associated with C. J. Pasedag or Pasedag & Co. It cannot be ruled out that this was the second Pasedag building on the map.

<sup>142</sup>William N. Brown, *Discover Gulangyu* (Xiamen University Press, 2005) 16.

<sup>143</sup>William N. Brown, *Discover Gulangyu* (Xiamen University Press, 2005) 214.

<sup>144</sup>The photo was taken by the local Chinese studio Rui Sheng/Jui Shan (瑞生) and Yi Fang/E-Fong (宜芳)(Hahn).





Figure 8: The Pasedag House<sup>145</sup> (by Courtesy of Thomas H. Hahn)



Of additional interest is the location of the *Asiatic Petroleum Tanks* (23). The tanks belonged to the Asiatic Petroleum Company for which Pasedag & Co. acted as an agency (see Section 7.3.1).




Figure 9: Map of Xiamen from the Fourth Decennial Maritime Report 1912-1921<sup>146</sup>

<sup>145</sup>Thomas H. Hahn, "Pasedag House" (06 Jan. 2012), <<http://hahn.zenfolio.com/p147681789/h15c67505>>.

<sup>146</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館，中國海關總署辦公廳，*Amoy. Decennial Report, 1912-1921*，中國舊海關史料(1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 155.



There are only few hints of private German properties in Xiamen. Several properties were discussed as potential locations for a storage magazine as initiated by Stosch in 1875 and discussed in Section 5.4. The file associated with the discussion contains a photo of Gulangyu with three potential locations. Figure 10 shows these three properties. The property marked in red and labeled with *I* was owned by Gerard who drew attention to him through the “Sugar Boiling Pan Incident”. The property was not located on Gulangyu but on the opposite of the inner harbor on the island of Xiamen. The property marked in blue and labeled with *II* was a property near the German consulate. The building labeled with *III* was owned by L. A. Andersen.




Figure 10: Gerard's and Andersen's Properties Around 1875<sup>147</sup>

### 6.3 Education and Missionaries

The first public library in Xiamen was established by the German H. Budler (卜某) who worked in the consulate as a interpreter. He established the library in the city (not in Gulangyu) in 1875 as Bowen Academy (博闻书院). He arrived only one year earlier on the 13. November 1874.<sup>148</sup> Budler wanted to provide the Chinese with a reading

<sup>147</sup>BArch R 901/22575, Bl. 32.

<sup>148</sup>PA AA R 9208/950 212.

room open for everyone, and to offer access to foreign standard works and the leading Chinese newspapers. It was at times supported by subscribers and also by the local government.<sup>149</sup>

Apart from that, no other German successes in education can be noted. Germany's participation in education in China was generally low. In 1913, the number of Chinese students in German schools only amounted 368 and German institutions were thus far behind British and American ones. The first German-run middle schools were opened in Qingdao, Jinan, Guangzhou, and Hankou along with the Qingdao University (青島大學) and the Tongji University (同濟大學) in Shanghai.<sup>150</sup>

Shortly before the First World War German government stipends of five million RM were on the plan to expand German education and make German an obligatory foreign language. However, with the outbreak of war these efforts could no longer be continued.<sup>151</sup>

Another reason for the small participation in the educational sector was that no German missionaries were stationed in Xiamen. Instead, they were concentrated in the area around Shandong.<sup>152</sup> On the other hand, American and British missionaries were an important part in Xiamen. They contributed to local Chinese and foreign life through education, physical welfare, by opposing opium, as interpreters, and through writing books. The American and British missionaries promoted their religion, ideals, and language through educating the local population.

Already in February 1842, the year of the Treaty of Nanking, Xiamen became the base of the Protestant Missionary operations. In 1842 the Reformed Church in America arrived in Xiamen. The London Missionary Society arrived in 1844, the English Presbyterian Church in 1850, and the Seventh Day Adventists in 1905.<sup>153</sup>

The early converts could speak the local dialect of Xiamen. Many missionaries were previously stationed in Java and Borneo and waited for the opening of China.<sup>154</sup> However, Germany's colonial efforts started late and did only have few missionaries that could speak Fukkien or Mandarin. Exceptions were German missionaries such as the Protestant Gützlaff<sup>155</sup> who could speak Fukkien, Cantonese, and Mandarin because he joined missionary efforts from early colonial countries.

That German missions missed their chances and that a German institute would not only have been accepted but was even welcome show requests to the German consulate in 1902.<sup>156</sup> Chinese merchants asked the consulate for a teacher for a "German Chinese School" that they planned to found in Quanzhou, a city near Xiamen and part of the German consular district of Xiamen. The school should teach the elementary subjects, as well as the German language. The merchants already could provide enough money for the school grounds and a modest salary for a teacher. However, since a certified teacher with German nationality seemed unaffordable, they first wanted to hire a Chinese who

<sup>149</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, *Amoy. Decennial Report, 1882-1891*. 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 514.

<sup>150</sup>William C Kirby, *Germany and Republican China* (Stanford University Press, 1984) 15.

<sup>151</sup>Kirby 14, 15.

<sup>152</sup>Kelly 118.

<sup>153</sup>Pitcher 229.

<sup>154</sup>Pitcher 231.

<sup>155</sup>Gützlaff was also the German missionary who helped as an interpreter in the British mission that lead to the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 (see Chapter Three).

<sup>156</sup>BArch R 901/5150: Yearly Trade Report for 1901 and 1902, 18. June 1903.

had been educated in Germany. The consulate in Xiamen could not find a suitable teacher and the consul reported that “the few Chinese that come into question want salaries that hardly even get paid for certified English or American teachers.”

In a confidential note the consular criticized the German Basel Mission (Basler Mission, 崇真会) that was stationed in Hongkong. The mission concentrated their efforts on schools and teachers with English as official language and thus “probably without their knowledge, indirectly putting German diligence, German intelligence, and German capital in the service of foreign nations.” On the other hand, they did not consider to send a missionary as a teacher to the school.

Overall, German local commitments did hardly touch on social welfare but focused on the business opportunities and shipping.

## 6.4 Municipal Council

As stated in Chapter Four, Gulangyu had a *Municipal Council* starting from 1903. Germany supported the establishment of the council and the German consul Krause signed the draft for the regulations of the council on the 10. January 1902. Also August Piehl of Pasedag & Co. signed it as a Consul of the Netherlands and vice-consul for Sweden & Norway. Out of the five members in the initial council, four were English, one Japanese, and also one German. The German member was Dr. Franke who worked as an interpreter in the consulate.<sup>157</sup>

In 1904, Bernhard Hempel of the Pasedag & Co. became chairman of the board (Vorsitzender des Verwaltungsrates). This is again not surprising, since due to the small population foreign merchants often took a double role in a governing or administrative position in Xiamen. Probably, these positions were mainly honorary, rather than professional positions. This is further confirmed through a letter of the German consul from the 8. March 1905 where he reports to Berlin that Hempel retired from his position to take a one year holiday to Germany, and no further German national suitable for this position could be found. Hence, Marshall of the British firm Tait & Co. took over Hempel’s place. However, W. Kruse, another merchant of Pasedag & Co. was appointed as a member of the Municipal Council.<sup>158</sup>

After an initial interest of the German administrative organs in Berlin, the Municipal Council quickly was forgotten. After all, its responsibilities were mainly administrative, and as a continuation of the General Purpose Committee restricted to Gulangyu. Also, the Germans did not contribute significantly to it as, e.g., the British with their Indian Sikh police force.<sup>159</sup>

In 1908 the consul wrote on behalf of the consul secretary Heinrich Gottwaldt who complained that he had to pay taxes both to the Municipal Council and Germany. However, the Imperial Prussian Court (Königlich Preußisches Oberverwaltungsgericht) decided that the taxes to the Municipal council could not be understood as equivalent state taxes, and thus dismissed his complaint.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>157</sup>BArch R 901/30946.

<sup>158</sup>BArch R 901/30946.

<sup>159</sup>BArch R 901/30946.

<sup>160</sup>BArch R 901/30946.

## 6.5 Consulate Court

Another local administrative organ that was associated with the consulate was the German court. It was mainly involved in questions regarding shipping, but also in local cases such as the “Borck Case” (see Section 6.7).

Captains occasionally complained that the court was inefficient. Indeed, the small population made legal proceedings time intensive and costly, and probably not completely fair, as a complaint in 1882 shows: “13 Germans are living in Xiamen<sup>161</sup>, for which only 4 can be considered as observers. The consul selected two merchants of them as advocates. [...] If one captain wants to take legal action, one of the two advocates has to defend him without request since both are the bosses of the houses of H. A. Petersen & Co. and Pasedag & Co. and all German ships are consigned to them. [...] Since the consul has four observers to whom he clings for several days, they all try to avoid the sessions, even more since the consul does not really consider their views.”<sup>162</sup>

The situation presumably did not improve much. Even the increase of the population to over 40 people did not cause much relief, since the German companies to which the ships were consigned mostly stayed the same, except for H. A. Petersen & Co. which vanished later on.

In 1912 the observers were the merchants Wilhelm Kruse (who was also in the Municipal council as shown in Section 6.4) and Carl Martens, the harbor pilot Johann Kupsch, and Maritime Customs worker Carl Schmäser. As deputies, the merchant Wilhelm Pfeng, and the Austrian practitioner Dr. Adolf Razlag were noted. The consul Heinrich Gottwaldt had to both represent the court clerk and bailiff.

## 6.6 The New Amoy Hotel

There were probably not more than four hotels in Xiamen during the time investigated in the thesis. The hotels comprised the *Victoria Hotel*, the *Sea View Hotel*, and the *New Amoy Hotel*. The *New Amoy Hotel* as shown in Figure 11 opened its doors in 1890 and was under German lead.<sup>163</sup> It is unclear when it finally closed.<sup>164</sup>

The *New Amoy Hotel* had an excellent reputation. It was also the hotel where Grube stayed who rated it as a “very nice German hotel” with “a good room and excellent food”. Also the British commissioner of customs speaks favorable of the hotel: “One of the best little establishments of its kind to be found on the coast of China is the New Amoy Hotel, Kulangsu. The rooms are spacious and comfortably furnished. A visitor can

<sup>161</sup>At the time of publication, the number actually exceeded already 40.

<sup>162</sup>D. Rüte, “Die Konsulate in China und Japan”, *Hansa: Schifffahrt, Schiffbau, Häfen* 19 (1882), <<http://digiview.gbv.de/viewer/image/72223831219/197/#head>>: 186.

<sup>163</sup>A. Wright and H.A. Cartwright, *Twentieth century impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other treaty ports of China: their history, people, commerce, industries, and resources*, vol. 1 (Lloyds Greater Britain publishing company, 1908) 828.

<sup>164</sup>The *Sea View Hotel* is mentioned together with the *Victoria Hotel* as the only hotels in the Amoy Business Directory in 1911.(Pitcher 309) However, further sources mention only the *Sea View Hotel* together with the *New Amoy Hotel* in 1902(Meyers Reisebücher 243), and even 1913.(Crow 195) As travel handbooks, the latter two might be outdated but no speculations will be made in the further, how long the hotel kept its business open.

<sup>165</sup>A. Wright and H.A. Cartwright, *Twentieth century impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other treaty ports of China: their history, people, commerce, industries, and resources*, vol. 1 (Lloyds Greater Britain publishing company, 1908) 828.





**THE NEW AMOY HOTEL.**  
(Proprietor, F. H. LUCASSEN.)

Figure 11: New Amoy Hotel Around 1908<sup>165</sup>

enjoy a game of billiards and rely upon his comfort being attended to in every possible way.”<sup>166</sup>

The owner, F. H. Lucassen was born in Emden in Germany. He first served in British and American vessels starting with the age of twelve and joined the German navy between 1876 to 1878. Subsequently, he came back to China and continued in the trade business until 1884, when he entered the Imperial Maritime Customs service. Prior to the opening of the *New Amoy Hotel*, he worked at a trading company.<sup>167</sup>

## 6.7 Imperial Chinese and German Post Offices

Issued by an imperial decree, the *Imperial Chinese Post Office* opened in China on the 20. March 1896. Until 1911 it was under the control of the Maritime Customs and later it was assigned to the ministry of Post and Communications.<sup>168</sup> The Chinese Post Office also operated in Xiamen.

An infamous example of German influence in Xiamen was given by the “Borck Case” caused by the German H. E. Borck who was in charge of the Chinese Post Office between 1909 and 1911. When Borck was to be replaced by another officer, he tried to steal 13,060 dollar from the office and left on the 26. August 1911 with it on a steamer to Hongkong on an assumed name. However, the incident was reported and although Borck could not be caught in Hongkong, he was taken in custody in Singapore on the 28. August 1911. Borck was brought back to Xiamen to be tried in front of the German consul.<sup>169</sup>

The German post office in Xiamen was opened on the 12. June 1902.<sup>170</sup> Only the imperial mail steamer allowed the establishment of the post office, as noted in Section 5.2.

The consulate secretary accepted the offer of the Federal Post Office (Reichspostamt) to handle the post traffic for 75 dollar a month. Due to the low extent of post and business, his salary was lowered to 50 dollar. On the 1. January 1909 his salary was increased again to 60 dollar, because of the increased business. The increased business was due to a cumulative deposit of 40,000 dollar.<sup>171</sup> However, this was probably a single case and still below expectations as the salary was still lower than the initial offer.

The post office was overall not profitable since the Chinese Post Office already operated at this time, and also other countries had their own post offices. The Maritime Customs notes that the customers of the post offices were almost exclusively confined to their own nationals.<sup>172</sup> With the small population, it is no wonder that the profit was low. Foreign post offices were mainly created for political reasons<sup>173</sup> and the German one was no exception.

Also the consul noted that with respect to the opening of the post office the “outgoing traffic has not developed yet as expected, since the German tariffs are almost universally

<sup>166</sup>Wright and Cartwright 828.

<sup>167</sup>Wright and Cartwright 828.

<sup>168</sup>W.W. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, vol. 1 (Johns Hopkins Press, 1920) 156.

<sup>169</sup>The Straits Times, “An Amoy Sensation. The Arrest of a German Postal Official” (14 Aug. 1911), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19110814.2.78.aspx>>: 8.

<sup>170</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Trade Report 1901 and 1902.

<sup>171</sup>PA AA R 252853 Letter From the 15. December 1908.

<sup>172</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館，中國海關總署辦公廳，*Amoy. Decennial Report, 1912-1921* 157.

<sup>173</sup>Willoughby 157-158.

higher than the ones of the other existing post offices.”<sup>174</sup>

The German post office in Xiamen likely operated until 1917, until which the post offices discontinued operation.

## 6.8 German's World Policy in Xiamen

In travel reports of Germans in Xiamen often resentment or envy towards the British can be felt. Wegener, e.g., reported that the British were “dominant” in Xiamen and everything centered around them: “The social center is the house of the English consul, then the ones of the other consuls, the head of the Maritime Customs and its higher officials, mostly also British, and finally the distinguished merchants” which were also British. Still, Wegener reported a harmonious and social coexistence.<sup>175</sup>

Indeed, British nationals were the main actors in China's treaty port landscape. They were not only the first imperialist powers which made politics with their gunboats in China, but also dominated shipping and trade. Moreover, they were highly represented in the Chinese Imperial Customs service as reported by Wegener. While the customs service was essentially an agency of the Chinese state, it was also part of the British informal empire and served its interests up to a certain degree.<sup>176</sup>

Grube's travel reports are by far more less positive. On Grube's travels in Xiamen he lived in a German hotel (most probably the *New Amoy Hotel*) and praised its “very good room and excellent food” while condemning the first hotel of Hongkong with its “disorder and dirtiness”. His repeated resentments against the English is prevalent in the letters and probably stems from the competition between the two countries that could also be felt in Xiamen. On the ship from Hongkong to Xiamen he found fault with the “negligence of the British” that “almost cost him his life”. While being on a dinner with German consul Constantin Merz he again complained about the English: “On the next day we had a dinner as the sole educated people among many Englishmen. Since nobody introduced us we also did not know how participate in this event. Nobody of these noble Englishmen even exchanged a single word with Lilly, and when people started to dance after dinner nobody invited Lilly. It is really outrageous and for a person with European views incomprehensible how a nation of louts could be dominant here.”

Grube also praised that Merz used his power to “punish” the British: “I am happy to see that M. treats the English officially and in duty with relentless ruthlessness and is thus highly respected by them. As one time an English boy who worked at the Customs office in Tamsui in Taiwan, where M. formerly worked as a consul, tore down the German consulate plate, M. demanded an immediate dismissal from work. The superior tried to persuade Dr. M. by saying that he would usually be a very well-behaved boy who has to support his old mother. M. explained that he personally felt very sorry for the young man but as a representative of the German empire he had to insist on his immediate dismissal.” Merz tried to help the man personally but Grube was happy that the Englishman was sent back to his country and “had time to think that one cannot play English jokes with the German empire and its representatives.”

<sup>174</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Trade Report 1901 and 1902.

<sup>175</sup>Wegener 217.

<sup>176</sup>Robert Bickers, “Good Work for China in Every Possible Direction. The Foreign Inspectorate of the Chinese Maritime Customs, 1854-1950”, *Twentieth-Century Colonialism and China. Localities, the everyday and the world*, ed. Bryna Goodman and David S. G. Goodman (MPG Books Group, 2012) 25-36.

Germany's rivalry with the British was probably not the only conflict point with the other powers. The seed of Germany's new *world policy* (Weltpolitik) that came up with Wilhelm II had also been planted into the travelers.<sup>177</sup> Grube felt hurt in his national pride when he saw the German consulate: "I entered a small and muddy garden tramped between other properties where I spotted a building with a lower and unfriendly appearance, made of red bricks and a colonnaded porch. Oh no! How can this hideous thing really represent the whole glory of the German empire here?" When he confronted Dr. Merz with the "disgrace" he responded that down there only the offices were situated, and that he should visit his mansion later. When Grube later on discovered the mansion he seemed satisfied: "Ah! That was the reason why the German consul laughed. Indeed, this mansion of the German representative does not be afraid to be compared with the Japanese one."<sup>178</sup>

## 6.9 The Rocking Stone and the SMS Leipzig

On Gulangyu there was a massive boulder called the *Rocking Stone* (Wackelstein, 风动石). However, this "one of most interesting curiosities of the region" was destroyed by a crew of the German warship *SMS Leipzig* on the 29. March 1908. Sailors from the vessel visited the place and rocked the stone down.<sup>179</sup>

The *Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser* reported the incident on the 2. April 1908: "The majority of people must have heard of famous 'Rocking Stone' on the Island of Xiamen. This is a large stone, peculiarly balanced by another rock, which, if it is pushed hard enough will swing in the most astonishing manner. A large party of sailors from from the German gun-boats were over at the spot on Sunday afternoon [the 29. March 1908], and a number of them started to make the stone rock, and they did it to such good effect that it rocked off, and fell down upon some graves. Considerable ill feeling is being evinced, and the affair may lead to serious consequences."<sup>180</sup>

On the 8. April 1908, the *Straits Times* reported that throwing the stone down was not an accident, as the sailors put smaller pieces of rock under the stone and levered it over. The stone narrowly missed a house owned by a Japanese and damaged his garden. He plied in front of the Japanese consul for compensation, who then contacted the German consul. The man went on board of the ship and identified three sailors, who confessed in front of the German consul. They offered a compensation of one dollar each, which he refused. The Japanese was then offered 100 dollar which he again refused as "altogether too small".<sup>181</sup>

The German newspaper *Kompaß* confirms that six sailors knocked down the rock: "The agitation among the Chinese population is understandingly major and it is very regrettable that the stone was of all destroyed by German sailors."<sup>182</sup>

<sup>177</sup>It would be desirable to present a more detailed account of German informal cultural influence and social interactions with other nationals. However, apart from the primary sources referenced in this section, no informal or personal descriptions by Germans related to Xiamen could be found.

<sup>178</sup>Wegener 47, 50, 60.

<sup>179</sup>The *Straits Times*, "Upsetting Amoy's Rocking Stone Causes Trouble" (08 Apr. 1908), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Page/straitstimes19080408-1.1.8.aspx>>: 8.

<sup>180</sup>The *Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, "The Rocking Stone of Amoy" (02 Apr. 1908), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Page/singfreepressb19080402-1.1.5.aspx>>: 5.

<sup>181</sup>The *Straits Times*, "Upsetting Amoy's Rocking Stone Causes Trouble".

<sup>182</sup>*Kompaß*, "Ein zerstörtes chinesisches Naturwunder", *edition unknown* (1908): 4.

Figure 12 shows a photo of the *Rocking Stone* with a crew of German sailors in the foreground taken between 1907 and 1908, shortly before the stone was destroyed. Figure 13 shows the boulder from its other side. Several inscriptions of warships' names are visible such as for the *SMS Iltis* and the *SMS Hansa*. Probably, the warships' crews carved the names of their ships on the Rocking Stone.




Figure 12: Back Side of the Rocking Stone<sup>183</sup> (by Courtesy of Antiquariate Unverferth)

## 6.10 Conclusion

Xiamen only had a small German population of less than fifty persons throughout the time frame of this thesis. At its peak, the German population amounted 16% of the whole foreign population. Most of the population were merchants and the rest worked in the local establishments.

The establishments were few and comprised a consulate office, a consulate mansion, a hotel, grounds and houses by Pasedag & Co. and other smaller properties. Also the

<sup>183</sup>Unknown, "China Japan Lackalbum Album Kaiserliche Marine 1907 - 1909 Kolonien" (1909), <<http://www.benl.ebay.be/itm/China-Japan-Lackalbum-Album-Kaiserliche-Marine-1907-1909-Kolonien-/111289480955>>.

<sup>184</sup>Philip Wilson Pitcher, *In and about Amoy. Some historical and other facts connected with one of the first open ports in China*, Second Edition (The Methodist Publishing House in China. Shanghai and Foochow, 1912) 244.





Figure 13: Front Side of the Rocking Stone<sup>184</sup>

*New Amoy Hotel* and the post office represented a part of the local German influence.

The German consular interpreter Budler established the first public library in Xiamen on his own behalf. Apart from that, Germany did not initiate any other ventures that contributed to the social life. The Basel Mission did not even consider to send a missionary when Chinese merchants requested one for the opening of a school in Quanzhou.

The major incidents caused by Germans on the island were both of negative nature. One was the theft by the post officer Borck and the other one the destruction of the Rocking Stone by sailors of the *SMS Leipzig*. The significance and local coverage of these two events testify that German influence in Xiamen was very limited.

Germans played some role in the Municipal Council which was, however, only of local administrative influence. The Consulate Court on the other hand had to deal mostly with matters of German ships.

The small population made it necessary that persons often acted in double roles, e.g., by both occupying a professional position and an administrative post. For instance, Bernhard Hempel worked at Pasedag & Co. and was also part of the Municipal council. Wilhelm Kruse was a merchant and also acted as an observer in the Consulate Court and as a member in the Municipal council. August Piehl worked at Pasedag & Co. and was consul for the Netherlands, as well as vice consul for Sweden and Norway.

Overall, the significance of Germans on Gulangyu was very limited. However, as the next Chapters will show, the chartering of German ships played the biggest role for Germany in Xiamen and the Chinese coast in general.

Most occupations were in some form related to shipping. The consulate was primarily established for shipping questions, the Consulate Court worked on lawsuits issued by captains, and merchants and local firms based their business on shipping of goods and the chartering business. As Chapter Nine shows, German shipping declined rapidly from 1900. It is thus not surprising that after 1900 the local population declined.

However, before investigating the shipping traffic Chapter Seven explores German trade and commerce by looking at the business fields of local firms and the goods traded. It also examines the Krupp cannon trade, coolie transport, and the German involvement in the drug export to Xiamen.

## Chapter Seven Trade and Commerce

The German consul often noted that “German shipping and trade” were significant in Xiamen. However, most scholars note that the trade between Germany and China was insignificant before the First Opium War. Previous work on the categorization of German trade from 1905 to 1933 divides the trade in an early development from 1905 to 1913, a suspension of trade from 1914 to 1919, and an expansion from 1920 to 1933.<sup>185</sup> How does the supposed high German trade in Xiamen but the low general trade fit together?

One part of the answer is that the local trading houses were primarily active in shipping and coast trade where they traded Chinese and not German products. Another part is that the perception of a significant German trade in Xiamen was distorted through the chartering of German ships. Later Maritime Custom documents contain the German trade volume for some years. However, the entries do not reflect the trade volume by German merchants. German ships were often chartered by Chinese merchants, and the Maritime Custom entries thus include some part of the Chinese trading volume. Additionally, local trade and German commercial activity was mostly limited to shipping.

This chapter investigates local trading establishments as well as import and export between Germany and Xiamen. A special chapter of German trade in Xiamen were the purchase of Krupp cannons for Hulishan and other forts in and around Xiamen that are discussed in a section. Other sections also investigate whether Germany was locally involved in the opium or coolie trade.

### 7.1 Local German Banks

No German bank was in Xiamen during the unequal treaty time.

The only German bank in China was the *German Asiatic Bank* (*Deutsch-Asiatische Bank*, 德国银行) which never opened a branch in Xiamen. Was there no incentive for opening a branch?

German banking interests started late, when in 1885 the first German study commission visited China to investigate investment opportunities. The commission resulted in the founding of the German Asiatic Bank which was the first non-British bank in China.<sup>186</sup> She was founded as a consortium of German banks in Shanghai in 1889<sup>187</sup> to participate in the Chinese railroad business, to invest in ships, and to win grounds against other nations.<sup>188</sup>

In 1903 branches of the German Asiatic Bank were only listed for Hankou while a branch for Beijing had already been announced.<sup>189</sup> Figure 14 shows an exempt of an advertisement from the 3. September 1914 which presents the branches of the bank. Until 1917 when the bank had to close down in China, the German Asiatic Bank only

<sup>185</sup>Ping-Yin Ho, *The Foreign Trade of China* (The Commercial Press, Limited. Shanghai, China, 1935) 212.

<sup>186</sup>Kirby 8.

<sup>187</sup>1990 according to (Kirby 8)

<sup>188</sup>Jing 34.

<sup>189</sup>Germany, *Export*, vol. 25 (1903), 412.



had branches in Shanghai (1889), Tianjin (1890), Hankou (1898), Qingdao (1899), Hongkong (1900), Jinan (1904), Beijing (1905), and Guangzhou (1910).<sup>190,191</sup>




Figure 14: German Asiatic Bank Advertisement 1914<sup>192</sup>

In 1911, the Amoy Business Directory listed the *Bank of Taiwan*, the *Bank of Communications*, the *Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation*, as well as agents of the *Merchantile Bank of India*, the *National Bank of China*, the *Nederlands Indische Handels Bank*, and the *Ta-Ching Government Bank*.<sup>193</sup> There were also many small native banks in Xiamen.

Overall, there was no incentive for opening a branch of the German Asiatic Bank in Xiamen. Xiamen did not have many big investments that could use a loan of a bank. An exception was the construction of the railway to Zhangzhou, but which was built without a treaty that could have forced a foreign loan. Additionally, there was a high competition of banks on which long-standing businesses already relied, such as the biggest German company Pasedag & Co. which relied on the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.<sup>194</sup>

Apart from the commercial aspects, German banks were a political tool to compete with the British and secure influence in China. With the seizing of Jiaozhou, however, German efforts concentrated on the area of Shandong. There, e.g., the German Asiatic Bank gave loans to the Chinese government for constructing railways. Thus, without

<sup>190</sup>Heinrich Schnee, "Deutsch-Asiatische Bank" Deutsches Kolonial-Lexikon 1 (1920), <[http://www.ub.bildarchiv-dkg.uni-frankfurt.de/Bildprojekt/Lexikon/php/suche.db.php?suchname=Deutsch-Asiatische\\_Bank](http://www.ub.bildarchiv-dkg.uni-frankfurt.de/Bildprojekt/Lexikon/php/suche.db.php?suchname=Deutsch-Asiatische_Bank)>: 299.

<sup>191</sup>Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* 197-199.

<sup>192</sup>The Straits Times, "Banking. Deutsch-Asiatische Bank." (03 Sept. 1914), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19140903-1.2.93.1.aspx>>: 14.

<sup>193</sup>Pitcher 305.

<sup>194</sup>The Straits Times, "An Enemy Dividend Account" (20 Aug. 1917), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article.aspx?articleid=straitstimes19170820-1.2.55>>: 10.

significant commercial and political incentives in Xiamen, a branch probably did not receive serious consideration.

Still, traveling reports mention that the *Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Co.* acted as an agency for the *Berliner Disconto-Gesellschaft* which was part of the German Asatic Bank consortium which is also shown in Figure 14.<sup>195</sup>

## 7.2 Local German Currency

Although there were many currencies circulating in Xiamen, a German currency was not one of them.

Pitcher noted that there were “at least six or seven different kinds of the dollar coin in circulation at this port, viz, the Yen, Mexican, Hongkong, French, Straits, and Hupeh dollar and some Manila pesos.”<sup>196</sup>

The Maritime Customs confirms this by its statistics of the yearly import and export of currency. In 1909, American and English gold coins, Mexican, Hongkong, Carolus, Chinese, Philippine, Japanese, French Indo-China dollars as silver coins, as well as Chinese copper coins show up in the statistics.<sup>197</sup> However, in this and all other years no import and export of German currencies show up. Also the yearly written report frequently mention high variations in the exchange rate, but never for a German currency.

Still, Chen Guolin showed that German currencies before and after the founding of the German empire reached Xiamen. Moreover, German coins that had been minted in Jiaozhou reached Xiamen and have been preserved until today.<sup>198</sup> Probably, the German currencies did not acquire significance in business transactions in Xiamen.

## 7.3 Local German Firms

The number of firms in Xiamen was continually low and large companies never exceeded six.<sup>199</sup> Were there important German companies in Xiamen?

Table 3 shows the amount of German firms in China as well as in Xiamen, and the total number of foreign firms in Xiamen for comparison.<sup>200</sup>

As argued in the following passages, the German company Pasedag & Co. was one of the first firms in Xiamen and existed until after the outbreak of the First World War. It was thus the only German firm in Xiamen in 1874, 1875, and 1911.<sup>201</sup> Gerard & Co. was another company that was mentioned in 1881.<sup>202</sup> Through the “Sugar Boiling Pan Incident” (see Section 5.3) it is apparent that Gerard & Co. existed until at least

<sup>195</sup>Meyers Reisebücher 243.

<sup>196</sup>Pitcher 221.

<sup>197</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, vol. 50 (1909), 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 556.

<sup>198</sup>陈国林, 外国金属货币, 厦门货币图录 (厦门大学出版社, 2012) 135-140.

<sup>199</sup>Wright and Cartwright 820.

<sup>200</sup>The table was aggregated from various sources, similiarly to the table for the German population (see Table 2 in Section 6.1). The table represents a plausible development and some of the different sources for the same years contain equal data.

<sup>201</sup>Also Pitcher mentions Pasedag & Co. as one of the companies that has been existing for over 50 years.(Pitcher 214)

<sup>202</sup>Germany. Reichsministerium des Innern and Germany. Auswärtiges Amt and Germany. Reichswirtschaftsministerium, *Deutsches Handels-Archiv: Zeitschrift für Handel und Gewerbe*, vol. 1 (1881), 525.

1884. Another known German company was Petersen & Co. which was together with the Pasedag & Co. involved in the Deli coolie trade starting from 1888.<sup>203</sup> In 1898 the company was mentioned together with Pasedag & Co. as the only German company in that year. The company thus at least existed between 1891 and 1898.

Overall, it seems likely that Pasedag & Co. was the only German company until 1875. It is possible that in 1881 or before, Petersen & Co. and Gerard & Co. started to operate. In about 1898, Gerard & Co. ceased to exist. Petersen & Co. operated at least until 1898, more likely it only disappeared a few years after. In 1906, the company was reported to have already ceased to exist several years ago.<sup>204</sup> In 1911, only Pasedag & Co. was left.

It is not possible to rule out the possibility that for certain years the number of German companies was higher. It is even likely that, e.g., the watchmaker Otto Martin as one of the first Germans (see Table 1) operated as a company. However, if a company existed that stayed unmentioned, then it was probably only of minor significance. This includes the company around 1900 that stays unexplained. The consular reports for 1900 and 1902 state that 27 and 25 foreigners<sup>205</sup> were associated with the companies. The unexplained company thus probably only included one or a handful of people.

In, e.g., 1906 the German consul stated that “one can only talk about one company” since besides the company Pasedag & Co. the second “firm” was a ship’s chandler without properties and capital.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>203</sup>BArch R 1001/2301: 169.

<sup>204</sup>PA AA R 252853 11.

<sup>205</sup>The report does not state whether the workers were all German, or also included other foreigners or Chinese. However, another source shows that around 1900 26 German foreigners were working at a German company. (Pitcher 217)

<sup>206</sup>PA AA R 252853 9.

Year	Germans firms in China	Germans firms in Xiamen	Foreign Firms in Xiamen
1850	7 <sup>207</sup>	-	-
first firms (around 1850) <sup>209</sup>	-	1	11
1865	-	-	15 <sup>210</sup>
1872	40 <sup>211</sup>	-	-
1874 <sup>212</sup>	-	1	25
1875 <sup>213</sup>	-	1	17
1880	-	-	24 <sup>214</sup>
1881	50 <sup>215</sup>	3 <sup>216</sup>	23 <sup>217</sup>
mid-1880s	-	-	24 <sup>218</sup>
1886 (1885?)	-	3 <sup>219</sup>	-
1892	78 <sup>220</sup>	-	-
1898 <sup>221</sup>	80	2	-
1900 <sup>222</sup>	-	3	148
1902 <sup>223</sup>	145	2	181
1905 <sup>224</sup>	-	2	289
1906	-	2 <sup>225</sup>	-
1911 <sup>226</sup>	-	1	363
1913	296 <sup>227</sup>	-	-
1919	2 <sup>228</sup>	-	-

Table 3: Number of German Firms in China and Xiamen 1850-1919

Xiamen with 2 firms in 1898 was far behind Shanghai with 26 German firms, Hongkong with 16, Guangzhou with 9, Tianjin with 14, and Hankou with 5 firms.<sup>229</sup> In terms of local German companies, Xiamen was thus negligible. Only 2 of the 80 German companies in China were based in Xiamen in this year.

It is not surprising that not more foreign or German firms operated in Xiamen. Although Xiamen was known as a city with many returned overseas Chinese that got rich abroad and returned living an affluent life on Xiamen, the demand on foreign imports could be satisfied with the few local all-rounder firms which also operated in the coast trade and as charterers.

Additionally, Xiamen continuously lost economical importance after the First Opium War. While the number of German firms in China continuously increased, the number of German firms in Xiamen stayed almost constant. Until 1872 only 40 firms were in China, 1 of them being the Pasedag & Co. In 1881 even 3 out of the 50 German companies in China were located in Xiamen. However, in 1902 there were only 2 local German companies, contrasted by 145 in the whole country. In 1913, the number climbed up to 296. With the First World War the German companies ceased to exist.

It seems that around 1900 the number of foreign firms in Xiamen increased rapidly, thus giving an alternative explanation for the diminished German shipping as explained in Chapter Nine, namely through the displacement of German companies. Table 4 shows

<sup>207</sup>W. Schüler, *Abriss Der Neueren Geschichte Chinas* (Bod Third Party Titles, 2013) 149.

<sup>208</sup>R. Nield, *The China Coast: Trade and the First Treaty Ports* (Joint Publishing (HK), 2010) 104.

<sup>209</sup>R. Nield, *The China Coast: Trade and the First Treaty Ports* (Joint Publishing (HK), 2010) 104.

<sup>210</sup>A. Wright and H.A. Cartwright, *Twentieth century impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other treaty ports of China: their history, people, commerce, industries, and resources*, vol. 1 (Lloyds Greater Britain publishing company, 1908) 820.

<sup>211</sup>BArch R 901/5150: Trade Report 1901 and 1902.

<sup>212</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, vol. 5 (1875), 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 719.

<sup>213</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, vol. 6 (1875), 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 129.

<sup>214</sup>A. Wright and H.A. Cartwright, *Twentieth century impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other treaty ports of China: their history, people, commerce, industries, and resources*, vol. 1 (Lloyds Greater Britain publishing company, 1908) 820.

<sup>215</sup>BArch R 901/5150: Trade Report 1901 and 1902.

<sup>216</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, vol. 9 (1881), 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 373.

<sup>217</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, vol. 9 (1881), 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 373.

<sup>218</sup>R. Nield, *The China Coast: Trade and the First Treaty Ports* (Joint Publishing (HK), 2010) 109.

<sup>219</sup>PA AA R 9208/951: 77.

<sup>220</sup>BArch R 901/5150: Trade Report 1901 and 1902.

<sup>221</sup>Unknown, *Ost-Asien*, vol. 1 (1898), 127.

<sup>222</sup>BArch R 901/5150: Trade Report 1901 and 1902.

<sup>223</sup>BArch R 901/5150: Trade Report 1901 and 1902.

<sup>224</sup>PA AA R 9208/953: 225.

<sup>225</sup>PA AA R 252853: 9.

<sup>226</sup>Philip Wilson Pitcher, *In and about Amoy. Some historical and other facts connected with one of the first open ports in China*, Second Edition (The Methodist Publishing House in China. Shanghai and Foochow, 1912) 216.

<sup>227</sup>William C Kirby, *Germany and Republican China* (Stanford University Press, 1984) 16.

<sup>228</sup>William C Kirby, *Germany and Republican China* (Stanford University Press, 1984) 16.

<sup>229</sup>Unknown, *Ost-Asien*, vol. 1 (1898), 127.

the number of foreign firms in 1902. Especially the Japanese imperialism and expansion to Xiamen could have been a reason for the decline of German shipping through the displacement of German companies.

Nationality	Firms
German	2
Japanese	107
British	43
Spanish	12
American	8
Dutch	5
French	3
Danish	1

Table 4: Number of Foreign Firms in 1902

However, the high number of foreign firms is only an illusion. With the Japanese expansion to Taiwan (and Xiamen) the number of Japanese and their firms in Xiamen indeed increased. However, the German consul determined for the year 1902, that there were only two German, nine British, one American, and several Japanese companies. The other companies' owners were all Chinese, which acted under protection by a foreign country. Germany as the only country did not grant this right to Chinese merchants, thus letting the number of German firms appear smaller.<sup>230</sup> The number of foreign firms thus stayed almost constant throughout the treaty time, invalidating the alternative explanation for the displacement of German companies.

The German companies were not involved in direct trade with Germany. In 1904 the consul notes that "the local German firms already gave up their efforts to get a larger amount of German import trade into their hands years ago." When the local German firms found a German article that they could sell well, Chinese customers quickly sent a sample to their agents in Hongkong, which then also imported the article. The merchants in Hongkong then tried to lower the price significantly, so that the local German business could not compete. The consul ascertained that "it is reasonable that German merchants only deal in seldom cases with the import of new goods, when they have full security, that Chinese merchants cannot directly get the articles."<sup>231</sup>

The next sub sections will present more information about the individual companies.

### 7.3.1 Pasedag & Co. 1854-1917

Pasedag & Co. (宝记洋行, abbreviated 宝记, and in Hongkong known as Poa-kee) was the most important German company in Xiamen. It was founded in about 1854 as the first German company<sup>232</sup> and as one of the first firms in Xiamen generally. The founder was the German C. J. Pasedag who was also consul for Hanover, Hamburg, and Prussia.<sup>233</sup>

<sup>230</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Trade Report 1901 and 1902.

<sup>231</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Trade Report 103.

<sup>232</sup>Mike Peters, "City with beauty and age" (29 Jan. 2013), <[http://www.fjfao.gov.cn/english/livinginfujian/tourism/201301/t20130129\\_624973.htm](http://www.fjfao.gov.cn/english/livinginfujian/tourism/201301/t20130129_624973.htm)>.

<sup>233</sup>R. Nield, *The China Coast: Trade and the First Treaty Ports* (Joint Publishing (HK), 2010) 104.

Pasedag made high profits with the rice trade in the initial years, together with Siemssen & Co. to which he had a good relationship.<sup>234</sup> However, after 1864 the rice export from Taiwan was no longer allowed and this business perished.<sup>235</sup> Still, the company did not go bankrupt and continued to operate in other fields.

During its later existence, the company was noted as an “agency concern”, “shipping business”, or “general import and export business”.<sup>236</sup> In reality, the company was continuously active in all these businesses. This was not unusual and the first firms in Xiamen tended to be general trading houses and only few specialized on specific businesses. The generality of business areas was also noted by Möring who described the business field of Siemssen & Co. and the associated companies before 1914 as an “all-rounder business over half the world”.<sup>237</sup>

The company changed its owner at least once, when on the 1. January 1864 Pasedag left his company in Xiamen and another one in Ningbo.<sup>238</sup> Pasedag returned from Xiamen to Germany in November 1883.<sup>239</sup> Probably August Piehl who was consul of the Netherlands, and vice-consul for Sweden and Norway took over the office, who was already living in Xiamen since at least 1878.<sup>240</sup> In its later years Pasedag & Co. moved its headquarter to Taiwan.<sup>241,242</sup>

Sources from the 1890s show that August Piehl became a later owner of the company and together with B. Hempel he led a large coal trade. At this time the company was noted as an agency for the shipping companies Asiatic Petroleum Company, the NDL, the HAPAG, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, and the British India Shipping Companies.<sup>243</sup> B. Hempel was also a German and came in 1891 to China. From 1902 he served as a consular of the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway.<sup>244</sup>

Pasedag & Co. was known to participate in the coolie trade. In 1902 twelve German steamers transported 8234 passengers, most of them coolies, in 1903 23 German steamers 13960 passengers, and in 1904 16 German steamers 101119 passengers. Most of them went onto the account of Pasedag & Co.<sup>245</sup> Pasedag & Co. also initiated the “Deli Project” in which the company wanted to establish a direct coolie export to Deli. However, it transferred this business to Petersen & Co.

The consul also noted that Pasedag & Co. employed four Chinese agents in the interior which frequently led to negotiations with the authorities, often requiring action of the consulate.<sup>246</sup> Although not noted by the consul, the four Chinese agents were probably set up as coolie traders, since Chinese were usually the middlemen for the coolie trade.

<sup>234</sup>Maria Möring, *Siemssen & Co., 1846-1996*, Band 55 der Veröffentlichungen der Wirtschaftsgeschichtlichen Forschungsstelle e.V (Verlag Hanseatischer Merkur, 1996) 69.

<sup>235</sup>Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* 103.

<sup>236</sup>See (Nield 104), (Baur and Kaske 433), and (Wright and Cartwright 828).

<sup>237</sup>Möring 107.

<sup>238</sup>Möring 69, 70.

<sup>239</sup>PA AA R 252848: 117.

<sup>240</sup>Giles 36.

<sup>241</sup>Baur and Kaske 433, 768.

<sup>242</sup>Wright and Cartwright 819, 828.

<sup>243</sup>Wright and Cartwright 828.

<sup>244</sup>厦门市鼓浪屿-万石山风景名胜区管理委员会, “鼓浪屿公共租界工部局的董事会” (Feb. 2013), <<http://go.gly.cn/s/a/201302/512.html>>.

<sup>245</sup>PA AA R 9208/953 241.

<sup>246</sup>PA AA R 252853 12.

An investigation following a notification of the forced deletion of the ships of Pasedag from the shipping register sheds some light on the size of the company in 1893 and 1894. At this time, the sole owner of the company was still August Piehl, registered as a citizen of Lubeck in Germany. He operated the company from Xiamen and had no representatives in Germany. Four barks were registered on his name that all operated in the coast trade.<sup>247</sup> At this time, over 50% of the German ships were already steamers.<sup>248</sup>

The German consul presented in 1906 a comparison of Pasedag & Co. with Siemssen & Krohn in Fuzhou. In contrast to the organized and controlled business of Siemssen & Krohn, the business by Pasedag & Co. was not really clear. The consul noted that “it is difficult to define in what business Pasedag & Co. mainly is engaged in at all.” While in Fuzhou Siemssen & Krohn concentrated three fourths on the tea business, among other smaller businesses such as its sawmill, Pasedag & Co. seemed only to “technically limit itself to the Petroleum and coal import and on the export of coolies.” Instead, the company was also known to “operate all possible export and import businesses, so that one can see that it [the business] is constantly fluctuating back and forth.” In contrast, the business of Siemssen & Krohn increased slowly but constantly through the years.<sup>249</sup>

Pasedag & Co. was also a smaller company than Siemssen & Krohn in Fuzhou. Section 6.2 supports this hypothesis based on the properties noted by the consul. Siemssen & Krohn’s properties not only exceeded Pasedag & Co.’s, but all the German properties in Xiamen taken together. The consul mentioned that the position of Siemssen & Krohn in Fuzhou is “incomparably more important than the position of the firm Pasedag & Co. among the companies in Xiamen.” While the consul estimated Siemssen & Krohn to be in the first business tax category (*erste Gewerbesteuerklasse*), he would group Pasedag & Co. at best into the second.<sup>250</sup>

As seen above, one later field of Pasedag & Co. was the petroleum trade. When after 1895 private Dutch enterprises turned their attention to China, often German trading companies such as Pasedag & Co. acted as their agents. Dutch companies in Xiamen included the JCJL, NIHB, and Royal Dutch/Shell. Royal Dutch built kerosene tank installations in Xiamen in 1898. In 1900 it was the third largest oil importer in China, behind Standard Oil and STT. In 1903, STT and the Royal Dutch combined their Asian efforts in the Asiatic Petroleum Company.<sup>251</sup> The German consul noted the “success of a local German company with the import of Sumatra Petroleum” the first time for 1894,<sup>252</sup> probably when Royal Dutch started its efforts in Xiamen.<sup>253</sup> When Royal Dutch company was established in 1903, Pasedag & Co. represented it until at least 1906.<sup>254</sup>

<sup>247</sup>Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck (AHL), “Registrierung von Schiffen der Firma Pasedag & Co. zu Amoy im hiesigen Schiffsregister” Neues Senatsarchiv (NSA) (1893–1894): Signatur 10107.

<sup>248</sup>As Section 8.15.1 shows, the company accounted for a high German shipping traffic in Xiamen with its ships.

<sup>249</sup>PA AA R 252853 9, 12.

<sup>250</sup>PA AA R 252850: 9-10,12.

<sup>251</sup>Frans-Paul van der Putten et al., “Corporate behaviour and political risk: Dutch companies in China, 1903-1941”, Diss., Research School of Asian, African and Amerindian Studies (CNWS), Leiden University, 2001, 19, 22.

<sup>252</sup>BArch R 901/5149: Shipping and Trade Report 1894.

<sup>253</sup>Pitcher states that the Asiatic Petroleum Company was established in 1907. However, several sources note that the business had been initiated years before. (Pitcher 215)

<sup>254</sup>Contracts with the period of validity from 1903 to 1905 indicate that Pasedag & Co. acted on behalf of the Asiatic Petroleum Company. (Putten et al. 73) Trade reports from 1903 and 1906 by the German



Around 1911 Pasedag & Co. also appeared in the *Amoy Business Directory* as agency for the *National Bank of China*.<sup>255</sup>

Pasedag & Co. outlived the outbreak of the First World War but the business of Pasedag & Co. stagnated. The company could not longer act as an agency for enemy states. Violations resulted in law cases, such as a case against Thoresen & Co. The company supplied five petroleum stoves to Pasedag & Co. when the company was acting as an agency for the East Asiatic Trading Company.<sup>256</sup>

After the outbreak of the First World War, German companies could still continue with their business until 1917 when the Chinese government expropriated the companies and seized the goods.<sup>257</sup> Pasedag & Co. among other German companies thus ceased to exist in 1917.

### 7.3.2 Petersen & Co. 1888-1898

Petersen & Co.'s business field was similar to Pasedag & Co.'s. The company operated as a trading house, participated in the coast trade as well as in the coolie transport. From 1888 to 1890 Petersen & Co. even operated the coolie trade to Deli on its own, after the company took over the business from Pasedag & Co. Petersen also occupied several small vessels under his and the company's name (see Section 8.15.2). Additionally, all the German ships during the existence of Petersen & Co. were either consigned to his company or to Pasedag & Co. In 1906 the consul mentioned that with the vanishing of Petersen & Co. a small decline of German commerce in Xiamen could be felt.<sup>258</sup>

### 7.3.3 Gerard & Co. 1881-1884

Regarding Gerard & Co. little is known. It was most probably founded by "Gerard" who was one of the first German inhabitants in Xiamen and was registered as a Grocer. Gerard & Co. engaged in the manufacturing of iron pans for which he also had a furnace, which eventually led to the "Sugar Boiling Pan Incident". Additionally, the firm operated as a trading house. There are no hints that Gerard participated in the coast trade or operated ships himself.<sup>259</sup>

## 7.4 Export Products to Germany

There were almost no products suitable for export to the German market. The consul mentioned in 1907, that camphor represented the only exception.<sup>260</sup> However, three years later he states that in the meanwhile the camphor trade had become "almost hopeless".<sup>261</sup>

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consul also acknowledge the development of the Petroleum trade that was represented by the German company. (BArch R 901/5150 Trade Report 1903) (BArch 5036 Trade Report 1906)

<sup>255</sup>Pitcher 305.

<sup>256</sup>The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, "Enemy Trading in Hong Kong" (30 May 1916), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/singfreepressb19160530-1.2.44.aspx>>: 7.

<sup>257</sup>Möring 101.

<sup>258</sup>PA AA R 252853 11.

<sup>259</sup>Table 1 shows Gerard as a Grocer. The "Sugar Boiling Pan Incident" is discussed in Section 5.3. Section 7.5 shows a complaint by Gerard regarding German export houses to Xiamen.

<sup>260</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1907.

<sup>261</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1910.

China as an agricultural country mainly exported raw products, food, drinks, and tobacco to Germany.<sup>262</sup> Fujian as a mountainous province was, however, not suitable to produce these goods in a high quantity. Instead, Xiamen imported food itself and, e.g., the rice import was frequently noted in the Custom documents.

## 7.5 Import Products from Germany

While most countries that exported goods to Xiamen had specializations in their export goods which were noted in the Custom reports, German ones were not mentioned in a single report of the Customs. Also tea trade with Germany never showed up in them.<sup>263</sup> Did Germany not have a specialization in trade with Xiamen?

Several factors come into play to explain why German goods are not mentioned in the Customs reports:

A significant part of the German maritime exchange in Xiamen was passenger shipping, including the coolie transport.

Another part was the Krupp cannon trade, that was not mentioned in the Customs reports (see Section 7.6).

Before 1905, the Maritime Custom entries show Germany only together with other states as the “Continent of Europe”. Only starting with 1905 Germany’s trading statistics were directly listed. The grouping of countries limited the visibility of German trade with China.

Even after 1905, there was no direct trade from Germany to Xiamen as a document from 1904 written by the German consul shows. The consul stated that he cannot answer questions by German firms regarding “good import houses” since there was almost no direct import from other countries. Instead, the Chinese merchants that were known to “almost have a monopoly on the import trade primarily obtain their goods from Hongkong, whose trading houses are informed about the needs and requirements of the local place, and the credit-worthiness of the local businesses.” Directly imported products only included a few goods such as petroleum, coals, and opium “which do not interest our domestic industry”.<sup>264</sup>

Also, most export goods to China from, e.g., Hamburg were various goods such as woolen cloths, cotton yarns, sewing needles, iron and steel products, matches, and window glasses that were all noted as “sundries” in the Customs reports.<sup>265</sup> German trade in Xiamen did not fall out of the line and thus sundries belonged to the commonly traded German goods.

Although German companies tried to enter the market they often failed, mostly because of the poor quality of products. Some cases from 1881 and before illustrate the failure of the market entrances:

For example, a firm from Cologne tried until 1881 to have direct trade with Xiamen. Following, a German living in Xiamen agreed to accept “Eau de Cologne” perfume samples. A survey determined that there were interested parties both among natives and

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<sup>262</sup>Ho 225, 235.

<sup>263</sup>Tea was still an important product shipped from China to Germany, as explained in (Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* 183-186). However, Fuzhou and Taiwan were the main tea ports and not Xiamen.

<sup>264</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Trade Report 103.

<sup>265</sup>Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* 190.

foreigners. However, because of the poor quality the perfume did not find buyers.

In another case, the packaging of cordial, fruit jelly, and fruit jam was inadequate. Thus, before arrival, the products fermented and arrived almost empty.

Another German company from Hamburg shipped a Pianoforte and a Cottage Piano to Xiamen. While the first one met the expectations, the latter one was not finished when it was shipped. In the end, the latter piano could only be sold at a loss.

Another company shipped tools to Gerard & Co. but the products also did not meet the expectations. For some tools, it was even suspected that they were already broken before the shipment.

Yet another company from Hamburg regularly shipped account books to Xiamen. When the company changed the color of the books from white to blue, buyers were no longer interested in the books.

Gerard & Co. also explained that English companies sent information about new products regularly by themselves, while for German companies one could more or less only directly order products.<sup>266</sup>

That German companies did not react to this catalog problem is apparent through a letter of the German consul more than twenty years later in which he complained that German companies often sent catalogs without prices that were written only in German or French.<sup>267</sup>

Another problem for the German export trade was the small market for German products in Xiamen. Table 5 shows the areas of the companies that sent requests regarding business opportunities to the German consulate in 1907.<sup>268</sup> There was only little local demand for machinery and thus the fields machine construction, surgical equipment, and motor vehicles. Also the other fields do not reflect typical import goods for the local market. Germany as an advanced industrial country with heavy manufactured goods<sup>269</sup> did simply not produce the right products for the hinterlands of Fujian.

Machine Construction & Metal Industry	15
Chemicals, Drugs & Colors	7
Wine	5
Textiles	4
Imitation Jewelry & Gold Articles	4
Timber Industry & Building Materials	4
Surgical & Optical Equipment	3
Graphics Industrie	3
Motor Vehicles & Automobiles	2
Miscellaneous	6
Informations Regarding Loans etc.	5

Table 5: Fields of Inquiries Regarding the Establishment of Busines Connections in 1907

The following subsections nevertheless present a few products which were relatively important for the German trade with Xiamen such as dyes, beer, morphine, and cocaine.

<sup>266</sup>Germany. Reichsministerium des Innern and Germany. Auswärtiges Amt and Germany. Reichswirtschaftsministerium 525.

<sup>267</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report for 1907.

<sup>268</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1907.

<sup>269</sup>Ho 224.

### 7.5.1 Dyes

Dyes, especially artificially produced indigo were popular among the Chinese. The Chinese preferred blue to color the wool and silk for everyday clothing.<sup>270</sup>

In the maritime customs the import of German dyes is noted only after the First World War in the decennial report of 1911. However, the German consul noted aniline colors as an important import product from Germany already in 1903.<sup>271</sup> That aniline colors did not appear before in the Customs reports of Xiamen is probably related to that only starting from 1905 the indigo was statistically recorded.<sup>272</sup> Before the First World War, already all aniline dyes and artificial indigo used in China were from Germany. Together with manufactured goods, and machinery, chemicals such as dyes became the most important export good.<sup>273</sup>

Another case signifies the importance of German dyes as an export good to Xiamen: A big customer of the German company Jebsen & Co. which was associated with the shipping company M. Jebsen went bankrupt in 1907. The customer was the Chinese company Wang Kee in Shantou, which was also an important buyer of BASF aniline colors. The assistant manager of the company, Choi Leung Yu, opened his own company Chit Cheong & Co. in Xiamen in 1911. If Choi Leung Yu did not use his existing contacts and continued trading aniline colors, then this case shows at least that the neighboring ports imported the German aniline colors.<sup>274</sup>

Also the German chemical company *Chemische Fabrik auf Actien vormals E-Schering* addressed several letters to the consul in which the company showed interest in Xiamen.<sup>275</sup>

### 7.5.2 Morphine and Cocaine

While Germany did not grow poppy, it produced Morphia and exported it to China. The Customs decennial report for 1902 to 1911 notes that 23,722 ounces of morphia used as a substitute for opium were imported to Xiamen during the decade with the main quantity being from Germany, but also from Japan, and Great Britain. The report noted that the bigger portion came to Xiamen through smuggling, and that from the 1. January 1909 import of morphine into China was forbidden.<sup>276</sup>

The German consul disapproved of the morphine import and also attested that the morphine trade was a greater evil than the opium trade. At the beginning, morphine was used as a “cure” for opium. That the contrary was the case, had been witnessed by the German consul who stated that with morphine “a worse enemy against the Chinese people than opium came into the world. It is a known fact that the most addicted opium smokers can put aside their pipe, and they also mostly do so, as long as they get their regular morphine injections, but immediately fall back to their old addiction when they stop the consumption.”<sup>277</sup>

<sup>270</sup>Möring 94.

<sup>271</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Trade Report 1903.

<sup>272</sup>Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* 191.

<sup>273</sup>Ho 224-226.

<sup>274</sup>Hänisch 111, 112.

<sup>275</sup>BArch 5036 Letter from the 12. December 1907.

<sup>276</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館，中國海關總署辦公廳，*Amoy. Decennial Report, 1902-1911*. 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 102.

<sup>277</sup>BArch R 901/5149 Shipping and Trading Report for 1897 and 1898.

In the trade report for 1908, the German consul mentions that high duties on morphine had been introduced in the year. In either case, cocaine, which was also mainly imported from Germany, replaced the morphine consumption.<sup>278</sup> While in 1908 the import of cocaine to Xiamen amounted 36,792 Tls it increased to 74,487 Tls in 1909. However, in the same year the Chinese government introduced similar restrictions on cocaine, as it did on morphine.<sup>279</sup> The German consul mentions that from 1910 on, “cocaine vanished from the statistics of the Maritime Customs, however, not from the market.”<sup>280</sup> In the report of the previous year he explained that the cocaine import to Xiamen was the highest in China because the Chinese emigrants to Singapore and other countries smuggled it in their hand luggage.

### 7.5.3 Beer and Other Alcoholics

Another product from Hamburg, that is even attributed the same importance as an export good for Hamburg, as tea for China, was beer. It was up until to the First World War one of the most exported goods from Hamburg to China. The highest volume was shipped in 1901 with 30,025 hectoliters.<sup>281</sup>

In the trade report for 1910, the German consul states that “real lager beer of the most viable German brands is available on the market”. In that year, the import of beer to Xiamen amounted 12,000 Tls (in the previous year only 5300 Tls), and the one of wine and other alcohol 37,000 Tls.<sup>282</sup>

However, one example of German beer export to Xiamen is not from Hamburg, but from North Schleswig: Jebesen from the M. Jebesen shipping company held an honorary office in the local brewery *Apenrader Aktienbrauerei* which was founded in 1881. Through his contacts, he sent samples to Shanghai and in 1883 he shipped fifty boxes of beer to Hongkong to introduce it to the Chinese coast, where it could be sold in high numbers. Besides agents in Shanghai, Shantou, and Fuzhou, he also had an agency (probably Pasedag & Co.) selling the beer in Xiamen.<sup>283</sup>

### 7.5.4 Other Products

Other products that appeared in the trade reports mainly belonged to the “sundries” category and were noted as piece goods (*Stückgüter*) by the German consuls. They included condensed milk, butter and cheese, sugar, sewing needles, lamps, clocks, drugs, lamps, cotton wool and wool products. As already mentioned, Xiamen mainly imported items of everyday use and consumption, instead of the more advanced products inquired by the German companies as shown in Table 5.

A German company acted as an agency for the condensed milk, most likely Pasedag & Co.<sup>284</sup> German wool products were not popular for a long time, since in 1912 Pasedag & Co. was noted to import British wool products since they were cheaper than the German goods. For the same year, the consul reported that the German firm received a

<sup>278</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report for 1908.

<sup>279</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report for 1909.

<sup>280</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1910.

<sup>281</sup>Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* 191.

<sup>282</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1910.

<sup>283</sup>Becker 649-643.

<sup>284</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1909, Trade Report 1911.

greater amount of clothing samples by a German company which could not find consumers and had to be sold on auction.<sup>285</sup> Pocket and wrist watches were noted in 1903 not to be “very important” but “capable of expansion”.<sup>286</sup> The consul’s prediction did not turn out well, since watches were not noted again. Still, clocks were sometimes mentioned as traded goods.<sup>287</sup> Sewing needles that were imported to Xiamen were mostly from Germany. However, in the year 1907 the volume decreased from 1,743,000 to 220,000 Tls.<sup>288,289</sup> Even though Xiamen exported sugar itself, German sugar was imported to the island. In 1907, the German consul reported that the export of German sugar to China increased over 600% in 1906.<sup>290</sup> However, the sugar import from Germany had already been replaced again in the next year by sugar from Java.

Overall, Germany had a smaller export market in Xiamen as, e.g., compared to Shandong where railway materials were an important export good.<sup>291</sup>

## 7.6 Krupp cannons and Fort Hulishan

When the British invaded Gulangyu they destroyed all the cannons they could find. Later on, the governor of Fujian Bian Biaodi (卞宝第) began with the planning and construction of modern forts. Today, Xiamen tourism bureaus proudly present a German made Krupp cannon in Hulishan that is confirmed to be the largest and oldest cannon of the 19th century still in existence. Was the cannon an individual case or was the import of Krupp cannons in Xiamen significant?

Germany played a major role in the modernization of the army under Chiang Kai-Shek (蔣介石) and the GMD between 1928 and 1938. Before, Germany appeared to be to some degree worthy of admiration and emulation through its “ability to project political power and prestige through military means”.<sup>292</sup> After the founding of the German empire, modernization progressed quickly, and obtained Chinese recognition.

The German steel production firm Krupp (克虏伯) profited but also played an important role in this process. In 1811, Friedrich Krupp founded the company in Essen. His son Alfred Krupp brought the company to success, and under his lead the first cannons casted out of steel were manufactured. Decades later, successor models reached Xiamen.

Beginning from the late 1880s<sup>293</sup>, Krupp sent advisers to China and secured contracts for heavy armaments.<sup>294</sup> For Xiamen, mainly Georg Theodor Bauer and Henry William von Düring were relevant for the selling of Krupp cannons. However, German involvement was not restricted to mere cannon trade with Krupp. The initial design of Fort Hulishan had been implemented by Constantin von Hanneken, who was a German

<sup>285</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1912.

<sup>286</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1903.

<sup>287</sup>洪明章 features in a chapter “Rarities from Germany” photos of a compass, wall clock, grandfather clock, and thermometer imported from Germany to Xiamen (洪明章 110-111).

<sup>288</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Trade Report 1903.

<sup>289</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1907.

<sup>290</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1906.

<sup>291</sup>Ho 212.

<sup>292</sup>Kirby 3, 7.

<sup>293</sup>Eberstein notes that the first delegation had already been sent in 1866 (Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* 191).

<sup>294</sup>Kirby 10.

military advisor.<sup>295</sup>

Between 1874 and 1876, four forts on the island of Xiamen (Wukou, Zhengcuoan, Wukongyuan, and Baishitou) and two on the opposite site in Zhangzhou (Longjiaowei and Yuziwei) were constructed.<sup>296</sup> First, those forts were mainly equipped with British Armstrong cannons, but also some smaller Krupp cannons of caliber 12 cm and 17 cm came into use. Between 1884 and 1886 the forts Yuziwei and Baishitou were rebuilt. Latter was re-equipped with two Krupp cannons with a caliber of 21 cm and model C/80 with a short barrel of type L/25. On the island of Xiamen, the new fort Panshi was constructed, with two Krupp cannons of caliber 21 cm C/80 with a long barrel of type L/35. At the same time, the outdated forts Wukou, Zhengcuoan, Wukongyuan, and Longjiaowei were abandoned.

Another fort was needed as replacement and Baodi asked emperor Guangxi in 1888 for financial support. However, the emperor decided that the province should finance the venture by itself. Shortly before his death in 1890, Baodi signed a contract for a battery with two Krupp cannons. For the most important batteries in Xiamen of Fort Hulishan he selected two cannons of caliber 28 cm of models C/86 and C/87. Baodi hoped that the central government would eventually cover the purchase, which it did not. The following governor Tan Zhonglin (譚钟麟) financed the batteries by a bank loan and donations of rich returned overseas Chinese.<sup>297</sup>

In total, China ordered 135 coastal cannons from calibers 17 to 28 cm between 1871 and 1912. In a table of Kurzawa, 16 Krupp cannons are attributed to forts in Xiamen.<sup>298</sup> Considering that the two cannons in Hulishan cost 160,000 ounces of gold which were 628,000 RM at this time, they significantly contributed to the German trade. Additionally, insurance and shipping probably amounted 25 percent of the purchase prize of the cannons.<sup>299</sup>

The cannons were constructed in 1892. In July 1894 they were shipped to Fuzhou on board of the steamer *Essen*. In 1896 the batteries in Hulishan finished construction.<sup>300</sup> Besides the two big Krupp cannons and cannons of other manufacturers, the fort also included smaller ones of caliber 15 cm.<sup>301</sup>

The cannon trade with Krupp was never mentioned in the Customs reports of Xiamen, nor in the ones in Fuzhou of the years 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896.

## 7.7 German Merchants and the Opium Question

The extent of the participation of German merchants in the local opium trade is not easy to determine.

First of all, Germany did not produce opium by itself and thus could not have exported it to Xiamen. German merchants could only have obtained the opium by the East India Company, and then sold it in Xiamen such as examples in cities near Xiamen show. German companies including Siemssen & Co. were known to engage in the

<sup>295</sup>Kurzawa Piotr, "Küstenbefestigungen in Xiamen", *fortifikation* 28 (2014): 7.

<sup>296</sup>Piotr 3.

<sup>297</sup>Piotr 5-7.

<sup>298</sup>Piotr 7.

<sup>299</sup>Piotr 8.

<sup>300</sup>Piotr 8.

<sup>301</sup>Piotr 9, 12.

opium trade, since “it could almost not be avoided.”<sup>302</sup> Also Eberstein notes that the opium trade of Hamburger companies with China cannot be quantified, but that “due to competitive reasons they probably could not completely avoid it.”<sup>303</sup>

An infamous example of German opium merchants in China is also given through the Hamburger James Milisch who founded a German opium and camphor company in the nearby Tamsui on Taiwan on the 6. October 1865. There, he acted as an agent for the British company Jardine, Matheson & Co. with his British partner James Horn. He illegally established an agreement with the aborigines and essentially formed a private colony. Eventually, under Chinese and German pressure Milisch had to abandon his illegal business in 1870.<sup>304</sup>

The examples show that it is unlikely that Pasedag & Co. or another German firm in Xiamen did not engage in the profitable business. However, there are no strong arguments that confirm this. Also the German consuls did not mention whether a local company was involved in the opium trade.

The Treaty of Tientsin from 1861 already secured German rights to engage in the opium trade and mentions a tax of 30 Taels per 100 catties on opium.<sup>305</sup> Thus, Germany followed the other states by demanding China to officially acknowledge the opium trade. However, since Germany did not grow poppy, the amount traded was probably not high enough to force a public debate.

The Maritime Customs show that German ships were used to transport opium to Xiamen. Figure 15 shows the opium taxes, also called Likin, that was charged on German steamers. Only with 1887 the Likin had to be payed after clearing the ship, while before the buyer had to pay the tax. Thus, the opium tax predating 1887 is not visible in the Customs documents. The peak of the trade was in 1887 when the Likin was introduced. It reached a low point in 1890 but rose again until 1898. From 1900 to 1903, German opium transport almost came to a stillstand. The trade rose again quickly, until 1905 where a new high was reached. The high fluctuations show that there was no regular involvement in the opium transport in these years. It is thus probably, that Chinese merchants chartered the ships to transport the opium from other ports on the Chinese coast.

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<sup>302</sup>Möring 62.

<sup>303</sup>Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* 90.

<sup>304</sup>Eberstein, *Preussen und China. Eine Geschichte schwieriger Beziehungen* 210-233.

<sup>305</sup>Imperial Maritime Customs. Inspectorate General of Customs. 878.






Figure 15: German Opium Likin 1887-1919

In 1906 an edict issued by the Chinese Imperial Government stated that opium smoking should cease within ten years and measures should be taken to prevent the cultivation of opium in China. The British agreed in 1907 to reduce the opium imported from India every by one tenth.<sup>306</sup> As the figure shows, German opium transport mostly discontinued starting from 1907. The end of German opium transport to Xiamen thus predated the first international opium conference in The Hague in 1912 that regulated the opium trade.

Overall, Germany participation in the opium trade could only have been small. German merchants probably participated in the opium trade in small quantities and German steamers were used to transport a small percentage.

## 7.8 Coolie Shipping

Xiamen was a port renowned for its ties to Southeast Asia and its overseas emigration.<sup>307</sup> Xiamen practically lived through the remittances that the overseas Chinese sent back home. Most coolies were shipped to the Straits Settlement, especially Singapore, which was a famous hub for coolies. From there, they were shipped to other Southeast Asian countries, especially Indochina, Malaysia, and Siam, but also European colonial states recruited workers from there.<sup>308</sup>

The emigration from the provinces Fujian and Guangdong existed already long before British and German started the coolie trade. The provinces suffered from overpop-

<sup>306</sup>Willoughby 469.

<sup>307</sup>Arnold 351.

<sup>308</sup>Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, 2. Auflage (Beck, 2010) 180, 211.

ulation and many Chinese tried to find a livelihood overseas.

It is widely known that the Germans were involved in the coolie trade to the Straits Settlement, only second to the British. The emigration traffic was besides the coast trade the main occupation of German shipping companies. Probably all the major and minor German shipping lines in China participated in the transport of coolies, mainly to Singapore. First, chartered sailing ships transported the coolies, then the small steamers such as by M. Jebsen, and after 1900 the big freight steamers of HAPAG and NDL.<sup>309</sup> When the coast trade had mostly stopped after 1900, the shipping companies could still make some profit with the coolie transport.

Shipping of coolies by German shipping companies did usually not receive special attention. The shipping companies did not organize the coolie emigration themselves, but relied on trading houses which employed Chinese agents. The consul noted for English coolie trading houses such as Boyd & Co., that they “only contact the Chinese [coolie] agencies to obtain passengers for the expected steamers.”<sup>310</sup> Cases that attracted attention were the carrying of excess passengers that, e.g., happened on a vessel chartered by Pasedag & Co. on the 10. October 1912 and was reported in Singaporean newspapers. The chartered vessel was the *Clara Jebsen* of M. Jebsen<sup>311</sup>. Instead of the stipulated 910 persons an excess of 59 was noted. Due to the frequency of steamers arriving with excess passengers, the inspector issued a heavy penalty. The captain had to pay a fine of \$8 for every excess passenger (the ticket cost being \$7) in addition to a fine of \$50.<sup>312</sup>

From the local companies, both Pasedag & Co. and Petersen & Co. were involved in the coolie trade. Pasedag & Co. organized the coolie trade to Singapore and occupied Chinese middlemen in the interiors for the recruitment of coolies. Pasedag & Co. also started a direct export business to Deli in 1888 which it transferred to Petersen & Co.

The Deli project already started in 1871 when a German company wanted to start an emigration business for the plantation work in Sumatra. The project failed due to the resistance of the local government, which probably stemmed from the bad working conditions on the plantations. Until the opening of the direct coolie export to Deli, coolies were first shipped to Singapore and Penang. From there, the coolies to Deli were selected. The emigrant workers did not have a choice to select their work and location and thus could not prevent their fate on the plantations of Sumatra.<sup>313</sup>

Since it would have been cheaper to directly transport the coolies to Deli, Pasedag & Co., which also represented the Dutch consulate, tried in August 1886 to start the project again after the *Convention to regulate the engagement of Chinese emigrants by British and French subjects* had been signed by the Chinese on the 5. March 1866. The convention allowed Chinese laborers to voluntarily go overseas for not more than five years. After almost two years of correspondence with the local government the emigration under the regulations of the convention was allowed.<sup>314</sup>

In the meanwhile, Petersen & Co. had taken over the Deli project. The company

<sup>309</sup>See Section 8.13 for the HAPAG participation, Section 8.14 for the NDL participation, and Section 8.2 for the participation of M. Jebsen.

<sup>310</sup>BArch R 1001/2301 162.

<sup>311</sup>The *Clara Jebsen* is shown in Figure 16. The shipping company M. Jebsen is further discussed in Section 8.2.

<sup>312</sup>The Straits Times, “A Growing Evil” (10 Oct. 1912), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19121010-1.2.60.aspx>>: 9.

<sup>313</sup>BArch R 1001/2301 164-165.

<sup>314</sup>BArch R 1001/2301 166-167.

started the coolie shipping and from September until December 1888 five steamers drove with coolies to Deli. However, “all classes of the populace, incited by the literati and Singaporean competitors” tried to stop the business. Coolies were stopped by mobs on the way to the steamers, officials of the local government were blackmailed, accuses under false witnesses were encountered every day, and even the coolie recruiters asked for supervision by a local Chinese official who supervised the transport starting with the sixth steamer.<sup>315</sup>

However, a letter with complaints to the Provincial Governor of Fujian by Ferguson resulted in an unwanted effect for Petersen & Co., since the governor implemented a passport control for the emigration to Deli which almost stopped the coolie business, since the coolies wanted to avoid official inference. However, the German and Dutch consuls Merz and Groot managed to get rid of the passport control through their negotiations.<sup>316</sup>

Whether or not the direct Deli emigration involved coercion is not discussed in this thesis. However, the consul remarked that “experience taught the company Petersen & Co. that free emigration in China of so called Lin-kos (coolies which left the first time for overseas) is and will stay an illusion, and will also not differ from the other treaty ports.”<sup>317</sup> Some measures were implemented to make a free emigration fairer, e.g., by not allowing the emigration of indebted coolies, and only one incident happened which led to a court case.

A young man tried to emigrate without approval of his family and left China with an assumed name. In Deli he used again his real name and was found through it three months after the complaints reached Petersen & Co. In the court case, the man testified that he went to Deli by his own will and that he also could not complain about the treatment on the plantations. While the case did not come to an indictment, the two main recruiters and two sub recruiters could only be freed with great difficulty and especially the two sub recruiters received “hard treatment” while being in prison.<sup>318</sup> Thereupon, the Chinese authorities made the regulations stricter.

However, already in January 1890 the plantation owners decided to stop the business.<sup>319,320</sup> The consul noted that the Chinese middlemen recruited “lying around, opium smoking layabouts and tramps” in the nearest surroundings of Xiamen instead of “hard working, physically strong and with agriculture familiar workers” which would have required them to look further in the interiors.<sup>321</sup> Not long after, the Zongli Yamen (总理衙门)<sup>322</sup> banned emigration to Sumatra without giving reasons, which did not have practical significance for Xiamen since the planters had already stopped the emigration.

The new Dutch consul Hempel visited the Taotai, who told him that he did not have any objections against the emigration as organized by Petersen & Co. Further, the Taotai stated that he had always approved with the project in his correspondence with his supervisors. He told the consul that the coolie trade was banned through alleged illegal practices of the recruiters in the inlands which caused the governor in Fuzhou to report

<sup>315</sup>BArch R 1001/2301 170.

<sup>316</sup>BArch R 1001/2301 170-171.

<sup>317</sup>BArch R 1001/2301 168.

<sup>318</sup>BArch R 1001/2301 172-173.

<sup>319</sup>BArch R 901/5147: Trade Report 1889.

<sup>320</sup>BArch R 1001/2301 173.

<sup>321</sup>BArch R 1001/2301 177.

<sup>322</sup>The Zongli Yamen was the Chinese Foreign Office and was founded in 1861.

the case to the Zongli Yamen. A father reported that his son had been abducted but the accused recruiter denied that he knew his son, his name could not be found in the emigration lists, and further investigations by the authorities also remained fruitless.<sup>323</sup>

In September 1891 Petersen & Co. succeeded in the negotiations with the planters and the Dutch government tried to open the emigration from Xiamen to Deli again. The negotiations either did not succeed or the planters themselves lost interest in the project, since the last time the Deli trade was mentioned by the German consul was in 1891.<sup>324</sup>

The only years in which coolies were actually transported to Deli were in 1888 and 1889. For the coolie export to Deli German steamers were used. In 1888, e.g., 7 steamers drove to Deli with coolies. The ships were the *Christian*, *Anton*, *China*, *Independent*, *Fidelio*, *China*, and *Chow Chow Foo*. In 1889 the *China*, *Niatkin*, *Picciola*, *Fidelio*, *Velox* and *Chow Chow Foo* were used in this business during 26 journeys.

## 7.9 Conclusion

Local trading establishments were limited to trading houses, of which only a handful existed. The German Asiatic Bank did not have incentives to open a branch and also no German currency was circulating in Xiamen.

The most important German company was Pasedag & Co. which existed from 1854 and survived the outbreak of the First World War. Its first owner was the merchant consul C. J. Pasedag and its later owner acted as consul for other nations. The company operated as an agency and also employed ships for the coast trade. A later important concern of the company was the representation of the Asiatic Petroleum Company which built tanks in Xiamen. Smaller companies included Petersen & Co. which had a similar business field as Pasedag & Co. as well as Gerard & Co. who manufactured iron pans.

Although the total number of foreign firms seems to have rapidly increased after 1880, the increase went onto the account of Chinese firms. Most nations except Germany gave a special status to Chinese and allowed them to conduct trade under the respective foreign nation's flag. The total number of German firms had a peak in the 1880s with three firms, but the number declined after 1900 due to the decrease of shipping and the decline of Xiamen as a trading hub.

Trade between Xiamen and China was very limited and was conducted indirectly over Hongkong. Since Hongkong appears in the Maritime Customs like a foreign country, the exact trading volume cannot be determined. Xiamen did not provide any important export products for Germany. Most of the popular German export products were also not applicable for the market in Xiamen. Products with some significance were sundries including dyes, beer and other alcoholics, condensed milk, butter and cheese, sugar, sewing needles, lamps, clocks, drugs, lamps, cotton wool, and wool products.

Surprisingly, China imported high quantities of morphine and cocaine in 1908 and 1909 with Xiamen as the primary importer. Large amounts also stemmed from Germany. However, the official trade was quickly stopped by high duties and a general ban on the drugs. Still, the trade continued on the black market. The import of the drugs was not primarily for the local population, but for the smuggling and selling of the drugs in Singapore to which coolies transported the drugs in their hand luggage.

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<sup>323</sup>BArch R 1001/2301 183-185.

<sup>324</sup>BArch R 1001/2301 151.

It cannot be determined with certainty whether Germans were involved in the opium trade. German trading houses near Xiamen such as James Milisch on Taiwan or Siemens & Co. in Fuzhou were known to be involved. However, there are no reports that Pasedag & Co. or another German company in Xiamen was participating in the trade. Still, the Maritime Customs show that opium fees were raised on German ships. Since German ships were often chartered, it is not unlikely that in reality Chinese or British merchants were trading the opium.

Another special characteristic of German trade with Xiamen were the Krupp cannons. With Bian Biaodi's modernization efforts Xiamen imported several Krupp cannons that were used to equip Fort Hulishan and other forts in and around Xiamen. The constructions for Fort Hulishan finished in 1896 and one of the two large Krupp cannons can still be looked at today.

Both German shipping companies and local German trading houses were involved in the coolie transport and trade. Probably all small and big German shipping companies participated in the transport of coolies to Singapore, either as charter ships such as by M. Jebsen or later as regular lines such as by the NDL or HAPAG. Pasedag & Co. employed Chinese middlemen, probably to hire coolies in the interiors. The company opened together with Petersen & Co. a direct Deli emigration business between 1888 and 1890, but it was stopped soon after due to the resistance by the population, the ban by Chinese authorities, and due to selection of unsuitable workers by the Chinese middlemen and the resulting reactions of the planters.

Previous chapters already mentioned that German shipping came to a decline in 1900. The next chapter investigates German shipping companies that existed between 1886 and 1900 and arrived with their ships in Xiamen. It gives a first explanation of German shipping development by looking at the factors and shipping traffic internal to the German shipping community.

## Chapter Eight German Shipping Companies

This chapter investigates which German shipping companies were active in Xiamen. Information about the shipping companies (history, business fields, size) and the ships (size, number of entrances) help to characterize the German shipping traffic.

Some, but not all of the yearly German consular reports contain detailed *ship lists* that record the entrance of German ships. This data differs from the Maritime Customs, since the custom entries record the number of declarations, i.e., the number of entrances and exits of ships. However, doubling the number of entrances should approximately equal the number of declarations. Deviations stem from the circumstance, that ships were still in the port when the year ended.

The years analyzed are 1886-1889, 1890-1893, and 1896-1900<sup>325</sup> from the consular reports of the German Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv). For this time frame, the years with no ship lists are not a major obstacle for sampling the active shipping companies. Also, the time frame is of major interest as it records the rapid decline of German shipping with a before unreached minimum of shipping traffic in 1900. Additionally, in the time period before, the constant decline of sailing ships is easier to explain compared to the abrupt descent of German ships and the increase of the average tonnage in 1900 as demonstrated in Chapter Nine. Although the years after 1900 are important to further trace the decline of German shipping, no further shipping lists could be found. Still, the German consul sometimes commented on the shipping traffic in terms of absolute numbers.<sup>326</sup>

After a general introduction to the shipping companies, the analysis of the shipping lists are presented. The individual lists are not cited in the sections below, but referred to as *ship lists*.<sup>327</sup>

Besides the analysis, the list of all ships that arrived in Xiamen from the respective shipping company are listed with additional information. The additional information includes the register tons, GRT (Bruttoregistertonne, BRT) from the ship list, as well as the carrying capacity in tons, if available from other sources. However, as already stated by Kludas,<sup>328</sup> the German measurement regulations changed frequently before 1900. Often, different sources report different register tons and carrying capacity. However, the tonnage metrics are still useful to relatively compare the size of the ships.

<sup>325</sup>The analysis of the shipping traffic was a labor intensive and error prone task, as ships and shipping companies had to be manually aggregated from the hand written records. The analysis can by far means not be viewed as complete and entirely correct. Also, shipping companies from the ship list have not been ranked and selected for analysis. Instead, shipping companies with a seemingly high contribution to the German shipping traffic were selected to explain a major part of German shipping. However, the conclusions drawn from the analysis are not affected by this since the arguments refer to the general development of the German shipping traffic and are thus not distorted by small errors in the number of declarations of individual ships.

<sup>326</sup>For instance, the German consul stated that in 1905 14 German steamers had 28 declarations distributed among 7 steamers from the NDL and 3 steamers from the HAPAG. The declarations of the two shipping companies in this year are used in the further arguments. (BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1905)

<sup>327</sup>The consular reports containing the ship lists are stored in four different files with periods 1886-1887 (BArch R 901/5146), 1889-1890 (BArch R 901/5147), 1891-1893 (BArch R 901/5148), and 1896-1900 (BArch R 901/5149).

<sup>328</sup>Kludas, *Die Pionierjahre, 1850 bis 1890* 8.

## 8.1 The German Steamer Shipping Company of Hamburg and the Kingsin line

After its founding in Hamburg in 1871 the *German Steamer Shipping Company of Hamburg* (Deutsche Dampfschiffs-Rhederei zu Hamburg) operated as the first German shipping company a cargo steaming business with limited passenger transport to East Asia. However, initially the shipping company had an irregular schedule and often passed several harbors on its return searching for freight.

Starting from 1881 the company named its line to East Asia *Kingsin* (金星). With the *Kingsin* line the company was the first German steamer shipping company that had a regular connection with East Asia starting from 1885.<sup>329</sup> Although the shipping company applied for mail transport between 1884 and 1885, it did not get the contract because of the irregular frequency and the low speed of the ships.<sup>330</sup> From 1886 on, a steamer started its journey to the ports of Said, Penang, Singapore, Hongkong, and Yokohama every twenty days. From 1889 the frequency increased to fourteen days. In 1900, the company sold its ships to HAPAG. Surprisingly, no ships of this company reached Xiamen in the time frame investigated. Probably the company only anchored at bigger ports such as Shanghai and Guangzhou when the company regularized their schedules.

## 8.2 M. Jebsen 1886-1900

Michael Jebsen founded the shipping company *M. Jebsen* (捷成汉) in North Schleswig (which belongs to Denmark today) in the city of Aabenraa (or Apenrade) and sent the first steamer to East Asia in 1881.

The shipping company was often chartered by Chinese merchants from Hongkong and neighboring ports including Xiamen for which it was used in the coast trade and for the transport of coolies. Many small and little companies such as Akow, Yuen Fat Hong, Tung Kee, Lee Wing, Sung Kee, Young Kee, Nam Woo, and the shipping company Yuen Cheong Lee were regular charterers of the line. In contrast to many other shipping companies which looked down on Chinese merchants, Jebsen instructed the company to deal with Chinese on equal basis and even favor them over European charterers.<sup>331</sup>

As with many other German companies, the steamers of Jebsen were relatively small, but appreciated by Chinese charterers during the 1880s through their flexibility. Their freight was usually not very big such that small steamers with a size between 600 and 1100 tons were preferred.<sup>332</sup>

A regular shipping transport was only established after the lease of Jiaozhou. The German government subsidized a mail service through a contract signed on the 30. August 1898 with weekly ships going between Shanghai and Qingdao.<sup>333</sup> Subsequently, contracts extended the mail service to also provide a line with a fourteen day frequency between Shanghai, Qingdao, Yantai, and Tianjin (also see Section 5.2).

<sup>329</sup>Kludas, *Die Pionierjahre, 1850 bis 1890* 173.

<sup>330</sup>Kludas, *Die Pionierjahre, 1850 bis 1890* 156-159, 215.

<sup>331</sup>Becker 315-323.

<sup>332</sup>Becker 319.

<sup>333</sup>Hänisch 53.

With the pressure of the HAPAG (and interest of the NDL) in February 1901 Michael Jebsen decided to sell his ships and stop the service.<sup>334</sup>

M. Jebsen also operated an irregular shipping service, that anchored in Shantou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Ningbo.<sup>335</sup>




Figure 16: M. Jebsen's Steamer *Clara Jebsen* (by Courtesy of Museum Sønderjyllands)

Name	GRT	Entries
Apenrade	610	2
Vorwärts	611	4
Triumpf	674	1
Clara Jebsen (see Figure 16)	674	11
Mathilde	687	1
Jakob Diederichsen	712	1
Else	747	7
Doris	817	1
Amigo	821	15
Holstein	1102	1
Rio	1279	19
Germania	1713	6
Marie Jebsen	1867	2

Table 6: Partial List of *M. Jebsen* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

Table 6 shows the ships that arrived in Xiamen. Overall, M. Jebsen significantly

<sup>334</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 204-207.

<sup>335</sup>Meyers Reisebücher 241.



increased the shipping traffic in Xiamen. In 1886, he contributed to over 6 percent of the German shipping, in 1893 almost 25 percent, and in 1896 over 30 percent.

During the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese chartered the *Clara Jebsen*, *Triumpf*, and *Apenrade* which all arrived in a high frequency in Xiamen (see Chapter Nine). During 1904 and 1905 Jebsen thus held the main share of German shipping.

Although the *Else* had the same name as a barque of Pasedag & Co., the *Else* of Jebsen was larger and a steamer.

### 8.3 Steamship Company “Globus” 1886-1893

The *Steamship Company “Globus”* (*Dampfschiff Gesellschaft “Globus”*) from Flensburg sent two ships up to 1893 to Xiamen as Table 7 shows. Both the *Glücksburg* and the *Deburg* counted to the largest German ships in the harbor at this time.

Name	GRT	entries
Glücksburg	917	22
Deburg	1097	14

Table 7: Partial List of *Steamship Company “Globus”* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

The company contributed over seven percent to the German shipping traffic in 1886, and over ten percent in 1889.

### 8.4 The Steamboat Company Shantou 1886-1893

The *Hamburger Steamboat Company Shantou* (*Dampfschiffs-Gesellschaft Swatow*) operated in Xiamen before it sold its six steamers in 1895 to Nissen and The Chinese Coastline Company.

Name	GRT	entries
Chusan	623	3
Swatow	630	1
Hainan	647	6
Chow Chow Foo	796	17
Picciola	847	9
Fidelio	852	14
Dutevg (?)	1097	2
China	1113	3

Table 8: Partial List of *Steamboat Company Shantou* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

Table 8 shows the ships of the Steamboat Company Shantou. In total, 8 different steamers anchored in Xiamen between 1886 and 1893. No more ships were seen two years before the remaining steamers were sold. The ships of the company generally arrived in irregular frequencies. The *Dutevg(?)* only arrived in 1889, the *Swatow* in 1890, the *Chusan* in 1891, and the *China* in 1892. Apart from that, the *Hainan*, *Chow Chow Foo*, *Fidelio*, *Picciola* were irregularly seen in these years.

The Steamboat Company Shantou probably bought the sailing ships *Fidelio* and *Picciola* from A. E. Hertz (see Section 8.16.7) in 1888 from whom *Fidelio* was still seen in 1888 and *Picciola* in 1886. The company bought the *China* from F. H. Häncke (see Section 8.16.10) who operated the ship between 1888 and 1890.

In 1889 the company contributed over 25 percent of the shipping traffic, in 1890 almost 9 percent, in 1891 over 15 percent, and 1892 over 8 percent.

## 8.5 Sartori & Berger 1886-1889

The ships from Sartori & Berger reached the port until 1889. Since the analysis of the ship lists starts at 1886, when the *Anton* entered Xiamen seven times, the shipping company probably already operated before.

Name	GRT	entries
Anton	395	8
Johann	427	1
Elisabeth	447	9

Table 9: Partial List of *Sartori & Berger* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

As Table 9 shows, three ships arrived in Xiamen: the *Anton*, the *Elisabeth*, and the *Johann*. The *Anton* was used in the coolie trade to Deli in 1888. The *Elisabeth* was sold to Pasedag & Co. in 1890 when it appeared the first time under the new owner in the ship list. In the previous year, Sartori & Berger still sent the vessel three times to Xiamen.

Sartori & Berger accounted for more than four percent of German ships in 1886 and almost five percent in 1888.

## 8.6 M. Struve 1888-1898

Matthias Struve founded the shipping company *M. Struve* in 1884 in Blankenese. Initially, few people were interested in the company, and he could only buy the small steamer *Cito*. Struve concentrated his efforts on the Chinese coast, where his steamers were often chartered by Chinese merchants.<sup>336</sup> Siemssen & Co. worked as agency for Struve.<sup>337</sup>

With the success of his business, he could expand the company and buy his second steamer *Presto* in 1888. In 1891 and 1892 he additionally bought the steamers *Pronto* and *Progress*. In 1894, Struve sold the steamer *Cito* and in 1896 the *Presto* to buy bigger ships. The two new, bigger ships were the *Süllberg* and the *M. Struve*. The last and biggest steamer bought by Struve was the *Landrat Scheiff*.

In 1904 Struve sold the *Pronto* to Russia. In 1905, the *M. Struve* stranded on the coast and in 1907, the *Süllberg* got lost in a typhoon. The last remaining steamer, the

<sup>336</sup>Bernhard Klobedanz, "Blankenese im Chinesischen Meer", *Hamburger Klönschnack* Heft 01/00 (Jan. 2000), <<http://www.kloenschnack.de/archiv/einzelartikel/archiv/2000/januar/artikel/wissenswertes-schiffahrt/>>.

<sup>337</sup>Möring 86.

*Landrat Scheiff*, was detained in Bangkok during the First World War and eventually seized.<sup>338</sup>

As Table 10 shows, Struve's first small steamer *Cito* also anchored in Xiamen. It appeared continuously in the years from 1888 to 1891. Until the sale of the steamer in 1896, it did no longer anchor in Xiamen. The *Presto* was only seen in 1893, and the *Pronto* in 1899. In a high with 17 declarations of the *Pronto* in 1899, M. Struve made up over 15 percent of German shipping in Xiamen.

Name	GRT <sup>339</sup>	entries
Cito	378 (387?)	8
Presto	632 (655?)	5
Pronto	655 (719?)	17

Table 10: Partial List of *M. Struve* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

## 8.7 Flensburger Steam Company of 1869 1890-1900

The *Flensburger Steam Company of 1869* (*Flensburger Dampfgesellschaft v. 1869*) from Flensburg sent ships to Xiamen between 1890 to 1900. Siemssen & Co. was working as an agency for the company, being in charge of steamers such as the *Deuteros* and *Tetartos*, as well as the *Tertia*, *Quarta*, *Quinta*, and *Sexta*.<sup>340</sup>

Name	GRT	entries
Decima	1144	1
Reara	1145	1
Protos	1149	2
Duckaos (?)	1251	1
Deuteros	1251	2
Tritos	1340	2
Pumptos (Pemptos?)	1764	1
Tetartos	1812	3

Table 11: Partial List of *Flensburger Steam Company of 1869* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

Table 11 shows the ships of the Flensburger company that arrived in Xiamen. Most of them only anchored a single time. The ship list shows that some of the ships were operating in the coast trade, others drove with passengers, probably coolies, to Singapore.

In 1892 the company almost contributed five percent to the German shipping in Xiamen.

<sup>338</sup>Klobedanz.

<sup>339</sup>The alternative tonnage in parentheses stems from (Klobedanz).

<sup>340</sup>Möring 86.

## 8.8 Asiatic Coast Company 1890-1900

The *Asiatic Coast Company* (Asiatische Küstengesellschaft) from Hamburg appeared with ships between 1890 and 1900 in Xiamen.

Name	GRT	entries
Tailee	828	20
Taicheong	828	10
Tai Rick	902	2
Taiyick	1063	1
Taifu	1065	5

Table 12: Partial List of *Asiatic Coast Company* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

The shipping company primarily contributed in two heights to the German shipping in Xiamen: In 1891 with over 15 percent of German ship traffic and in 1898 with almost 18 percent. *Taicheong* and *Tailee* sometimes also appeared under name of the Chinese Coastline Company (see Section 8.10).

## 8.9 Rickmers Shipping Company 1896-1900

The family shipping company *Rickmers Shipping Company* (Rickmers Rhederei, 瑞克麦斯轮船公司) started 1859 as a shipping company, but already operated before as a shipyard. The family was also active as *Rickmers Ricemills* (Rickmers Reismühlen) and *Shipbuilding AG* (Schiffbau AG). The shipping business of the company to East Asia started in 1896 as a freight and passenger business. However, due to family conflicts and competition with the HAPAG and NDL, which also presented obstacles later, the regular line was already stopped in 1897. The ships were chartered by the NDL and HAPAG with an eventual buying option. However, preparations for coast shipping still continued and were realized in 1899. One of the newly built steamers, the *Sui-Hsiang*, was used for transportation of the international expedition against the Boxer rebellion. Due do the competition on the Yangtze River ships had to be sold to the HAPAG and NDL in 1901, two other coast steamers followed. Rickmers had no more coast steamers and only in 1902 six ships came again to East Asia. In 1903, a passenger and freight transport opened from Bangkok to Hongkong and Shantou. In 1903, the whole fleet was sold to the NDL.<sup>341</sup>

Between 1896 and 1898, the *Sabine Rickmers* frequently entered Xiamen. In 1896, the ship entered six times, contributing over 6 percent of German shipping traffic and almost 18 percent in 1897 with nine entries. In 1898 the *Sabine Rickmers* was sold to the Shell Transport Co. in Hong Kong.<sup>342</sup>

The *Tsintau* which was finished on the 6. April 1900 entered Xiamen a single time in the year of its construction, as the ship list shows. However, when the NDL gave

<sup>341</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 208-214.

<sup>342</sup>S. Swiggum and M. Kohli, "Rickmers Line / Rickmers Reismühlen, Rhederei & Schiffbau AG", *The-ShipsList* (25 Aug. 2006), <<http://www.theshipslist.com/ships/lines/rickmers.shtml>>.

<sup>343</sup>S. Swiggum and M. Kohli, "Rickmers Line / Rickmers Reismühlen, Rhederei & Schiffbau AG", *The-ShipsList* (25 Aug. 2006), <<http://www.theshipslist.com/ships/lines/rickmers.shtml>>.

<sup>344</sup>Arnold Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900*, Geschichte der deutschen Passagierschifffahrt (Weltbild Verlag, 1994) 210.

Name	GRT	tons <sup>343</sup>	entries
Sabine Rickmers	690	1026	17
Tsintau	1002 <sup>344</sup>	1685	1

Table 13: Partial List of *Rickmers Shipping Company* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

Rickmers an offer for the ship (and the *Shantung*), Rickmers sold the steamer again in 1901. *Tsintau* was thus one of the two last ships that still constituted the coast steamer fleet of Rickmers in this year.<sup>345</sup>

## 8.10 The Chinese Coastline Company 1896-1900

Another German shipping company to East Asia was founded in 1887 by Woldemar Nissen, owner of the Hamburger company Siemssen & Co., namely the *Chinese Coastline Company* (Chinesische Küstenfahrt-Gesellschaft). Nissen started a small passenger line and freight transport between Guangzhou, Hongkong, and Shanghai. With the success of the shipping company, Nissen took over the Hamburger *Steamboat Company Shantou* in which he had already been involved before.<sup>346</sup> With the expansion of the Hapag which planned to open the same line in 1900, Nissen decided to stop the business.<sup>347</sup>

Name	GRT	entries
Swatow	630	17
Taicheong	828	10
Picciola	847	7
Taillee	939	1
Nanyang	1059	78
Lyemoon	1238	1
Daphne	1290	1

Table 14: Partial List of *Chinese Coastline Company* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

Although Nissen's steamers already operated earlier on the Chinese coast, they were not on the shipping list before 1896. Probably Nissen took over the agents from the Steamboat Company Shantou which the company bought in 1895.

Nissen let two of the ships from the Steamboat Company Shantou still operate in Xiamen, namely the *Picciola* and the *Swatow*. The *Taicheong* and *Taillee* were sold to Meyer & Co. in Hongkong around 1900. The *Lyemoon* was later sold to the HAPAG. Both *Taillee* and *Taicheong* appeared several years both under the name of the Chinese Coastline Company and the Asiatic Coast Company.

The *Nanyang* contributed significantly in 1897 and 1899 to the shipping traffic where the ship accounted alone for 78 declarations. The vessel made up 48 percent of the Shipping traffic in 1898 and 27 percent in 1899. The ship was operating in these years

<sup>345</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 210-213.

<sup>346</sup>Möring 86.

<sup>347</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 38-39.

in the coast trade, e.g., between Tainan, Shantou, Niuzhang, Hongkong, and other coastal ports loaded with piece goods.

In 1897 the shipping company made up over 33 percent with its declarations, in 1898 almost 55 percent, and in 1899 over 49 percent of the local German shipping traffic.

### 8.11 R. Wahl and W. Wahl 1897-1900

*R. Wahl* from Cologne operated ships from at least 1897 to 1900. As Table 15 shows, the ship list to Xiamen included the *Cosmopolia*, *Dante*, and *Loyal*. Although the *Cosmopolia* had a similar name as the *Cosmopolit* from the Cologne shipping company AG Cosmopolit (see Section 8.16.12), the two ships were not related. However, the ship *Dante* was bought from the Shipping Company Ocean from Cologne (see Section 8.16.14) which operated in 1896 for that company. In 1898 it appeared in the fleet of R. Wahl.

Probably related to R. Wahl was W. Wahl, also from Cologne, who sent the *Independent* once in 1897 as Table 15 shows. In 1888 the ship still belonged to the *AG Shipping Company Mannheim (Cologne)* (Actien Ges. Rhederei Independent Mannheim (Köln)) which only appeared once and transported coolies to Deli with the vessel. Either W. Wahl or M. Wahl sent the *Hansa* to Xiamen once in 1900.

In 1898 the two shipping companies R. Wahl and W. Wahl made up more than five percent of German shipping.

Name	GRT	entries
Cosmopolia	674	3
Loyal	1237	2
Dante	1302	2

Table 15: Partial List of *R. Wahl* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

Name	GRT	entries
Independent	1040	1
Hansa	1201	1

Table 16: Partial List of *W. Wahl* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

### 8.12 R. M. Flomann 1899-1900

A less known shipping company from Hamburg started to operate in Xiamen around the same time as the HAPAG and NDL. Similarly as the two shipping giants, the shipping company employed unusually big ships. Table 17 shows the four ships that arrived in Xiamen. In 1899, the *Catania* and *Pisa* arrived in Xiamen, and in 1900 the *Verona* and *Albenga*. The big ships point towards a larger shipping company, and thus the company probably still kept operating its ships after 1900.

Name	GRT	entries
Catania	1822	1
Albenga	2745	1
Pisa	2889	1
Verona	3039	1

Table 17: Partial List of *R. M. Flomann* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

### 8.13 HAPAG 1899-1900

The Hamburg-America Line (Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft, 汉堡—美洲行包航运股份公司, HAPAG) was founded on the 27. May 1847.<sup>348</sup>

On the 3. January 1897 the HAPAG directorate approved the plans to open a monthly line to East Asia. It was the first time that the HAPAG left the Atlantic Ocean. The company also claimed to take part in Imperial Post Steamer service and came to an agreement with the NDL. On the 13. April 1898 the Reichstag officially decided to let both the HAPAG and NDL operate mail steamers to East Asia. At the same time the HAPAG also started to operate the freight transport together with the NDL.

HAPAG sent its first steamer to East Asia on the 25. February 1898. The *Andalusia* went from Hamburg over Antwerp to Penang, Singapore, Hongkong, Shanghai, and Yokohama. Hence, the line directly competed with the Kingsin line (see Section 8.1). The Kingsin line immediately gave in to the offer of the HAPAG and sold its fleet of 13 steamers on the 26. March 1898.

In this year and others, the HAPAG was the biggest shipping company in the world.<sup>349</sup> The HAPAG sold seven of its steamers from the Kingsin fleet to the NDL. The mail steamer contract, however, officially only started on the 1. October 1899 from when on journeys started weekly instead of every two weeks. In 1900 the HAPAG also participated in the transport of the troops for the Boxer rebellion.<sup>350</sup>

In March 1901, the HAPAG took over the Guangdong-Hongkong-Shanghai line of the Chinese Coastline Company and the route Shanghai-Jiaozhou-Yantai-Tianjin of the post steamer line of M. Jebsen. In the spring of 1901, the HAPAG already operated the four steamers *Loongmoon*, *Lyemoon*, and the smaller steamers *Tsintau* and *Gouverneur Jaeschke* on the coast. The *Tsintau* which the HAPAG took over from Jebsen also anchored in Xiamen in 1900. HAPAG further expanded and also took over the Yangtze River line of Rickmers. In 1902, the HAPAG established a freighter line from Hongkong to Port Arthur.

When the NDL persuaded Rickmers to sell the rest of his fleet in 1903 (see Section 8.9), agencies that before chartered the ships from Rickmers requested the HAPAG to take over the coast shipping business. Still, the HAPAG could not compete with the NDL on the coast line and also withdrew its mailing steamers. Instead, the HAPAG wanted that the NDL would operate the mailing steamers and the HAPAG the freight transport which happened from 1904 on.<sup>351</sup>

In June 1904, the HAPAG signed a contract to transport coals to Russia without

<sup>348</sup>Kludas, *Die Pionierjahre, 1850 bis 1890* 17-19.

<sup>349</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 83.

<sup>350</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 198.

<sup>351</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 190-203.

informing the German government. While the contract internationally provided heated political discussions, the HAPAG continued its transport and temporarily even used 80 steamers for it of which most were chartered.<sup>352</sup>

The HAPAG tried to extend its passenger transport to East Asia, which was a breach of the contract mentioned before, and subsequently led to disputes with the NDL. Starting with 1908, the HAPAG agreed to stop its passenger transport to East Asia. However, the HAPAG still occupied steamers for their coast line. The *Loongmoon* and *Lyemoon* operated on the line Guangzhou-Hongkong-Shanghai, and *Tsintau* and *Gouverneur Jaescheke* on the Shanghai-Jiaozhou-Yantai-Tianjin route. Several other steamers and also lines were initiated. Besides the passenger lines the HAPAG also occupied several freight services.<sup>353</sup>

New conflicts between the HAPAG and NDL led the NDL to infringe the contract from 1908 by opening a freight line to East Asia. In return, the HAPAG offered on the 18. Juli 1913 to operate the Imperial Post Steamer line to East Asia without subsidies. In 1914 the two lines worked on a solution to get rid of these conflicts, but the First World War prevented the implementation of planned measures.<sup>354</sup>

As the ship list in Table 18 shows, the first HAPAG steamer in Xiamen was the *Andalusia* that set up from Shanghai to drive with passengers to Singapore in 1899. It was the first ship of the HAPAG in East Asia, as mentioned before. In 1900, the HAPAG extended its shipping services with the *Asturia*, *Westphalia*, *Serbia*, and *Armenia* which arrived each once in Xiamen. In 1900, the HAPAG contributed almost 17 percent of the ship entrances.

The consul mentioned that out of the 14 ship entrances in 1905 3 went onto the account of HAPAG. In this year, the HAPAG contributed over 21 percent of the German ship traffic.

The *Asturia* was first used on an America line, but operated from 1899 on in East Asia. It stranded on the 16. June 1901 on the Gulf of Aden. The *Andalusia* had also previously been used on an America line. Starting from 1904 it was no longer used for passenger transport, but still operated until 1914. It was confiscated by the US in 1917.<sup>355</sup> The other ships were most probably freight ships.

Name	GRT	tons <sup>356</sup>	entries
Westphalia	1975	3079	1
Serbia	2376	3694	1
Armenia	? (5458?)	5471 (7590?)	1
Asturia	3318,63 (5285?)	5290 (7410?)	1
Andalusia	3488,78 (5457?)	5471 (7529?)	1

Table 18: Partial List of HAPAG Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

<sup>352</sup>Kludas, *Sprunghaftes Wachstum, 1900 bis 1914* 177-185.

<sup>353</sup>Kludas, *Sprunghaftes Wachstum, 1900 bis 1914* 177-185.

<sup>354</sup>Kludas, *Sprunghaftes Wachstum, 1900 bis 1914* 177-185.

<sup>355</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 84.

<sup>356</sup>The tonnage in the third column stems from (Swiggum and Kohli, "Hamburg-American Packet Company / Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktien-Gesellschaft (HAPAG) / Hamburg-American Line / Hamburg-Amerika Linie"). An alternative tonnage from (Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 84) is noted in parentheses.



The HAPAG was active in the coast trade in Xiamen, but also concentrated on the coolie transport to Singapore together with the NDL. In 1903 the HAPAG opened a regular line on the route Hongkong-Shanghai-Chemulpo (Inchon)-Port Arthur-Niuzhang-Xiamen with two steamers. However, the chosen time was very unfortunate since with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the HAPAG stopped its new line again.<sup>357</sup>

In 1904, five steamers of the HAPAG were transporting coolies,<sup>358</sup> probably to Singapore. Also in 1905, three steamers transported coolies to Singapore.<sup>359</sup> The coast shipping line before the Russo-Japanese War was not reinitiated, probably because it did not make any profit as also noted by the German consul for the NDL. This is further confirmed with the selling of two steamers in 1911 that before operated between Niuzhang and Xiamen.<sup>360</sup>

### 8.14 North German Lloyd (NDL) 1899

The North German Lloyd (Norddeutscher Lloyd, 北德意志-劳埃德, NDL) was founded in 1857<sup>361</sup> and counted together with the HAPAG to the most important shipping companies at that time.

Its involvement in China mainly coincided with the Imperial Post Steamer as already explained in Section 5.2. Apart from that, the NDL also transported an international corps in 1900 to counter the Boxer rebellion.<sup>362</sup>

In 1900 the NDL started to operate on the Yangtze River and on 1901 NDL bought ships from Melchers & Co. that drove before on the river. In 1901 the NDL initiated the route Shanghai-Zhenjiang-Shantou with the steamers *Mei Lee*, *Mei Shun*, *Mei Dah*, and *Mei Yu*.<sup>363</sup> In 1903 the NDL bought the coast steamers from Rickmers and used them in the Bangkok-Hongkong line.<sup>364</sup>

In 1904 the NDL operated 14 coast lines in East Asia.<sup>365</sup>

The ship lists show that ships from the NDL first arrived in Xiamen in 1899 in the same year as the HAPAG. In that year, three ships anchored in Xiamen: The *Stolberg*, *Weimar*, and the *Heidelberg*. The *Stolberg* and *Heidelberg* came from Moji (today's Kitakyushu) and Fuzhou, and were set for Singapore with passengers, and thus were probably transporting coolies. The *Weimar* arrived from Singapore with a replacement crew for Jiaozhou. In this year, the shipping traffic by the NDL in Xiamen not even accounted three percent.

For 1900 no NDL ships were contained in the ship list. In this year, the NDL had to transport an expeditionary corps of almost 20,000 soldiers in 18 passenger ships and 39 freight ships due to the Boxer rebellions.<sup>366</sup> It is obvious that the ships intended for Xiamen had been reused for these transports.

<sup>357</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1903, Shipping Report 1904.

<sup>358</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1904.

<sup>359</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1905.

<sup>360</sup>PA AA R 9208/954 22.

<sup>361</sup>Kludas, *Die Pionierjahre, 1850 bis 1890* 27.

<sup>362</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 110.

<sup>363</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 125.

<sup>364</sup>Norddeutscher Lloyd, "Bericht nebst Anlagen zur siebenundvierzigsten ordentlichen General-Versammlung des Norddeutschen Lloyds am 11. April 1904" (1904): 3.

<sup>365</sup>Kludas, *Sprunghaftes Wachstum, 1900 bis 1914* 171.

<sup>366</sup>Kludas, *Expansion auf allen Meeren, 1890 bis 1900* 110.

In 1903, the NDL let some of its steamers drive between Xiamen and Singapore.<sup>367</sup>

From a business report of the NDL it is clear that the *Stolberg* was given to the HAPAG in 1904, when the HAPAG stopped its participation in the Imperial Post Steamer service. The *Stolberg* was “exclusively used in freight transport” at the NDL before 1904 and then belonged to HAPAG’s freight line.<sup>368</sup>

Name	GRT	tons <sup>369</sup>	Entries
(Keongwai)	?	1777	at least 1
Stolberg	1553	2582	1
Heidelberg	2144	3372	1
Weimar	5316	4996	1

Table 19: Partial List of NDL Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

In 1904 the NDL occupied 44 vessels in East Asia with 69,819 GRT. In that year, the new line Hongkong-Xiamen-Shantou-Straits-Bangkok appeared in the trade report of the NDL. The trade report argued that the line was established “to even more advantageously facilitate the ships used in the Bangkok shipping business.”<sup>370</sup> Also the German consul noted that since the mid of 1904, the NDL monthly operated two steamers between the Straits Settlement and Xiamen for the transport of coolies.

For 1905, the line again appeared in a NDL report but subsequently no reference to it could be found in the NDL business reports.<sup>371</sup> The NDL used the steamers from the Scottish Oriental Shipping Company that operated before on a Shantou-Bangkok route<sup>372</sup> for which also the *Keongwai* was used. In 1905 the NDL operated 7 steamers to transport coolies to Singapore<sup>373</sup> and contributed 50 percent of the German shipping traffic in Xiamen with it.

The line was probably not profitable and was thus no longer mentioned. These speculations are also supported by the German consul who mentioned in 1905 that the NDL had been operating some of its coast steamers on the route Xiamen-Shantou-Singapore-Penang in the last years, but that “since of the high competition the profits left much to be desired which was probably the reason the NDL did not initiate a regular line.”<sup>374</sup>

The NDL mentioned a high competition with the Nippon Yusen Kaisha in the “Bangkok shipping business” which also included the Xiamen coolie business. For 1908, the NDL reported that previously “the competition with the Nippon Yusen Kaisha [had]

<sup>367</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1903.

<sup>368</sup>Norddeutscher Lloyd, “Bericht nebst Anlagen zur achtundvierzigsten ordentlichen General-Versammlung des Norddeutschen Lloyds am 15. April 1905” (1905): 2.

<sup>369</sup>S. Swiggum and M. Kohli, “North German Lloyd Company / Nord-deutscher Lloyd”, *TheShipsList* (10 June 2008), <<http://www.theshipslist.com/ships/lines/nglloyd.shtml>>.

<sup>370</sup>Norddeutscher Lloyd, “Bericht nebst Anlagen zur achtundvierzigsten ordentlichen General-Versammlung des Norddeutschen Lloyds am 15. April 1905” 2.

<sup>371</sup>Norddeutscher Lloyd, “Bericht nebst Anlagen zur achtundvierzigsten ordentlichen General-Versammlung des Norddeutschen Lloyds am 5. April 1906” (1906): 2.

<sup>372</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1904.

<sup>373</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1905.

<sup>374</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1905.

demanded significant sacrifices”, but in that year the situation was relieved.<sup>375</sup> However, later reports lament the Chinese competition in the Bangkok shipping. Chapter Nine shows that it was not the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, but the Osaka Shosen Kaisha which eventually led to the decline of German shipping in Xiamen.

In either case, the NDL did not sent steamers in 1909 due a shortage of ships for the coolie transport to Singapore, as stated by the German consul.<sup>376</sup> However, if the route would have been profitable steamers surely would have been found.

The NDL continued to anchor in Xiamen in the next years until the outbreak of the First World War.

The only ship that could not leave the harbor due to the outbreak of the First World War was the *Keongwai*<sup>377</sup> which was taken over from the Scottish Oriental Steamship Co.

The NDL operated big steamers with significantly higher tonnage than most of the other German Shipping companies. The list of NDL ships that anchored in Xiamen represented by Table 19 confirms this.

## 8.15 Local Shipping Companies

Several local “shipping companies” were based in Xiamen. The local trading houses Pasedag & Co. as well as Petersen & Co. operated several ships with probably transported goods by their own order or were chartered by Chinese companies. Also several captains with their own ships were based in Xiamen such as J. W. Danielsen, L. P. Michelsen, or Holm.<sup>378</sup>

### 8.15.1 Pasedag & Co.

Pasedag & Co. was operating in the coast trade and often drove to Niuzhang to transport beans and beancake to Xiamen. Table 20 shows that Pasedag & Co. operated 10 ships between 1886 and 1900.

The *Elisabeth* was sold to Pasedag & Co. in 1890, while in 1889 it still had been operating under Sartori & Berger (see Section 8.5). Pasedag & Co. probably bought the *Therese* in 1892 from Heinrich Wilhelm Clausen (see Section 8.16.3), and the *Galveston* from Reck & Boyes (see Section 8.16.6) in 1889. A court case regarding the ships of Pasedag & Co. shows that the *Anna Bertha* and the *Elisabeth* had been registered in 1887 and 1890 in Hamburg. The *Mary Stewart* was registered in 1892 and was before in British possession.<sup>379</sup>

Until including 1896, Pasedag & Co.’s sailing ships were frequently and continuously seen in Xiamen. In 1886 Pasedag & Co. accounted with 11 journeys for almost 7 percent, in 1888 with 11 journeys over 10 percent, in 1889 with 7 journeys 8 percent, in 1890 with 14 journeys almost 25 percent, in 1891 with 12 journeys over 15 percent,

<sup>375</sup>Norddeutscher Lloyd, “Bericht nebst Anlagen zur achtundvierzigsten ordentlichen General-Versammlung des Norddeutschen Lloyds am 24. April 1909” (1909): 3.

<sup>376</sup>PA AA R 141825.

<sup>377</sup>PA AA R 141826: Consular Report for 1914 and 1915.

<sup>378</sup>It is not unlikely that other shipping companies mentioned in this chapter but not under this section were based in Xiamen. Since most shipping companies were small, no or only few information about them could be found.

<sup>379</sup>Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck (AHL) 17-19.

Name	GRT	entries
Mary Stewart	-	7
Johann Carl	144	5
Else	287	23
Anna Dorothea	342	3
Basuto	347	10
Therese	390	1
Elisabeth	447	23
Anna Bertha	468	19
Augusta	472	4
Galveston	618	10

Table 20: Partial List of *Pasedag & Co.* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

in 1892 with 23 journeys almost 38 percent, in 1893 with 13 journeys over 20 percent, and in 1896 with 7 journeys for over six percent of the German traffic.

### 8.15.2 H. A. Petersen and Petersen & Co. 1886-1899

*Petersen & Co.* was another local company in Xiamen, which was established after *Pasedag & Co.* and was outlived by it. Similar to *Pasedag & Co.* it was probably acting as a charter company, in the coast trade, and coolie transport. It both occupied steamers and sailing ships. In the ship list, both *H. A. Petersen* (1886-1899) and *Petersen & Co.* (1886-1893) appear. Table 21 shows the ship list of *Petersen & Co.* and Table 22 the ship list of *H. A. Petersen*.

The barque *Oscar Mooyer* and the *Kristina Nilsson* appeared under the name of *Petersen & Co.* and entered Xiamen a total of 12 times. The *Oscar Mooyer* temporarily belonged to J. W. Danielsen (see Section 8.15.3) in 1886 and 1889. The *Kristina Nilsson* belonged before to J. E. Thomsen (see Section 8.16.4) until 1889, and also appeared under L. P. Michelsen in 1890 and 1896.

Name	GRT	entries
Kristina Nilsson	279	6
Oscar Mooyer	382	6

Table 21: Partial List of *Petersen & Co.* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

Under *H. A. Petersen* five vessels entered Xiamen a total of 53 times. Petersen bought the *Orient* from *W. Rickertsen* who arrived with the vessel three times in 1889 and started to operate it in 1890. He also bought the *Sibirien* from *A. H. Märck* from Flensburg in 1886 and already used it in the same year.

Petersen's contribution to the German shipping traffic was significant but smaller than *Pasedag & Co.*'s. In 1886 his ships made up over 12 percent of German shipping in Xiamen, in 1890 over 10 percent, in 1892 over 16 percent, in 1893 over 18 percent, and in 1899 still over five percent.

Name	GRT	entries
Sibirien	376	4
Activa	388	5
Orient	460	19
Amoy	662	9
Velox	753	16

Table 22: Partial List of *H. A. Petersen* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

### 8.15.3 J. W. Danielsen 1886, 1889

*J. W. Danielsen* from Flensburg arrived four times with the *Oscar Mooyer* (382 GRT) in Xiamen. Danielsen lived in Xiamen, together with his wife and son.<sup>380</sup>

In 1886 and 1888 the same ship appeared under Petersen & Co. (see Section 8.15.2) in Xiamen. It is possible, that the ownership changed several times between the two shipping companies. Another possibility is that due their personal or professional relationship, ownership was conferred or rented.

In 1889, the declarations of the ship made up over three percent of German shipping.

### 8.15.4 Holm 1886-1893

Captain Holm was also registered in Xiamen. There, he occupied an one man shipping company *Holm*. As Table 23 shows, the captain entered the harbor seven times. In 1886 he sailed the *Louuse*, and later on the *Bylgia* until 1893.

Name	GRT	entries
Louuse	286	2
Bylgia	333	5

Table 23: Partial List of *Holm* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

Holm bought the *Bylgia* from Lund (see Section 8.16.8) who still entered the harbor the year before. In 1896 the *Bylgia* appeared under the name of L. P. Michelsen (see Section 8.15.5) which indicates that Holm sold the ship between 1893 and 1896.

In 1893 Holm contributed almost five percent of the German shipping traffic.

### 8.15.5 L. P. Michelsen 1886-1896

The ships from *L. P. Michelsen* from Flensburg account for 18 entries between 1886 and 1896. L. P. Michelsen was also a German living in Xiamen<sup>381</sup>

Table 24 shows that Michelsen only occupied small sailing ships which were probably used in the coast trade. The *Kristina Nilsson* was mainly seen between 1890 to 1892. The *Byliga* only appeared in 1896, the *Director Barrow* in 1889, and *Francisca* in 1886.

Michelsen bought the ships from shipping companies that already operated in Xiamen. The *Director Barrow* appeared before one time in 1888 led by C. A. Benz which had

<sup>380</sup>Giles 35.

<sup>381</sup>Giles 34-37.

Name	GRT	entries
Kristina Nilsson	278	11
Director Barrow	326	1
Bylgia	339	2
Francisca	367	4

Table 24: Partial List of *L. P. Michelsen* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

no other declarations. Also the *Kristina Nilsson* already operated under J. E. Thomsen before (see Section 8.16.4). Holm operated the *Bylgia* before Michelsen.

Michelsen contributed more than six percent in 1891, and almost five percent of the German shipping traffic in 1892.

## 8.16 Other Shipping Companies

There was a multitude of other smaller shipping companies operating in Xiamen.

In particular at the beginning of the analyzed years many different smaller shipping companies existed. They partially still included sailing ships, and usually just operated one or two ships.

### 8.16.1 Dr. Maßmann (and P. Kock) 1886-1899

*Dr. Maßmann* from Heiligenhafen arrived in Xiamen with his sailing ship *Ingraban* (894 GRT) in very irregular frequencies. After arriving two times in 1886, it anchored again a single time in 1896, and then four times in 1899. In 1899, the shipping company contributed almost four percent to the shipping traffic.

*Dr. Maßmann* mainly transported goods on the Chinese coast, and also saved six Chinese officials in 1898 from distress at sea.<sup>382</sup>

A partner shipping company from Maßmann, also from Heiligenhafen, was *P. Kock*, which only sent the *Hermann* (444 GRT) once in 1886.

### 8.16.2 J. D. Bischoff 1886-1893

*J. D. Bischoff* from Vegesack sent the *Alwine Seyd* (558 GRT) a total of fourteen times from 1886 to 1893 to Xiamen. In 1893 the declarations of the ship even contributed over nine percent of the ship traffic in Xiamen. After this year, the ship no longer reached Xiamen because it collided with a rock on the 21. May 1894 near the Barren Islands, after it left Niuzhang on the 18. May 1894.<sup>383</sup>

### 8.16.3 Heinrich Wilhelm Clausen 1886-1892

*Heinrich Wilhelm Clausen* from Eckernförde often sent the barque *Therese* (390 GRT) to Xiamen. It appeared 13 times between 1886 and 1892. It was seen two times in 1886,

<sup>382</sup>Heimatomuseum Stadt Heiligenhafen, "Hafen und Seefahrt", <<http://www.heiligenhafen.de/kultur/heimatomuseum/hafen-und-seefahrt.html>>.

<sup>383</sup>Seeamt Bremerhaven, "Seeamtsentscheidungen", *Hansa: Schifffahrt, Schiffbau, Häfen* 34 (1897), <<http://digiview.gbv.de/viewer/fulltext/72223831234/357>>: 343–344.

five times in 1888, two times in 1889, one time in 1890, and three times in 1891 and 1892. In 1888 and 1892 it amounted for almost five percent of German shipping.

Figure 17 shows the *Therese*. The ship was built 1865 in Apenrade, and from 1874 Clausen used it in East Asia for coal and salt trade. After the captain of the ship C. Hansen died in 1886, it was sold several years after his death.

In 1892, the ship appeared under the name of the company Pasedag & Co., but was probably sold further since it did not appear in the ship list afterwards.



Figure 17: Heinrich Wilhelm Clausen's Barque *Therese* Around 1876<sup>385</sup> (by Courtesy of Museum Eckernförde)

#### 8.16.4 Jürgen Emanuel Thomsen 1886-1889

Jürgen Emanuel Thomsen from Apenrade employed the barque *Kristina Nilsson* (279 GRT) and arrived with it a total of eleven times in Xiamen. It arrived four times in 1886 and 1888, and three times in 1889. In 1890, the ship was sold to L. P. Michelsen (see Section 8.15.5) and later also appeared under the lead of Petersen & Co.

A company *Thomsen & Co.* was acting in Xiamen in retail for dry goods and groceries.<sup>386</sup> It is unclear whether J. E. Thomsen was engaged in the company.

In 1886 the *Kristina Nilsson* almost contributed four percent to the German shipping traffic.

<sup>384</sup>Museum Eckernförde Inv. Nr. 2015/010 (Foto: Museum).

<sup>385</sup>Museum Eckernförde Inv. Nr. 2015/010 (Foto: Museum).

<sup>386</sup>Pitcher 213.

### 8.16.5 Wilhelm Meyer 1886-1889

*Wilhelm Meyer* who was first registered in Hamburg and then in Hongkong sent the *Johanna Kremer* (or *Krinner*?) (279 GRT) a total of nine times to Xiamen. The barque arrived three times in 1886, three times in 1888, and four times in 1889. In 1889 Meyer contributed almost five percent of the German ship traffic.

### 8.16.6 Reck & Boyes 1886-1888

*Reck & Boyes* from Bremen anchored the *Galveston* (618 GRT) two times in 1886 and three times in 1888. In 1888 the declarations of the sailing vessel accounted for almost three percent of the shipping traffic. In 1889 the ship was sold to the *Pasedag & Co.*

### 8.16.7 A. J. Hertz 1886-1888

Adolph Jakob Hertz founded the shipping company *A. J. Hertz*, or *A. J. Hertz & Sons* (*A. E. Hertz & Söhne*) from Hamburg. *Siemssen & Co.* acted as agency for the shipping company, such as for most shipping companies from Hamburg. Already in 1862, *Siemssen* wrote with regard to Hertz that the “Hamburger shipping companies have to get used to the ideas to send more steamers, to dominate the coast trade, as they did earlier with sailing ships.” However, the company decided against using steamers.<sup>387</sup>

The company operated at least two sailing ships until 1888. The *Fidelio* and *Picciola* entered the harbor a total of 15 times as Table 25 shows.

Name	GRT	entries
Fidelio	852	11
Picciola	874	4

Table 25: Partial List of *A. E. Hertz* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

Both *Fidelio* and *Picciola* were sold to the *Steamboat Company Shantou* (see Section 8.4) where they appeared starting from 1888. The ship list thus suggests that *A. E. Hertz* was taken over by the company, in which also *Nissen* from *Siemssen & Co.* participated.

*A. E. Hertz* undoubtedly counted to one of the earlier coast trade sailing ship companies that were displaced through steamers. Before, the company still contributed to more than seven percent of German shipping traffic in Xiamen in 1888.

### 8.16.8 J. G. Lund 1886-1888

*J. G. Lund* from Hamburg operated the barque *Bylgia* before he sold the ship to German captain *Holm* who was living in Xiamen (see Section 8.15.4). He arrived with it one time in 1886 and two times in 1888. With the two entrances in 1888 he contributed almost two percent to the German declarations.

<sup>387</sup>Möring 56-57.



### 8.16.9 F. Lange 1886

*F. Lange*, registered in Kiel, arrived with the *Elsa* (577 GRT)<sup>388</sup> fourteen times in 1886. In that year, the shipping company almost contributed ten percent of the German shipping traffic, but was not seen afterwards.

### 8.16.10 F. H. Häncke 1888-1890

*F. H. Häncke* (Hähnke?) from Hamburg, later registered in Hongkong, was the owner of the *China* (648 GRT) until 1889, when he sold the vessel to the Steamboat Company Shantou (see Section 8.4). In 1888, he arrived with the vessel three times, in 1889 eight times, and in 1890 a single time. In 1888 and 1889 the *China* was chartered for the Deli coolie business. In 1889, the declarations of the ship made up more than nine percent of the German declarations.

### 8.16.11 F. Rick & Co. 1888-1890

From 1888 to 1890, *F. Rick & Co.* from Bremen sent the barque *Sebastian Bach* (811 GRT) in total eight times to Xiamen. In 1889, the company contributed four percent of the German shipping traffic in Xiamen.

### 8.16.12 Cosmopolit 1890-1896

The *AG Cosmopolit* (Aktiengesellschaft Cosmopolit) from Cologne sent the *Cosmopolit* (557 GRT) one time in 1890 and three times in 1896 to Xiamen. Therefore, it made up more than three percent of the German shipping traffic in 1896.

### 8.16.13 Köper Docke & Co. 1891-1896

The company *Köper Docke & Co.* from Bremen sent four times ships to Xiamen. As Table 26 shows, they comprised the *Wuotan* and *Dunar* of same tonnage. In 1891, the company contributed almost four percent of the German shipping traffic.

Name	GRT	entries
Wuotan	1201	3
Donar	1201	1

Table 26: Partial List of *Köper Docke & Co.* Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900

### 8.16.14 Shipping Company Ocean Cologne 1896

Before the *Shipping Company Ocean Cologne* (Rhederei Ocean Köln) sold the *Dante* (1302 GRT) to R. Wahl (see Section 8.11), the company sent the ship seven times to Xiamen in 1896. In that year, the company amounted for almost eight percent of the German shipping traffic.

<sup>388</sup>The ship was not related to the barque *Else* of Pasedag & Co.

## 8.17 Conclusion

Figure 18 shows a stacked bar plot with the number of entrances of ships of the various shipping companies. Due to the high number of different companies, most of the companies' ship entrances were grouped together. The label for *local companies* corresponds to the shipping companies of Section 8.15 and comprises the ships of Pasedag & Co., H. A. Petersen, Petersen & Co., J. W. Danielsen, Holm, and L. P. Michelsen. The shipping companies M. Jebsen, the Chinese Coastline Company, HAPAG, NDL, the Steamboat Company Shantou, the Steamship Company "Globus", M. Struve, the Asiatic Coast Company, and Rickmers contributed a relatively large amount of entrances to Xiamen and were thus not grouped. The Flensburger Steam Company of 1869, R. Wahl and W. Wahl, R. M. Flomann, Sartori & Berger, F. Rick and Co., F. Lange, Dr. Maßmann, P. Kock, AG Cosmopolit, Heinrich Wilhelm Clausen, Shipping Company Ocean from Cologne, A. E. Hertz, Köper Docke & Co., J. D. Bischoff, Reck & Boyes, J. G. Lund, F. H. Häncke, and Wilhelm Meyer were grouped together as *Other Shipping Companies* since they had only a low number of entrances or were not deemed relevant for the discussion.

Still, the various shipping companies do not explain the whole German shipping traffic in Xiamen. Particularly in 1886 there were many shipping companies that did not appear after this year and were thus only partly included in the analysis. However, the selected companies explain 60 percent of the German shipping traffic in this year and at least 70 percent in the other years.

The figure and the analysis of the ship list shows that there was a colorful landscape of different shipping companies and ships in Xiamen. The shipping companies mostly operated as charter companies, driving along the coast or as passenger transporters (mostly coolies) to Singapore and other coolie hubs. There was never a regular German shipping line in Xiamen that was operating for more than a few years. Overall, the companies of German vessels that arrived in Xiamen frequently varied and were often not even stable within a single year. It was seldom that a shipping company dominated German shipping for a period of over a year.

The local company Pasedag & Co. continuously contributed a relatively high number of declarations, usually around 20 percent, and in 1892 even 38 percent. However, the company mostly occupied sailing ships and until 1900 sailing vessels disappeared completely from the German shipping business in Xiamen. The Chinese Coastline Company contributed over 33 percent in 1897, almost 55 percent in 1898, and over 49 percent of the traffic in 1899, mostly with the vessel *Nanyang*. However, in the other years the shipping company only appeared seldom with vessels in Xiamen. M. Jebsen appeared sometimes with a high number of declarations in Xiamen, e.g., in 1893 almost 25 percent, and in 1896 over 30 percent. Also during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and 1905 Jebsen's ship were chartered and mostly made up the German shipping in Xiamen in these two years.

The situation at the port changed around 1900 when the NDL and HAPAG started to anchor in Xiamen. In 1900, the HAPAG contributed over 16 percent of German shipping traffic with 4 declarations. The NDL (and also HAPAG) was busy transporting troops during the Boxer rebellions and did not go to Xiamen. In 1905, over 71 percent of the declarations went onto the account of the HAPAG and the NDL. Also in the other years after 1900, with exception of the distortions caused by the Russo-Japanese War,




Figure 18: German Shipping Companies and Number of Entries of Their Ships 1886-1900

the NDL and HAPAG dominated German shipping in Xiamen.<sup>389</sup> However, after 1900 German shipping traffic was on its low point and the absolute number of declarations was small. The number of declarations of the two companies in 1905 had also been reached by many small shipping companies before 1900, although the ships were much smaller than the ocean steamers of HAPAG and NDL.

Especially in the first few years of the analyzed time frame many small shipping companies sent one or two ships and never appeared with vessels in Xiamen again. Until 1900, many of these small shipping companies fell away. This development is illustrated by the decline of the smaller shipping companies. In the figure, the “Other Shipping Companies” mostly represent these companies. In 1886 these companies explain over 29 percent of the German shipping traffic, in 1888 36 percent, and in 1889 almost 30 percent. Then, the number abruptly decreased to 10 percent in 1890. There were some highs again in 1896 with 16 percent and in 1900 with almost 21 percent, but in the new millennium the various small companies had already lost their former importance in absolute numbers and tendency.

Some of them were victims of natural disasters and accidents such as M. Struve who lost two ships to a stranding and a typhoon, or Heinrich Wilhelm Clausen whose captain died in 1886. Others gave in to offers of other small and middle-sized shipping companies. For example, the barque *Kristina Nilsson* appeared under Thomson between 1886 and 1889, was then sold to L. P. Michelsen where it operated between 1890 and 1896, and finally appeared under Petersen & Co. in 1893. The *Picciola* was first employed by A. E. Hertz until 1886, then sold to the Steamboat Company Shantou, and when Nissen took over the company in 1895 he operated the vessel. Another reason is mostly undocumented, namely that shipping companies continued to operate in other waters since the freight rates were too low.

Apart from the competition between the smaller shipping lines, the HAPAG and NDL are known to have displaced their competitors from their routes. The HAPAG took over ships from the Kingsin line, and also from the Chinese Coastline Company, M. Jebsen, and Rickmers, which ships also reached Xiamen. Not only the HAPAG, but also the NDL competed with the other shipping companies and bought, e.g., the *Tsintau* from Rickmers which only had chance to arrive a single time in Xiamen. Besides buying the ships of Rickmers, the NDL also took over ships from M. Jebsen. Since the small and middle-sized shipping companies had no chance against the two shipping giants, they probably gave in to the offers easily. Still, it seems that the HAPAG and NDL could not get a firm stand in the shipping business in Xiamen and the two companies almost exclusively transported coolies to Singapore. The coast trade seems to have been no longer profitable, since only a few German ships kept operating in this business.

When the sailing ships were displaced, first the ships of smaller and middle-sized companies fell away. The local companies such as Pasedag & Co. and Petersen & Co. vanished slower than the other small shipping companies. The local companies which mostly occupied sailing ships could not easily change their location since the ships were tied to their business in Xiamen. Hence, the contribution of local shipping companies increased until around 1893. In 1886 the local companies contributed over 15 percent of the German shipping traffic, in 1888 over 23 percent, in 1890 almost 39 percent, in

<sup>389</sup>The German consuls mentioned the two shipping companies by their name and commented on their development since the year they started to anchor in Xiamen. German consuls had not done this before, since the German shipping market was much more fractioned.

1892 over 60 percent, and in 1893 43 percent. However, until 1900 the companies had sold their ships and probably further relied on foreign regular shipping lines. In 1900, their contribution was close to zero.

That the ships were not substituted by ships of other German shipping companies can only be explained by additional external factors as explained in the next chapter. The chapter argues that there was not only a competition between German shipping companies in Xiamen, but also with Japanese and British regular lines that lead to the decline of German shipping.

## Chapter Nine German Shipping Traffic in Xiamen

The first German vessels probably arrived in Xiamen after the First Opium War. However, the Maritime Customs do not directly confirm this. The first custom volume starts in 1859, and the first chapter regarding Xiamen can only be found in 1862. The Customs house under Foreign Inspectorate was only opened on the 1. April 1862, and thus the entries miss months. Even then, the entries only discriminated between American, British, and “Sundry” vessels. First entries regarding Germany are the duties paid by Prussia in 1863, and the reports for year 1864 include the vessel data of German states.<sup>390</sup> Later on, only “Northern German States” or Germany appeared in the Custom documents.<sup>391</sup> This chapter explores the development of the German shipping in Xiamen from 1864 up to the First World War and its position compared with other nations. No attempts are made to explain the shipping traffic before 1864.

### 9.1 Overview

First of all, the cumulative local shipping traffic in tonnage was almost constantly increasing up to shortly before the First World War as Figure 19 depicts.<sup>392</sup>




Figure 19: Total Shipping Tonnage 1863-1919

<sup>390</sup>The opening of the Customs house in Xiamen was only in 1862 (Hughes 120).

<sup>391</sup>From 1863 to 1866 the Maritime Custom entries discriminate between Prussian, Bremen, Hamburg, Oldenburg, Hanover, Mecklenburg, and Lubeck ships. Since the origin of the vessels were deemed to be not important for the thesis, the origin of vessels in these and other years are not explained.

<sup>392</sup>Tonnage in this chapter refers to the register tonnage of the ships, not the tonnage of freight. Tonnage of a nation thus refers to the cumulative tonnage of arriving and departing ships.

The general importance of the port, however, almost continually decreased throughout time, as often lamented by the Maritime Custom documents. The main two reasons for this decrease of importance were the displacement of local tea, as well as Xiamen's decreasing importance as a trading hub which was caused, e.g., by ban on rice export from Taiwan and Japan's later invasion of Taiwan.

However, German shipping traffic decreased almost as constantly, as the whole shipping increased in Xiamen. Figure 21 and Figure 20 show tonnage and number of incoming and outgoing German vessels from the period of 1864 to 1919 that is discussed in the further.




Figure 20: Declarations of German Ships 1863-1919




Figure 21: Tonnage of German Ships 1863-1919

A maximum in tonnage and a high number of German ships were recorded in 1904. However, the number of German vessels is not related to an expansion of German influence. Instead, the Maritime Customs annual summary describes that the Russo-Japanese War influenced the statistics: After the 9. February no Japanese steamer entered Xiamen and the Japanese government chartered all steamers of Osaka Shosen Kaisha to serve for transports. Osaka Shosen Kaisha in return chartered one Norwegian, and three German steamers which explains the high number of German (and Norwegian) entries and exits.<sup>393</sup>

One month after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha used the three German steamers for their coast line. The company let the *Clara Jebsen* and *Triumpf* of M. Jebsen (see Section 8.2) operate in their established line between Shantou, Xiamen, and Fuzhou where they anchored for 8 hours in Shantou and Xiamen, and for 42 hours in Fuzhou. Additionally, Osaka Shosen Kaisha established a new line with the steamer *Apenrade*, also from M. Jebsen, between Tamsui, Xiamen, and Fuzhou. Of the 280 declarations in 1904, 260 have to be attributed to the Japanese company.<sup>394,395</sup>

In 1905, both Norwegian and German tonnage as well as entered and cleared ships were still unusually high. Figure 22 confirms this with the peak of Norwegian shipping traffic in this year. Although not mentioned in the trade report of the Maritime Customs, the Japanese still chartered the ships in 1905.

<sup>393</sup> 中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, *Amoy Trade Report, For the Year 1904*, vol. 39 (1904), 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001).

<sup>394</sup> BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1904.

<sup>395</sup> PA AA R 9208/953 206.






Figure 22: Declarations of Norwegian Ships 1901-1907

That the ships were still chartered is also confirmed by the German consul who reports that the number of declarations by the Osaka Shosen Kaisha went back to 232 of 260 declarations in 1905. For this year, the company chartered six German ships. The remaining 14 German steamers accounted for 28 declarations. During the year and with the end of the war, Osaka Shosen Kaisha replaced the chartered German and Norwegian ships by vessels of their own.<sup>396</sup>

Since of the distortions in 1904 and 1905, tonnage in Figure 21 and declarations in Figure 20 display the shipping traffic including the charters of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha in blue, excluding it in red. Due to the exceptional state in these two years further diagrams also do not display German shipping data for 1904 and 1905.

In terms of tonnage, Germany contributed over 16 percent of the shipping traffic in 1863 and 1864. In 1866 German shipping almost represented 21 percent of the total shipping and nearly 22 percent in 1869. After this initial ups, German shipping decreased with respect to the other nations. In 1875, German shipping was the first time under 10 percent. Although it often exceeded 10 percent again, it came in 1890 lower than 5 percent for the first time. In 1900 German shipping barely reached 3 percent. The charters in 1904 and 1905 due to the Russo-Japanese War let German shipping again reach 14 and almost 12 percent. However, this increase was only temporarily and in 1912, before the First World War broke out, Germany did not even contribute half a percent of the shipping traffic in Xiamen.

<sup>396</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1905.

## 9.2 Factors in the Development of Shipping

In order to explain the development of German shipping in Xiamen, many factors have to be considered. Chapter Eight already presented internal factors such as competition between the small and middle-sized companies, as well as between the NDL and HAPAG and the other companies. However, this information is not sufficient to explain why German shipping declined in absolute numbers and relative to the other nations. Thus, the following sub sections present the main factors needed to explain the broader view of German shipping.

### 9.2.1 Slow Transition from Sailing Ships to Steamers

Germany among other states employed more and more steamers in the observed period. Figure 23 shows the change from sailing ships to steamers by displaying the percentage of German steamers that arrived and were cleared in Xiamen. While the blue bar is the percentage of steamers only considering the number of declarations, the red bar weighs the declarations by the tonnage. Both show a similar transition.

From 1863 to 1871 the Maritime Customs do not give an account of the vessel type employed. However, it is clear that before 1872 most German ships on the Chinese coast were sailing ships. Beginning from around 1880, the German vessels in Xiamen slowly transitioned from sailing ships to steamers. In 1886, steamers crossed the first time the 40 percent bar and alternated between 40 and 60 percent until 1893. Then, steamers quickly replaced sailing ships and from 1900 until the First World War only steamers were in use.




Figure 23: Percentage of German Steamers 1872-1914

Figure 24 shows a comparison of the weighted percentage of steamers in Xiamen

between German, British, Japanese, and other nationalities. The figure shows that all other nations already heavily relied on steamers when German shipping companies started the transition. When in 1872 German steamers slowly started to be seen in Xiamen with a weighted percentage of 4.87%, the weighted percentage of British steamers amounted 82.70%, and from the other nationalities 57.65%.<sup>397</sup>




Figure 24: German, British, and Japanese Percentage of Steamers 1863-1819

It is thus apparent, that Germany lacked behind the other states in terms of occupied steamers. This was not entirely a disadvantage, since transport with sailing ships was slower but also cheaper. Chinese merchants appreciated the German sailing ships for a long time and used them in their coast trade and coolie transport to Singapore and other ports.

However, when the freight rates were dumped through the heated competition between the regular lines, sailing ships were entirely displaced.

### 9.2.2 Small Sailing Ships and Steamers

Figure 25 shows the average tonnage per vessel of German origin. The average tonnage per ship of German vessels was 223 in 1863 and continually increased. In 1886, when steamers crossed the 40 percent bar, the average tonnage was 496. In 1900, when steamers completely displaced sailing ships, the average tonnage skyrocketed from 870 of the previous year to 1686.

<sup>397</sup>The Japanese ships were 100% steamers which, however, is not meaningful since only two Japanese ships reached Xiamen in this year.




Figure 25: Average Tonnage of German Ships 1863-1915

However, during the time frame under analysis, both steamers and sailing vessels were in use with a different average tonnage, as Figure 26 shows.




Figure 26: Average Tonnage of German Steamers and Sailing Ships 1863-1914

The reliance of German shipping companies on sailing ships partially resulted in the lower average tonnage of German ships. The average tonnage of sailing ships never exceeded the 500 tons mark.

In 1863 the average tonnage of sailing ships amounted 223, exceeded the first time the 400 tons mark in 1888 with 406 tons, and reached its maximum in the years 1898 and 1899 with 447 tons, after which German sailing ships vanished completely.

Not enough, the German sailing ships were also smaller than the sailing ships of the other nations. Figure 27 shows the average tonnage of German, British, Japanese, and other nation's sailing ships. Not only the British steamers but also the sailing ships were bigger and carried more tonnage. From 1865 the gap widened until 1894 at which point sailing ships had mostly been replaced by steamers.




Figure 27: German, British, and Japanese Average Tonnage Sailing Ships 1863-1910

Only Japanese sailing ships show a significantly lower tonnage than German sailing ships. However, they only appear in the Customs starting from 1889. In the trade report for 1905, the German consul reports that the Japanese sailing ships were actually owned by Chinese from Taiwan, to which the Japanese registration organization gave the right to operate under the Japanese flag.<sup>398</sup>

Also sailing ships of the remaining states show a higher average tonnage than German vessels. Thus, German sailing ships were among the smallest ones arriving in Xiamen, not counting the Taiwanese ones under the Japanese flag.

<sup>398</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Trade report 1905.

Due to the low number of German steamers, a meaningful average tonnage is given starting from 1882 with 834 tons. Figure 26 shows that until 1889 the tonnage did not increase significantly and in this year the average tonnage still amounted 890 tons. However, in the next year the tonnage skyrocketed to 1686 tons as already mentioned.




Figure 28: German, British, and Japanese Average Tonnage Steamers 1863-1914

This increase in steamer tonnage in 1900 was the result of the displacement of the smaller German freight ships from the market. Tonnage and declarations reached a minimum in this year, but the increased average tonnage shows that the ships that were not replaced were significantly bigger than in the previous years. Only big ships still could make a profit at this time. This is also argued by the German consul in 1906 who noted that most of the German steamers which were not participating in regular lines had an average tonnage of 600 to 700 GRT and referred to a statement of the Douglas Steamship & Co. to argue that only bigger ships would be profitable.<sup>399</sup>

Figure 28 shows that German steamers were smaller than British steamers until 1900, when the ships of most nations had roughly the same size. The German steamers were in average not much smaller than the Japanese ones. Again, after 1900 the remaining German steamers that anchored in Xiamen were bigger and even exceeded the size of the Japanese steamers.

Still, until 1900 German ships belonged to the smallest ships that anchored in Xiamen, both in terms of sailing ships and steamers. While the small size was profitable

<sup>399</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1906.

for small Chinese companies and merchants, the big regular line ships replaced their smaller charterable German counterparts around 1900.

### 9.2.3 The Chartering Business: Between Coast Trade and Coolie Export

The operation mode of the German shipping companies that were present in Xiamen was primarily chartering. This was generally true until 1900 and included both sailing ships and steamers. Only after 1900, the smaller charter ships were displaced by competitors, and the NDL and HAPAG tried to establish regular shipping lines.

German ships were chartered by Chinese and English merchants and companies. They were especially popular among Chinese and often preferred if there was a choice between German and other nations' ships. The most important chartering field was the coast trade which mainly focused on Niuzhang and Yantai. Often, bean cake and beans were transported for which sailing ships were preferred, since no high profit could be made with these goods. Around 1909, the value of imported bean cake still only ranked after opium.<sup>400</sup> The second chartering field was the passenger transport to Singapore and other coolie ports. The coast trade almost completely died out around 1900 while coolie transport got again more important, especially through initiative of the HAPAG and NDL, as demonstrated in the previous chapter.

Two forms of chartering contracts were preferred: *time charter* and *trip charter* contracts. Time charter contracts rented a ship for a period of a month up to usually a year, while trip charters were made for single journeys. Either case did not ensure that ships were occupied for a long time. German shipping quickly reacted to changes in the freight rate, to local events, and competitors. Since the charter companies were mostly small, they had to fill niches and could not easily compete with the bigger regular lines.

Thus, the annual number of declarations frequently varied and a single big charter contract could give a "false image" of the tendency of German shipping in Xiamen. Examples are the charters of ships from M. Jebsen during the First Sino-Japanese War by the China Merchant Steam Navigation Company in 1895 and 1896, the chartering of ships from the Chinese Coastline Company by the Douglas Steamship Co. in 1898 and 1899, and the chartering of ships from M. Jebsen during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and 1905. While a sustainable operation of ships was no longer possible for German ships around 1895 the number of declaration still gave the impression that German shipping was not declining.

### 9.2.4 Higher Declaration Fees

With the founding of the German empire a standardized fee for declarations had to be paid by the ships. Before the establishment of the professional consulate in Xiamen, the fees were also used to finance Pasedag's post. At the founding time of the German empire most of the ships were sailing ships which hardly went on more than two journeys a year. However, when steamers started to take over, the declarations multiplied. Additionally, in China many German ships were active on the coast where they anchored in high frequency at the different ports. The declaration fees were simply not suitable for the German coast trade in China.

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<sup>400</sup>Pitcher 219.

For a 2400 tons steamer M. Jebsen had to pay around 3000 RM a year in East Asia. British ships, however, payed around 25 RM a year and did not exceed 300 to 400 RM. M. Jebsen tried to negotiate with the Federal Office in order to decrease the fees. However, the requests remained unheard. On the 14. February 1896 Jebsen communicated the high competition on the Chinese coast in a debate with the Foreign Office. Still, two years later there was no result and on the 11. February 1898 Jebsen started the debate again. He got the response that the tariff system would be reformed before the end of the century.<sup>401</sup>

However, this was too late for the German charter business in Xiamen. From 1900 on, this business was almost dead.

In 1894, the German consul responded to the complaints and admitted that under the prevailing conditions, the fees “might indeed seem somewhat too high”. He again reported that a middle-sized steamer which anchored at several ports between Hongkong and Japan had to pay around 30 dollar, while British steamers had to pay 3.75 dollar for the same route. The fees for a second anchoring would only amount half, which was still considerably more than for British steamers. However, the consul tried to justify the fees by arguing that German ships could transport coolies for cheaper since “the fees for their counting by the English consulate are significantly higher”. Even then, he had to qualify for the German ships that “only a small part of the ships in the local waters are occupied in the coolie transport.”<sup>402</sup>

In 1903 this last advantage in fees vanished. From 1903 the “Chinese Immigration Ordinance” act made German ships pay twice the fees as compared to their British proponents in Singapore.<sup>403</sup> Since most of the German ships were then transporting coolies to Singapore, an expansion of the coolie traffic did not seem feasible.

### 9.2.5 Displacement through Liner Shipping

There were several regular lines by shipping and trading companies that operated in Xiamen. While in the beginning, they coexisted with and complemented sailing ships, they started to displace them around 1880. This development was first slow but accelerated in 1890 until which the displacement also started to include small German steamers. In the displacement after 1890 the Osaka Shosen Kaisha played a major role.

The first steps of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha in Xiamen were the establishment of a line Japan-Xiamen-Tainan and a Manila line in 1890.<sup>404</sup> This negatively impacted German coast trade with Taiwan that had been relatively strong before.

When the Osaka Shosen Kaisha in 1898 started the lines Hongkong-Shantou-Xiamen-Tamsui with two steamers, Hongkong-Shantou-Xiamen-Taiwan with one steamer, Hongkong-Shantou-Xiamen-Fuzhou-Shanghai with two steamers, and Xiamen-Fuzhou-Tamsui with one steamer<sup>405</sup> the company was in direct competition with the German charter ships.

Additional to the Japanese competitor, the British shipping company Butterfield & Swire monopolized a line Xiamen-Yantai-Niuzhang in 1905.<sup>406</sup> This was another heavy blow for the German ships, that before often had been chartered for this route.

<sup>401</sup>Becker 488-490.

<sup>402</sup>BArch R 901/5148 Shipping and Trade Report 1893.

<sup>403</sup>Conrad 212.

<sup>404</sup>BArch R 901/5148 Shipping and Trade Report 1891.

<sup>405</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1906.

<sup>406</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1905.



In 1910 the Osaka Shosen Kaisha stopped the line Hongkong-Shantou-Xiamen-Fuzhou-Shanghai. The two leftover steamers were used for the two new lines Hongkong-Shantou-Xiamen-Fuzhou and Shanghai-Fuzhou-Taiwan.<sup>407</sup>

Overall, time chartering was more and more displaced by the regular liner transports. In 1904 also the consul noted that “the establishment and expansion of regular steamer lines through financially strong English, English-Chinese, and Japanese companies had almost completely displaced the German coast traders from Xiamen since the Chinese charterer considered it more advantageous to load their goods on regular steamers than to charter ships themselves.”<sup>408</sup>

Figure 29 illustrates the tragic development for the German ships clearly. The decline in German shipping was directly coupled with the Japanese increase and decrease of ships.

Between 1891 and 1895 when the Osaka Shosen Kaisha established the line to Taiwan the German shipping traffic had a correlation of  $-0.97$ <sup>409</sup> with the Japanese one.

Between 1899 and 1903 when the Osaka Shosen Kaisha initiated new coast lines, the correlation between German and Japanese shipping tonnage was  $-0.98$ . German shipping declined from almost ten to not much more than five percent. When disregarding the Russo-Japanese War, the shipping tonnage of the two nations between 1899 and 1909 even shows a correlation of  $-0.96$ .

Such a high correlation clearly indicates that the Japanese shipping expansion affected German shipping first. Still, while the British decline of shipping was extensively discussed in the Maritime Custom documents, the German decline was not. The Maritime Customs were biased towards British trade since most of the higher commissioners were British nationals. However, more important was that British ships declined in a higher number, namely from 82 percent of shipping in 1897 to 55 percent in 1907.

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<sup>407</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1910.

<sup>408</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1904.

<sup>409</sup>The correlation is expressed by the Pearson correlation coefficient. A correlation coefficient close to  $-1$  expresses that for every increase of Japanese shipping German shipping decreased linearly.




Figure 29: German, British, and Japanese Percentage of Total Tonnage in Xiamen 1863-1919

### 9.3 Development of Shipping

The development of shipping had three major phases. The first phase lasted from 1864 to 1900. In this period, German steamers slowly substituted sailing ships. Also, the initiation and expansion of regular shipping lines continuously displaced German shipping companies. The second phase reached from 1901 to 1911 where German sailing ships, which dominated the coast trade decades before, had completely vanished. In 1900, the regular shipping lines had also mostly displaced the smaller and middle-sized steamer companies. What remained were mainly big shipping companies such as the HAPAG, NDL, but also the middle-sized M. Jebsen. In the third phase starting with 1912, German shipping was de facto dead and only a few ships reached Xiamen. With the begin of the First World War German shipping seized completely. The following sub sections argue this in detail.

#### 9.3.1 Decline of Sailing Vessels and Displacement Through Regular Lines: 1864 up to 1900

Xiamen had its heyday for German shipping already before 1864. Afterwards, the numbers of anchoring ships continuously decreased.

Eberstein argued that initially Xiamen was important for the rice trade with Taiwan. In 1864 the government disallowed the rice export from Taiwan, since it put the nourishment of the local population in danger. Following, until 1868 the number of ships

declined. However, Eberstein acknowledged that Xiamen “did not completely lose its importance”.<sup>410</sup>

Indeed, the decline was only temporary and in 1869 the shipping traffic even exceeded the numbers of before the ban of rice trade in 1863 and 1864. The Suez canal which was opened in November of this year did not affect the German shipping to Xiamen since the arriving vessels operated in the coast trade and did not come from Germany.

As noted in 1874 by the German consul, German ships mainly transported Chinese piece goods which did not bring enough money to pay for the steamer fares. Most importantly, they transported bean cake from Yantai and Niuzhang to Xiamen. Also rice belonged to one of the goods still transported.<sup>411</sup>

Until 1880 the number of sailing ships fluctuated heavily and the number of steamers started to increase. However, the increasing rate of steamers did not balance the decreasing rate of sailing ships as seen in Figure 30.

In 1888 with about 60 percent sailing ships the German consul argued that the “significantly lower number of ships” mostly resulted from the “better sailing ships freight rates at home”. However, the years around 1888 also show a decline of steamers. The fluctuations were due to good freight contracts in 1887 were Chinese merchants chartered seven German steamers for the coolie transport to Singapore and almost monthly departed from Xiamen. Additionally, the China Merchant Co. chartered the *Chow Chow Foo*<sup>412</sup> with which the company arrived 9 times in Xiamen in this year. Three smaller steamers were rented by a Chinese merchant for the trade with Tamsui with which he arrived five times in Xiamen.<sup>413</sup>

That the number of steamers did not drop further in 1888 was due to the Deli coolie transport that was opened by the Pasedag & Co. and Petersen & Co. which accounted for 7 additional entrances. In 1889 10 German steamers transported in 38 journeys 5486 coolies from Xiamen, Shantou, and Hongkong to Deli.<sup>414</sup> However, that did not help the sailing ships, which continued to further decrease in 1889 and resulted in another low point.

Also in the next years German shipping did not have an opportunity to recover. Regular lines such as the Osaka Shosen Kaisha in 1890 further displaced sailing ships from the coast trade. In the same year the coolie transport to Deli stopped and the number of vessels came to a an unprecedented low of 114 declarations. In 1891 the German consul blamed the regular British lines, but also Finnish, Japanese, and Spanish lines for the decline of importance of German shipping. Still, he had hope in German shipping and its positive outview “only due to the higher increase of steamers”.<sup>415</sup>

Until 1895 about 80 percent of the German vessels were already steamers. In 1890, 1892, and 1893 the number of German ships in Xiamen were again in an unprecedented low. Still, the total tonnage of ships in 1895 was on a before unreached high. This is explained by the steamers which were rapidly increasing in size and had an average tonnage of over 986 tons in 1896, as compared with 849 the year before and 793 in

<sup>410</sup>Eberstein, *Hamburg-China. Geschichte einer Partnerschaft* 103.

<sup>411</sup>PA AA R 252844: 164.

<sup>412</sup>The *Chow Chow Foo* belonged to the Steamboat Company Shantou, see Section 8.4.

<sup>413</sup>BArch R 901/5147 Shipping Report 1888.

<sup>414</sup>BArch R 901/5147 Shipping Report 1889.

<sup>415</sup>BArch R 901/5148 Shipping Report 14891.

1894.

In 1896 Taiwan was the first year completely under Japanese control. It is surprising that the number of charters had not already declined in 1896, when the Japanese temporarily occupied Niuzhang.<sup>416</sup> Xiamen was a strategical point for the Japanese and their efforts to gain influence were also visible through their shipping efforts. The German consul could not predict this but commented again on the big steamer companies with high capitals and big fleets that “have been disturbing the German shipping business for a couple of years.”<sup>417</sup>




Figure 30: German Annual Declarations Steamers and Sailing Ships 1872-1914

In the last few years before 1900 the number of declarations was still relatively high. However, the numbers were highly influenced by single big charter contracts and not, as earlier, by the declarations of the numerous smaller shipping companies. In 1896 M. Jebsen contributed over 30 percent of the shipping, in 1897 the Chinese Coastline Company over 33 percent, in 1898 almost 55 percent, and in 1899 over 49 percent.

Between 1895 and 1896 during the First Sino-Japanese War the China Merchant Steam Navigation Co. chartered several German steamers for the route Xiamen-Singapore. In 1897 the company did not extend the contract and German shipping traffic declined.<sup>418</sup> The previous chapter showed that M. Jebsen contributed over 30 percent of shipping in 1897. Probably, his steamers had been chartered for the coolie transport.

In 1897 quarantine regulations in all East Asian harbors for ships from Xiamen resulted in a decline of shipping. In 1898 the Osaka Shosen Kaisha started its new coast

<sup>416</sup>BArch R 901/5149 Shipping Report 1895, Shipping Report 1896.

<sup>417</sup>BArch R 901/5149 Shipping Report 1896.

<sup>418</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1904.

lines under government subsidizing. Referring to the Osaka Shosen Kaisha the German consul still commented that an “inevitable freight rate war” had to break out with the Douglas company<sup>419</sup> but did not realize that the shipping line would also result in a decline of German shipping.

By 1898 most of the German sailing vessels had been replaced, as indicated by over 90 percent steamers in 1897 and almost 96 percent in 1898. No German ships were chartered for the coolie transport to Singapore in this year. However, the British Douglas Steamship Company chartered two German steamer in 1898 and 1899.<sup>420</sup> The company probably chartered the ships from the Chinese Coastline Company which had a high increase of traffic from 1897 to 1899. Its ships *Nanyang* and *Swatow* operated on the route and represented up to 55 percent of German shipping. If the British company would not have chartered the ships, German shipping would have reached the low point of 1900 already several years before.

A comment of the German consul regarding the decline of German shipping serves as a good summarization of the decade: “The decline of German shipping is nowhere in China so apparent as it is here here. While a few decades ago Xiamen occupied the first place it is now on the seventh place, and if no changes occur, then it can be expected that it will further decline. The reason for the decline of German shipping in Xiamen, probably in all of China’s treaty ports, is that regular English and Chinese [the Osaka Shosen Kaisha from Taiwan] lines constantly win terrain and displace the German coast steamers which primarily operate as monthly charter ships.” According to the consul, the only solution would be to have regular lines by shipping or trading companies. At the same time he still emphasized that “German ships are still popular among the Chinese and are always preferred if they offer the same conditions as the other nations.”<sup>421</sup>

An abrupt decline of German steamers was visible starting from 1900. Many reasons influenced the abrupt decline in this year. In 1900, the Japanese invaded Xiamen and many Chinese fled from the city<sup>422</sup> which disturbed the chartering business in this year. Additionally, German shipping companies such as NDL, HAPAG, and Rickmers were involved in the transport of the international corps to fight against the Boxer rebellion. However, the invasion of Gulangyu and the Boxer rebellion were events which only influenced the decline in this year.

The German aggressions and military involvement through the lease of Jiaozhou in 1898 and the involvement in the fight against the Boxer rebellion in 1900 might have negatively influenced chartering contracts. However, the main decline is strongly related to the rising of Japanese steamers of Osaka Shosen Kaisha. While until 1898 the number of Japanese ships was negligible, it skyrocketed starting from 1899. Osaka Shosen Kaisha steamers were subsidized by the Formosan government, while the German government only subsidized the Imperial Post Steamer to Shanghai and Hongkong.

When the Chinese merchants which fled the city in 1900 came back, they probably did not have a hard choice and mostly changed to the cheap regular steamer shipping lines from Osaka Shosen Kaisha.

A small decrease in German shipping after 1900 was also caused since the Royal

<sup>419</sup>BArch R 901/5149 Shipping Report 1897 and 1898.

<sup>420</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1904.

<sup>421</sup>BArch R 901/5149 Shipping Report 1897 and 1898.

<sup>422</sup>The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, “Japanese at Amoy”.

Dutch Petroleum Shipping traffic was no longer in the hands of the Germans, and instead Dutch and British ships carried the petroleum.<sup>423</sup>

### 9.3.2 Big German Shipping lines: 1901 to 1911

After 1900 most ships were from HAPAG, NDL, and probably M. Jebsen. Smaller charter ships had mostly vanished as the high average tonnage shows. Also the previous chapter shows that most of the small shipping companies vanished and were not replaced by new ones. While the tonnage in the years starting from 1900 might still suggest that the shipping did not change a lot, the declarations show that only the average sizes of the vessels increased.

HAPAG and NDL already appeared in 1899 but through the distortions of the Boxer rebellion the NDL did not anchor in Xiamen in 1900 and the HAPAG only with a few ships. Even then, the HAPAG contributed over 16 percent of the German ships in that year.

While in 1903, Chinese merchants chartered some German steamers to operate between Xiamen and Singapore, they retreated again in 1904.<sup>424</sup>

As mentioned above, from the 280 declarations in 1904 and 260 in 1905, 244 and 232 respectively go on the account of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, which chartered German steamers for their coast line. The German shipping growth was thus only a temporary phenomenon. Instead, the war led the HAPAG to stop its regular coast line that it initiated just in 1903. The NDL initiated a regular line to Singapore in mid 1904 which did not gain much importance.

In 1905, of 28 declarations 14 were attributed to the NDL, 6 to the HAPAG, 4 to German steamers which transported tea to New York, and 2 to the coast trade. The two coast trade declarations fell on one steamer which was carrying bean cake from Niuzhang.<sup>425</sup> While now the coolie business of NDL and HAPAG gained the most importance, the coast trade that had been most important before nearly vanished. As already mentioned, in 1905 Butterfield & Swire opened a line to Yantai and Niuzhang giving a final death blow to the German coast trade.

For 1907 the German consul mentioned that the freight for the coast trade was mainly transported by regular lines. However, at this time the NDL and HAPAG did no longer operate such lines. Additionally, a “noteworthy profit for the shipping companies was impossible”<sup>426</sup> which was again due to the competition between the regular shipping lines.

The small peak in ships and tonnage in 1910 was caused by the chartering of eight German steamers by a Chinese company for the trade between Xiamen and Niuzhang. Of the 33 German entrances, still 13 go onto the account of the chartering.<sup>427</sup>

After that, Butterfield & Swire took over with its line to Niuzhang. The drop in 1911 was caused by the selling of two steamers of the HAPAG, that were before operating on this route.<sup>428</sup>

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<sup>423</sup>PA AA R 9208/953 173.

<sup>424</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1904.

<sup>425</sup>BArch R 901/5150 Shipping Report 1905.

<sup>426</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1907.

<sup>427</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1910.

<sup>428</sup>PA AA R 9208/954 22.

### 9.3.3 Stillstand: 1912 until the end of the First World War

With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, maritime exchange between China and Germany immediately stopped and no vessels arrived between 1915 and 1919.

However, maritime exchange at this time was already negligible with 8 declarations (4 ships) in 1912, and 22 declarations (11 ships) in 1913. The big shipping companies thus mostly already gave up to anchor with their ships in Xiamen, since no profit was possible. In 1914 four German ships went with coolies to Singapore, and one brought coals from Japan and returned to there.<sup>429</sup>

Also the ships of the smaller companies had been completely displaced before 1912. In 1911 Pasedag & Co. could not even charter German steamers for single journeys or monthly rentals and instead had to use British, Norwegian, and Japanese steamers.<sup>430</sup>

The only German ship that remained in the harbor of Xiamen during the First World War was the *Keongwai* of the NDL, which was seized in 1917 by the Chinese government.

## 9.4 Conclusion

German shipping continuously declined in Xiamen. While before 1870 German shipping still contributed over 20 percent of the total shipping, before the First World War in 1912 it even contributed less than half a percent.

The factors involved in the explanation of German shipping traffic are various. The factors internal to the German shipping community, such as the competition between them, were already discussed in the previous chapter. There were also external factors, relative to the other nations that influenced the decline of German shipping. First of all, German shipping companies primarily relied on sailing ships when the other nations, particularly the British, mostly already had transitioned to steamers. Also, the German vessels were smaller than the other nation's sailing ships and steamers. This combination initially complemented regular shipping lines since German ships were most often chartered and did not go on journeys on their own account. They were used by Chinese and British merchants in the coast trade and for coolie transport. However, chartering contracts were irregular and the German shipping traffic fluctuated each year. Regular lines slowly started to displace the German ships and in the German transition period from sailing ships to steamers, the growth rate of steamers was lower than the decline of sailing ships. The competition grew when the Osaka Shosen Kaisha initiated its coast lines and the first victims of the expansion were the German charter companies. Additionally, higher consulate fares and the "Chinese Immigration Ordinance" in Singapore 1903 ensured for additional disadvantages to German charter companies.

Overall, German shipping in Xiamen can be categorized in three periods. The first period was from 1864 to 1900 when German sailing vessels were substituted by steamers and regular shipping lines started to slowly displace German shipping. Up to 1900, not only sailing ships had completely vanished but through the competition also smaller steamer companies got displaced. In 1901 to 1911 only big German shipping companies remained in Xiamen. The NDL and HAPAG which appeared a few years before belonged to these companies but also the ships of M. Jebsen still were chartered, e.g., during the Russo-Japanese War. The big shipping companies could not gain a strong

<sup>429</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1912.

<sup>430</sup>BArch 5036 Trade Report 1911.

foothold. After initial efforts to establish regular lines themselves, they could not make profit and were displaced by the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, and other regular shipping lines. When the First World War started German shipping had already mostly vanished from Xiamen.



## Chapter Ten Conclusions

The thesis relies on German and English materials to argue the extent of German involvement in Xiamen after the First Opium War. It shows that the local involvement was minor and that German interests focused on the shipping business.

The first treaty between China and Germany was the Treaty of Tientsin signed in 1861 which also opened Xiamen for Germany. Unexpectedly, a German population was already present, German ships frequented the harbor, and even a merchant consul acted in representation of the German interests.

The merchant C. J. Pasedag was the first consul in 1859 and abused his position. In 1874 Richard Krauel took over as the first professional German consul. In the meanwhile also the German empire had been founded. Subsequently, Germany began to expand its national interests to China and established the East Asia Squadron in 1876 as its navy in East Asia and the Imperial Post Steamer in 1886 which offered a regular connection to China.

In 1886 the East Asia Squadron was used in Xiamen to bring back sugar boiling pans that before had been confiscated by the local Chinese authorities in the “Sugar Boiling Pan Incident”. Also in the “Japanese Scare” in 1900 a German warship from the East Asia Squadron helped to fend off a potential Japanese invasion. Regrettably, it were also German sailors of a warship that destroyed a local sight in the “Rocking Stone Incident” in 1908 which ensured disapproval among the Chinese population.

The Imperial Post Steamer had no direct connection with Xiamen but the later important shipping companies NDL and HAPAG started their expansion to East Asia with it. Also M. Jebsen often arrived with ships in Xiamen and was subsidized by the German government for a coast post line in China.

Xiamen was of central interest for the German navy for its excellent harbor, and warships anchored every year. Richard Krauel already noted that Xiamen would become important as a later provision magazine when he was still in Fuzhou. A provision magazine received serious consideration in 1875 but the early plans were too extensive and the project was stopped, since a German provision magazine in East Asia was not really needed yet.

However, with the ascent of Wilhelm II Germany wanted to make “world policy” and started to look for a navy port in East Asia. Xiamen as an international settlement was again considered and investigations brought the result that the British would not prevent a German concession on the island. Although Xiamen stood on the verge of becoming a German concession, in 1897 Germany seized Jiaozhou instead.

It is not unexpected that local German life was very limited, since it mostly stayed unmentioned by British and American fellows. There were never more than 50 Germans living on the island. In 1864 12 Germans were registered, and in 1875 the number increased to 43. The local German population were primarily merchants but also catered to the people living on the island. Many Germans acted in double roles and often had an administrative or honorary position besides their work, such as in the Municipal Council, as consul for other nations, or in the German court.

Buildings associated with Germany were two consulate buildings, one of them being the office and the other one the mansion of the consul. These are the only two German buildings for which the location is still known today. Germany had a post office, but it only existed by name since it was housed in the consulate office. The *New Amoy Hotel*

existed for some time and was led by a German. Apart from that, there were several private properties by local German trading houses and residents. As a comparison, even the German company Siemssen & Co. in Fuzhou alone held more property than all German properties in Xiamen taken together.

Contributions to social life were few. Mostly undocumented, the consul worker Budler established the Bowen Academy as the first public library in Xiamen in 1875. Also, Germany supported the establishment of the Municipal Council in 1903 which initially had a German member. Apart from that, Germans did not invest in education, hospitals, or churches. Mostly unknown today is that German Basel Mission would have had a golden opportunity to send a missionary to Quanzhou but showed no interest. Infamously known is that in the “Borck Case” H. E. Borck stole a large sum from the Imperial Chinese Post Office in 1911.

There were never more than a handful of German trading houses in Xiamen. A peak was in 1881 with three German companies. The most important German company was Pasedag & Co. which engaged in many kinds of business fields and acted as an agency, in import and export, coolie trade, ship chartering, and coast trade. It was the only company that also sometimes got mentioned by non-Germans. Petersen & Co., which came into existence later, had a similar business field. Together, the two companies initiated a direct Deli coolie emigration in 1888 which was stopped two years later. Gerard & Co. known through the “Sugar Boiling Pan Incident” tried to establish a pan factory and also had a small furnace. Apart from that he was active as a grocer.

It is difficult to assess the volume of trade between Xiamen and China since the trade was indirect and went over Hongkong. What is clear is that Xiamen did not provide export products for Germany. Also German import products were few, and included dyes, beer and other alcoholics, as well as “sundries”. The Krupp steel factory sold Krupp cannons to Xiamen which were, e.g., used to equip Fort Hulishan. It cannot be clearly answered whether German merchants were involved in the opium trade. Surprisingly, the main quantity of cocaine and morphine stemmed from Germany. Xiamen was the main trading hub for these drugs in China, since coolies smuggled it from there to Singapore in their hand luggage.

Local life and trade was highly focused on shipping. The German professional consulate was established to support German shipping interests and when shipping declined around 1900, it was discussed to relocate the professional consul back to Fuzhou. At this time, also the population declined and only amounted 26 persons in 1905. Both the consul and German court mainly had to deal with shipping matters and the merchants operated in the chartering business and coast trade. This is a unique characteristic of Xiamen. For example, the nearby port of Fuzhou was important for the tea trade and less important for shipping, and Qingdao for the railroad construction business.

There was a big variety of German shipping companies operating in Xiamen. This was not unusual for China, and also other sources report a multitude of smaller coast shipping companies. For most years until 1900 only few companies continuously appeared in Xiamen with a high number of ships. Exceptions were the Chinese Coastline Company which appeared often between 1897 and 1899 and M. Jebsen during 1895 and 1896. However, the chartering business only temporarily caused high increases in shipping. After 1880 the small shipping companies started to vanish from Xiamen and after 1900 only big shipping companies remained.

This was also true for the local shipping companies which managed to operate longer

than the other small to middle-sized shipping companies. Pasedag & Co. and Petersen & Co. could not easily change their location and thus kept operating their ships which were mostly sailing vessels. However, until 1900 they also had to sell their ships and from then on chartered ships themselves.

Reasons internal to the German shipping community regarding the disappearance of the smaller German shipping companies were the competition between the shipping lines, but also natural disasters. Particularly, the HAPAG and NDL took over many small and middle-sized shipping companies which did not have a chance against the two shipping giants.

After 1900 mainly the HAPAG and NDL were able to remain with their big steamers, after they had appeared only two years before. However, they mainly operated in the coolie transport, and the coast trade which had been in German hands for a long time was overtaken by other nations' regular shipping lines.

German shipping in Xiamen continuously decreased from the opening of the port. Before 1870 German shipping contributed over 20 percent of the total shipping in Xiamen but before the First World War in 1912 less than half a percent. Especially in absolute numbers, the shipping decreased. Also other sources note a decline of German shipping in China. However, the explanation that other nations' steamers simply displaced the sailing ships is an oversimplification.

External reasons for the extinction of German shipping include that Germany relied on sailing boats for a long time while the other nations primarily used steamers. However, it is not the only one. German ships in Xiamen were generally smaller than the ones of other nations. Additionally, the German consul fees were high and the emigration fee for Singapore higher than for British vessels due to the Chinese Immigration Ordinance. Initially, the chartering business complemented regular shipping lines and German ships were often chartered by Chinese and British merchants. However, when competition between regular shipping lines grew the German ships were the first ships that were displaced.

Especially the Osaka Shosen Kaisha was responsible for the displacement of the German ships. The company started its first coast line in 1890 and extended it with further lines in 1898. In all these years, the increase of Japanese ships highly correlated with the German decrease of steamers. Additionally, in 1905 Butterfield & Swire monopolized a line to Yantai and Niuzhang which was the main port for coast trade in which German ships had been used before.

The period of German shipping can be roughly divided into three phases. In the first phase between 1864 up to 1900 Germany transitioned from sailing ships to steamers. However, the decline of sailing ships was higher than the increase of steamers, and smaller shipping companies were displaced by regular shipping lines. From 1901 to 1911 mostly only the two shipping giants HAPAG and NDL anchored in Xiamen. However, they could not make much profit due to the high competition and primarily transported coolies from there to Singapore. In the last phase starting from 1912, German shipping was practically dead.

The thesis investigated local life and German interests in Xiamen and concludes that shipping was most important for Germans in Xiamen. That Germany was involved in the shipping, especially in the coolie transport and coast trade, is widely known. However, a major contribution of this thesis is the explanation of the development of German shipping and important factors involved. To the best knowledge of the author, this is

the first attempt to generalize the German shipping traffic in a harbor of a Chinese treaty port over a longer period of the time, and the first attempt to provide a thorough list of factors that influenced German shipping.

Besides that, the thesis also gives general information of shipping in Xiamen to compare German shipping with the other nation's shipping traffic and characteristics. The thesis investigated the average tonnage of the boats, the ratio of steamers to sailing ships, and the number of declarations of German, British, Japanese, and other nation's vessels. It presented that shipping development such as the Osaka Shosen Kaisha's subsidized expansion affected not only German shipping but also led to the British decline of shipping.

Characterizing shipping from a perspective from Xiamen is important to gain an overview of German shipping in China. Many of the small and middle-sized shipping companies that operated in the coast trade in China could not be found in literature and describing them from a perspective of Xiamen is a first step towards investigating their history. But also the history of the big shipping companies like HAPAG or NDL has gaps since many materials were destroyed during the Second World War. This thesis explored their contributions in Xiamen.

Additionally, the thesis uncovered many facts from German materials which are important to explain the history of Gulangyu and Xiamen. Until now, mainly Chinese, British, and American materials have been used to investigate the history of Gulangyu. The sources naturally focus on their own nation's contributions or on the nations present in a larger extent in Xiamen. However, nations with a smaller population also lived in and contributed to the life in the international settlement. This thesis is a step towards the goal to describe international life in Gulangyu.

The thesis also opened many new questions regarding local life. Since Germans acted as consuls for many other nations it is interesting to ask how "international" Gulangyu really was. Were there mostly Chinese, Japanese, British, and American inhabitants on the island? Were Germans one of the bigger minorities among the other nations that were present in a minor extent?

Events wait to be interpreted from sources of other nations. For example, German sources present the "Sugar Boiling Pan Incident" as a disobedience of the Chinese local authorities towards the central government in Beijing since they did not hand back the sugar pans as requested. Was this really the truth or just an excuse used by the Germans? The German consul represented the Deli coolie emigration initiated by German companies in a very favorable light. However, the protests signify that the "free emigration" to Deli between 1888 and 1890 was not necessarily true. Did Chinese or other nation's sources record any variations regarding the method of emigration? Was the "Japanese Scare" really just a pretext to invade Xiamen or do Japanese sources suggest another course?

For German history it is also interesting to see how Germans shaped the treaty port landscape in Xiamen. The thesis presented that the extent of local involvement was minor with a small population and a low number of establishments. Still, the "Sugar Boiling Pan Incident", the "Rocking Stone Incident" and the "Borck Case" were events caused by Germans. The thesis also demonstrated that neither the Basel Mission nor other missions were involved in Xiamen, although they would have had a good opportunity.

What was perhaps most surprising to find out is that Germany seems to have been

the main supplier of morphine and cocaine to China, and that Xiamen was the biggest importer of these drugs in China. Even though the current thesis could not investigate the extent of the drug trade in detail, it might well serve as a starting point for further research on this intriguing topic. Whether German merchants were involved in the opium trade in Xiamen could not be answered with certainty. To investigate further into this question, most likely Chinese or other materials would have to be evaluated.

## List of Figures

1	Stamp of the German Consulate in Xiamen next to Merz's signature <sup>431</sup>	16
2	Earlier Seal of the German (Prussian) Consulate in Xiamen <sup>432</sup>	17
3	German Post Offices in China 1902 <sup>433</sup>	22
4	The East Asia Squadron in Xiamen 1896 <sup>434</sup> (by Courtesy of William Brown)	24
5	German Consulate Mansion on Gulangyu at Around 1898 <sup>435</sup>	35
6	German Consulate Office on Gulangyu <sup>436</sup>	36
7	Map of Gulangyu 1908 <sup>437</sup> (by Courtesy of William Brown)	37
8	The Pasedag House <sup>438</sup> (by Courtesy of Thomas H. Hahn)	38
9	Map of Xiamen from the Fourth Decennial Maritime Report 1912-1921 <sup>439</sup>	39
10	Gerard's and Andersen's Properties Around 1875 <sup>440</sup>	40
11	New Amoy Hotel Around 1908 <sup>441</sup>	44
12	Back Side of the Rocking Stone <sup>442</sup> (by Courtesy of Antiquariate Unverferth)	48
13	Front Side of the Rocking Stone <sup>443</sup>	49
14	German Asiatic Bank Advertisement 1914 <sup>444</sup>	52
15	German Opium Likin 1887-1919	68
16	M. Jebsen's Steamer <i>Clara Jebsen</i> (by Courtesy of Museum Sønderjyllands)	75
17	Heinrich Wilhelm Clausen's Barque <i>Therese</i> Around 1876 <sup>445</sup> (by Courtesy of Museum Eckernförde)	90
18	German Shipping Companies and Number of Entries of Their Ships 1886-1900	94
19	Total Shipping Tonnage 1863-1919	97

<sup>431</sup>PA AA R 141824.

<sup>432</sup>PA AA R 252845.

<sup>433</sup>Germany. Reichspostministerium, *Postarchiv*, vol. 31 (1903), 84.

<sup>434</sup>*Illustrierte Zeitung*, "Das deutsche Geschwader auf der Rhede von Amoy (China)" (09 Mar. 1896): 562-563.

<sup>435</sup>G. Franzius and W. Röse, *Kiautschou, Deutschlands Erwerbung in Ostasien* (Schall & Grund, 1898) 89.

<sup>436</sup>Philip Wilson Pitcher, *In and about Amoy. Some historical and other facts connected with one of the first open ports in China*, Second Edition (The Methodist Publishing House in China. Shanghai and Foochow, 1912) 42.

<sup>437</sup>William N. Brown, *Discover Gulangyu* (Xiamen University Press, 2005) 16.

<sup>438</sup>Thomas H. Hahn, "Pasedag House" (06 Jan. 2012), <<http://hahn.zenfolio.com/p147681789/h15c67505>>.

<sup>439</sup>中國第二歷史檔案館, 中國海關總署辦公廳, *Amoy. Decennial Report, 1912-1921*, 中國舊海關史料 (1859-1948) (北京:京華出版社, 2001) 155.

<sup>440</sup>BArch R 901/22575, Bl. 32.

<sup>441</sup>A. Wright and H.A. Cartwright, *Twentieth century impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other treaty ports of China: their history, people, commerce, industries, and resources*, vol. 1 (Lloyds Greater Britain publishing company, 1908) 828.

<sup>442</sup>Unknown, "China Japan Lackalbum Album Kaiserliche Marine 1907 - 1909 Kolonien" (1909), <<http://www.benl.ebay.be/itm/China-Japan-Lackalbum-Album-Kaiserliche-Marine-1907-1909-Kolonien-/111289480955>>.

<sup>443</sup>Philip Wilson Pitcher, *In and about Amoy. Some historical and other facts connected with one of the first open ports in China*, Second Edition (The Methodist Publishing House in China. Shanghai and Foochow, 1912) 244.

<sup>444</sup>The Straits Times, "Banking. Deutsch-Asiatische Bank." (03 Sept. 1914), <<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19140903-1.2.93.1.aspx>>: 14.

<sup>445</sup>Museum Eckernförde Inv. Nr. 2015/010 (Foto: Museum).

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20	Declarations of German Ships 1863-1919 . . . . .	98
21	Tonnage of German Ships 1863-1919 . . . . .	99
22	Declarations of Norwegian Ships 1901-1907 . . . . .	100
23	Percentage of German Steamers 1872-1914 . . . . .	101
24	German, British, and Japanese Percentage of Steamers 1863-1819 . . . .	102
25	Average Tonnage of German Ships 1863-1915 . . . . .	103
26	Average Tonnage of German Steamers and Sailing Ships 1863-1914 . . .	103
27	German, British, and Japanese Average Tonnage Sailing Ships 1863-1910	104
28	German, British, and Japanese Average Tonnage Steamers 1863-1914 . .	105
29	German, British, and Japanese Percentage of Total Tonnage in Xiamen 1863-1919 . . . . .	109
30	German Annual Declarations Steamers and Sailing Ships 1872-1914 . .	111

## List of Tables

1	List of Germans in Xiamen 1864 . . . . .	31
2	German Population in China and Xiamen 1849-1917 . . . . .	32
3	Number of German Firms in China and Xiamen 1850-1919 . . . . .	55
4	Number of Foreign Firms in 1902 . . . . .	57
5	Fields of Inquiries Regarding the Establishment of Busines Connections in 1907 . . . . .	62
6	Partial List of <i>M. Jebsen</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . .	75
7	Partial List of <i>Steamship Company "Globus"</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . . .	76
8	Partial List of <i>Steamboat Company Shantou</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . . .	76
9	Partial List of <i>Sartori &amp; Berger</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 .	77
10	Partial List of <i>M. Struve</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . .	78
11	Partial List of <i>Flensburger Steam Company of 1869</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . . .	78
12	Partial List of <i>Asiatic Coast Company</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886- 1900 . . . . .	79
13	Partial List of <i>Rickmers Shipping Company</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . . .	80
14	Partial List of <i>Chinese Coastline Company</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . . .	80
15	Partial List of <i>R. Wahl</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . . .	81
16	Partial List of <i>W. Wahl</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . . .	81
17	Partial List of <i>R. M. Flomann</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . .	82
18	Partial List of <i>HAPAG</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . . .	83
19	Partial List of <i>NDL</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . . .	85
20	Partial List of <i>Pasedag &amp; Co.</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . .	87
21	Partial List of <i>Petersen &amp; Co.</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . .	87
22	Partial List of <i>H. A. Petersen</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . .	88
23	Partial List of <i>Holm</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . . .	88
24	Partial List of <i>L. P. Michelsen</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . .	89
25	Partial List of <i>A. E. Hertz</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900 . . . .	91
26	Partial List of <i>Köper Docke &amp; Co.</i> Ships That Arrived in Xiamen 1886-1900	92



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## A Timeline


































- 1841 – British Fleet Captures Xiamen
- 1842 – Treaty of Nanking (England): Beginning of the “Treaty War”
- 1853 – Georg Th. Siemssen Advocates a Hamburger Consulate
- 1854 – Founding of Pasedag & Co.
- 1859 – First German Merchant Consul C. J. Pasedag
- 1861 – Treaty of Tientsin: Official Opening of Xiamen for Germany
- 1864 – 12 Germans in Xiamen
- 1869 – Opening of the Suez Canal
- 1871 – Founding of the German Empire
- 1874 – Purchase of the German Consulate Grounds
  - First German Professional Consul Richard Krauel
- 1875 – Peak of 43 Germans in Xiamen
  - Bowen Academy as the First Public Library Founded by Budler
  - Stosch Gives a Suggestion to Establish a Storage Magazine in Xiamen
- 1876 – Establishment of the East Asia Squadron
- 1880 – Supplementary Entry: Revision of the Treaty of Tientsin
- 1881 – Three German Companies in Xiamen
- 1886 – Small Shipping Companies Contribute the Most German Shipping Traffic
  - German Warship Crew Returns Seized Pans → “Sugar Boiling Pan Incident”
  - First German Imperial Post Steamer
- 1888 – Direct Coolie Emigration to Deli Organized by German Merchants
- 1890 – End of the Direct Deli Emigration
- 1896 – Finished Installment of Krupp cannons in Hulishan
  - Local German Shipping Companies Had Mostly Lost Importance
  - M. Jebesen Contributes Over 30 Percent of Shipping
- 1897 – Seizing of Qingdao
  - Chinese Coastline Company Contributes Over 33 Percent of Shipping




























































- 
- 1898 • Chinese Coastline Company Contributes Over 55 Percent of Shipping
  - Convention for the Lease of Kiaochow
  - 1899 • Doubling of the Frequency of the Imperial Post Steamer
  - Chinese Coastline Company Contributes Over 55 Percent of Shipping
  - HAPAG and NDL Appear in Xiamen
  - 1900 • Transportation of an International Corps due to the Boxer Rebellion
  - Low Point in Shipping Traffic
  - Unsuccessful Japanese Invasion in Xiamen → “Japanese Scare”
  - 1902 • Establishment of the German Post Office
  - 1903 • Establishment of the International Settlement on Gulangyu
  - Decrease to Around 20 Germans in Xiamen
  - 1908 • High Duties on Cocaine which Mainly Came from Germany
  - German Sailors Destroy the Rocking Stone → “Rocking Stone Incident”
  - 1909 • Ban on Morphine which Mainly Came from Germany
  - 1911 • Pasedag & Co. as the Only German Company
  - Borck Steals from the Imperial Chinese Post Office → “Borck Case”
  - 1912 • Effective Stillstand of German Shipping
  - 1914 • First World War
  - Complete Stillstand of German Shipping
  - Seizure of Qingdao by the Japanese
  - 1917 • Confiscation of Pasedag & Co. and the Steamer *Keongwai*
  - 1919 • Treaty of Versailles
-

## B Geographical Glossary

Beijing		北京	
			. 5, 9, 12, 21, 23, 51, 52, 119
		Peking	
Fujian		福建	
		Fukien, Foukien	. iv, 3, 5, 15, 17, 61, 62, 65,
			68, 70
Fuzhou		福州	
		Foochow, Fuchow, Fuh-chau, Fuh-Chow, Hock Chew, Hokchew	. iv, 6, 8, 9, 15–18, 20, 21,
		Futschau, Futschou	29, 33, 59, 61, 64, 66, 70, 72, 75, 84, 99, 107, 108, 116, 117, 135
Guangdong		广东	
		Kwangtun, Kwangtung, (Canton)	. 68, 82
		(Kanton)	
Guangzhou		广州	
		Canton, Kwangchow	. 8, 9, 17, 21, 41, 52, 56, 74,
		Kanton	80, 83
Gulangyu		鼓浪屿	
		KuLangHsu, Ko-long-soo, Ko-long-su	. iv, 1, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 25,
			26, 29, 30, 34–37, 40, 42, 47, 50, 65, 112, 119, 121, 132, 138
Hainan		海南	
			. 9, 18, 135
			
Hangzhou		杭州	
		Hangchow	. 21
			

Hankou	 汉口	
	 Hankow	. 6, 9, 10, 21, 41, 51, 52, 56
	 Hangkau, Hankau	
Hongkong	 香港	
	 Hong Kong	. iv, 2, 19–21, 24, 25, 27, 30,
		42, 45, 46, 52, 56, 57, 61, 64, 71, 74, 79–85, 91, 92, 107, 108, 110, 112, 117
Hulishan	 胡里山	
		. iv, 2, 6, 51, 65, 66, 72, 117,
		131, 138
Jiaozhou	 胶州	
	 Kiaochow, Kiauchau, Kiao-Chau	. 9, 10, 20, 21, 27–29, 52, 53,
	 Kiautschou	74, 82–84, 112, 116
Jinan	 济南	
	 Tsinan, Tsinanfu	. 41, 52
		
Jinmen	 金门	
	 Quemoy, Jinmen, Kin-mun, Golden Gate, Chin-men	. 27, 28
	 Kinmen, Goldenes Tor	
Jiujiang	 九江	
	 Kiukiang, Kew Keang	. 9
		
Liaodong	 辽东	
	 Liaodong	. 9
	 Liaotung	
Nanao Island	 南澳岛	
	 Island of Namoah, Namoah	. 27, 28
		
Ningbo	 宁波	
	 Ningpo, Mingchow	. 8, 9, 58, 75
		
Niuzhang	 牛庄	
	 Newchwang	. 9, 81, 84, 86, 89, 106, 107,
	 Niutschwang	110, 111, 113, 118

Penglai		蓬莱	
		Tengchow	. 9
		Tengtschau	
Port Arthur		旅顺口	
		Lyushunkou	. 2, 28, 82, 84
		Lüshunkou, Lüshun	
Qingdao		青岛	
			. 2, 6, 9, 13, 15, 18, 20, 24,
		Tsingtau, Tsingtao	
Qiongzhou		27–29, 41, 52, 74, 117, 131, 132	
		琼州	
		Kiungchow, (Qiongshan), (Kiungshan)	. 9
Quanzhou		Kiongtschau	
		泉州	
		Chinchew, Taitun, Zeitun, Zayton, Chwan-chew, Cuänchow, Chüan-chou, Zaytoun	. 41, 50, 117
Sansha			
		三沙湾	
		Samsah (north of Fuzhou, not the one belonging to Hainan)	. 27
Shandong			
		山东	
		Shantung	. 2, 10, 28, 41, 52, 65
Shanghai		Schantung, Schandong	
		上海	
			. 8, 9, 16, 17, 19–21, 25, 27,
Shanhaiguan		Schanghai	
		30, 41, 52, 56, 64, 74, 80, 82–84, 107, 108, 112	
		山海关	
Shantou		Shan-hai-kwan, Shan-hai-kuan	. 21
		Schanhaikwan	
		汕头	
Shantou		Swatow, Suatao	. 9, 27, 63, 64, 75, 79, 81, 84,
		Tschau-Tschau	
		85, 99, 107, 108, 110	

Tainan	 台南	
	 . 9, 81, 107	
	 Taiwanfu	
Taiwan	 台湾	
	 Formosa	. 15, 23, 28, 32, 46, 57, 58,
		
	61, 67, 72, 98, 104, 107–109, 111, 112	
Tamsui	 淡水	
	 Tanshui, Tamsui, Danshui, Dan-	. 2, 9, 17, 46, 67, 99, 107,
	shuei, Tamshui	
		
	110	
Tanggu	 塘沽	
	 Tongku	. 21
		
Tianjin	 天津	
	 Tientsin	. 6, 9, 10, 20, 21, 52, 56, 74,
		
	82, 83	
Weihai	 威海(威海卫)	
	 Weihaiwai, Port Edward	. 10
		
Xiamen	 厦门	
	 Amoy, Hea-mun, Drum Wave	
	Islet, Piano Island, Isle of Music,	
	Museum of International Archi-	. iv, 1–21, 23–33, 37, 39–43,
	tecture, Hia-mun, before 1400:	
	Ka-ho-su, Tiong-tso-so, Lo-kang	
	 Amoi	
	45–48, 50–53, 55–68, 70–93, 95–102, 104–123, 131, 132	
Yangtze River	 长江	
	 Chang Jiang, Yangtze, Yangzi	. 79, 82, 84
		
Yantai	 烟台	
	 Chefoo, Cheefoo	. 20, 21, 74, 82, 83, 106, 107,
	 Tschifu	
	110, 113, 118	

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Zhangzhou		漳州	
		Chiang-Chiu,	Chang-Chou, . 52, 66
		Chang-chew, Lung-chi	
Zhenjiang			
		镇江	
		Chinkiang,	Chenkiang, . 9, 10, 21, 84
		Jingjiang, Kingkiang, Jingkou	
Zhoushan Island		Tschinkiang	
		舟山岛	
		Chusan	. 27, 28
			

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